Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations

University Graduate School

3-6-2012

History and Evolutionary Trajectory of the Iranian
Nuclear Program
Mohammad Homayounvash
Florida International University

DOI: 10.25148/etd.FI12050230
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Recommended Citation
Homayounvash, Mohammad, "History and Evolutionary Trajectory of the Iranian Nuclear Program" (2012). FIU Electronic Theses and
Dissertations. 624.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/624

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Miami, Florida

HISTORY AND EVOLUTIONARY TRAJECTORY OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR
PROGRAM

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
by
Mohammad Homayounvash

To:

Dean Kenneth Furton
College of Arts and Sciences

This dissertation, written by Mohammad Homayounvash, and entitled History and
Evolutionary Trajectory of the Iranian Nuclear Program, having been approved in respect
to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

_______________________________________
Nicholas Onuf
_______________________________________
Thomas Breslin
_______________________________________
Benjamin Smith
_______________________________________
Mohiaddin Messbahi, Major Professor

Date of Defense: March 6, 2012
The dissertation of Mohammad Homayounvash is approved.

_______________________________________
Dean Kenneth G. Furton
College of Arts and Sciences
_______________________________________
Dean Lakshmi N. Reddi
University Graduate School
Florida International University, 2012

ii

© Copyright 2012 by Mohammad Homayounvash
All rights reserved.

iii

DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my parents, family, and colleagues at Florida International
University without whose generous emotional and intellectual support it would not have
come to fruition.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank all members of my committee for patiently and smoothly guiding
me throughout the research and writing phases of the present work. Special gratitude
should go to Dr. Mohiaddin Messbahi whose intellectual brilliance, generous mentorship,
and inspiring lectures have been at the genesis of the present work and have guided it
throughout. I would also like to thank Dr. Thomas Breslin for providing invaluable
historiographical methodology and archival research advice. I have also benefitted from
Dr. Nicholas Onuf’s theoretical insights and inspiring works and words.

v

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
HISTORY AND EVOLUTIONARY TRAJECTORY OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR
PROGRAM
by
Mohammad Homayounvash
Florida International University, 2012
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Messbahi, Major Professor
What actors and processes at what levels of analysis and through what
mechanisms have pushed Iran’s nuclear program (INP) towards being designated as a
proliferation threat (securitization)? What actors and processes at what levels of analysis
and through what mechanisms have pushed Iran’s nuclear program away from being
designated as an existential threat (de-securitization)? What has been the overall balance
of power and interaction dynamics of these opposing forces over the last half-century and
what is their most likely future trajectory?
Iran’s nuclear story can be told as the unfolding of constant interaction between
state and non-state forces of “nuclear securitization” and “nuclear de-securitization.”
Tracking the crisscrossing interaction between these different securitizing and desecuritizing actors in a historical context constitutes the central task of this project.
A careful tracing of “security events” on different analytical levels reveals the
broad contours of the evolutionary trajectory of INP and its possible future path(s). Out
of this theoretically conscious historical narrative, one can make informed observations
about the overall thrust of INP along the securitization -- de-securitization continuum.

vi

The main contributions of this work are three fold: First, it brings a fresh
theoretical perspective on Iran’s proliferation behavior by utilizing the “securitization”
theory tracing the initial indications of the threat designation of INP all the way back to
the mid 1970s. Second, it gives a solid and thematically grounded historical texture to
INP by providing an intimate engagement with the persons, processes, and events of
Tehran’s nuclear pursuit over half a century. Third, it demonstrates how INP has
interacted with and even at times transformed the NPT as the keystone of the nonproliferation regime, and how it has affected and injected urgency to the international
discourse on nuclear proliferation specifically in the Middle East.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“On March 6 [1957] the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department
of State announced that representatives of Iran and the United States on March 5 signed a
proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
The signing was announced in Iran by His Imperial Majesty, the Shah, at the opening
ceremony of the U.S. atoms-for-peace exhibit at Tehran on March 6;”1 So reads the
Department of State Bulletin 36, April-June 1957. This event marks the official
inauguration of Iran’s nuclear journey whose initial phase, both conceptually and
operationally, was all but humble.
Almost a half-century later, on July 31, 2006, The UN Security Council
(UNSC) adopted resolution 1696 “seriously concerned that the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) was still unable to provide assurances about Iran’s undeclared
nuclear material and activities after more than three years, demand(ing) that Iran suspend
all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development,
and (giving) it one month to do so or face the possibility of economic and diplomatic
sanctions to give effect to its decision.”2 The UNSC resolution marks the official
internationalization of a U.S. sponsored and led securitization campaign to designate the
Iranian nuclear program (INP) as a credible existential threat whose trajectory should be
deterred from going “rogue” at any cost.
1

U.S. Department of State, “Atoms for Peace Agreement with Iran,” (Department of State Bulletin 36,
Washington DC: 15 April 1957), 629. The agreement was signed at 2:30 p.m. on March 5, 1957 by Ali
Amini, the Iranian Ambassador to the United States, Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the United States Atomic
Energy Commission, and William Rountree, Assistant Secretary of the State.

2

Resolution 1696 (2006) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5500th meeting, United Nations, July 31,
2006, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm (accessed January 10, 2010).
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Panoramically viewed, these two watershed events punctuate the atomic
odyssey Iran embarked upon over a half century ago, a still unfolding voyage of selfdiscovery for both the Iranian state and the Iranian nation whose coming to conceptual
and operational grips with the atom has gone through a most tumultuous and tortuous
path. The present work is an attempt to give a security-textured narrative of how the
Iranian state set off on the nuclear road, how its nuclear consciousness evolved (selfreferentially and in interaction with the international system) under the Shah and in the
first decade of the Islamic Republic era.
The study is based on extensive archival research at the National Archives in
College Park, Maryland, the Richard Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda,
California, and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California. It has
also benefitted from the National Security Archive documents collected and published by
the George Washington University (GWU). The declassified documents edited by
William Burr at the National Security Archive’s Project on Nuclear Documentation have
been thoroughly examined as they shed the most illuminating light on the nuclear
dynamics between the Ford and Carter administrations and the Shah’s regime.
To complement the aforementioned material, I have examined relevant documents
in the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) at the National Archives in College Park and
the

FOIA

(Freedom

of

Information

Act)

Electronic

Reading

Room

at

http://www.foia.cia.gov/. The CIA materials, although few and far between, proved
especially critical as they shed light on the intelligence side of the INP and demonstrate
crucial points of divergence in judgment between the U.S. intelligence community and
the conventional wisdom on the Islamic Republic’s predilection for proliferation and

2

weaponization especially in the Islamic Republic era. The 2007 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) was one such document whose crucial impact in retarding the drifting of
Iran’s nuclear dispute to a military conflict could hardly be overstated.
A note of caution on the intelligence side of the INP is in order here though. As
National Security Archive senior analyst William Burr has noted, for the most part, CIA
documents on the INP are yet to be declassified and without them one can not shed
definitive light on the reasoning behind the Ford and Carter administrations’ arrièrepensée in demanding from Iran safeguards beyond those stipulated by the IAEA before
they could sell nuclear reactors to the Shah. Access to those materials assumes even more
significance once one realizes that the CIA had an intelligence attaché in Tehran in the
late 1970’s exclusively tasked with monitoring the INP and the Shah’s long-term nuclear
intentions.3
Additional materials, especially media accounts on the post-revolution era, have
been gathered from the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and its
successor, the Open Source Center’s (OSC) World News Connection (WNC) that contain
invaluable primary and secondary source intelligence data on the INP obtained from mass
media outlets across the globe. I have used the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
Monitoring to supplement the FBIS and OSC materials. Important nuggets of data were
also found at the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s (NTI) profile on the chronology of Iran’s
nuclear program. I have also used the Vanderbilt Television News Archive to gain more
context about the conventional wisdom on the evolutionary trajectory of the INP.

3

Assad Homayoun, interview by Mohamad Homayounvash, trans. Mohammad Homayounvash,
Washington D.C. (July 23, 2010).
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Furthermore and to fill in possible gaps on the Iranian side of the story, a wide net
was cast to capture material from Persian sources. One invaluable source was Gholam
Reza Afkhami’s interview with the founding figure of the Iranian nuclear program,
Akbar Etemad, published by the Foundation for Iranian Studies in 1997.

The

biographical interview accounts collected by Harvard University’s Iranian Oral History
Project and The Foundation for Iranian Studies also contained significant insights into the
Shah’s nuclear program on which the Persian paper trail is extremely scarce and
sporadic.4 For media accounts on the post-Revolution era, I have used Iranian
government-affiliated websites, newspaper archives, and news websites.
To engage the INP more intimately and to supplement the primary archival
material and secondary sources, I have also conducted a number of in-depth interviews
with a number of key observers of the INP. These individuals are part of a steadily
growing epistemic community that has formed, over the years, around Iran’s nuclear
enterprise and their expert judgments reflect and shape the past and the future of the INP.
Prominent among the interviewees are Gary Sick who served on the National Security
Council in the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, Hans Blix, former head of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Ahmad Kamal, Pakistani Ambassador to
the UN (1995-1999), Assad Homayoun, former Iranian diplomat in charge of political
affairs in the Iranian Embassy in Washington under the Shah, Behrad Nakhai, a former
Research Scientist at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and a prominent nuclear safety
4

One reason for the paucity of paper trail in the Shah’s era, as former Iranian diplomat Dr. Assad
Homayoun mentioned, was that the majority of top strategic decisions on the nuclear issue were made
directly and esoterically by the Shah and only then orally conveyed to the respective authorities for
execution. Assad Homayoun, interview by Mohamad Homayounvashtrans. Washington D.C. (July 23,
2010). This situation continued in the Islamic Republic era as the strategic-level nuclear decision making
was completely privatized by the Supreme Leader.
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expert, and Muhammad Sahimi, a Professor of Chemical Engineering and Materials
Science at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles.
Methodology
The Iranian Nuclear Program (INP) has captured the epicenter of international
proliferation discourse and practice for nearly a decade now. This has given rise to a
sizable body of literature on various aspects of Iran’s nuclear bid oftentimes geared
toward “divining” Iran’s strategic nuclear intentions and the determinants “driving” them
both prior to and after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
This mode of analysis is generally in synch with how the question of nuclear
proliferation is treated in International Relations (IR) theory. A survey of theoretically
informed works on nuclear proliferation reveals two broad schools of thought: those who
take an outward looking approach and afford primacy to the geostrategic context of
nuclearization and those who turn their beam of inquiry inward giving precedence to the
psychological context of the state’s top decision making apparatus.
As viewed by the first school of thought, the geostrategic context of the state is
the external strategic environment within which the state forms and performs its national
security ambitions and decisions. IR theories drawing on this environment to account for
a state’s nuclear behavior give pride of place, varyingly, to national security imperatives,
economic inducements, bureaucratic causalities, and technological determinants.5

5

For a pithy and lucid illustration of these factors, see Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and
Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007). Other important works include
Avery Goldstein, "Robust and Affordable Security: Some Lessons from the Second-Ranking Powers
During the Cold War ," Journal of Strategic Studies, 15, no. 4 (1992): 476 - 527 . David Albrigh, "South
Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50, no. 4 (July/August 1994). Peter R.
Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 2, no. 3, 4 (September
1993): 210. Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some
Policy Implications," World Politics, 24 (1972): 40-79. As applied to Iran, see Shahram Chubin, Iran's
Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). Trita Parsi,

5

On the other hand, the psychological context is defined by the “national cognitive
space” in which ultimate nuclear decision-makers operate. This psychological context is
populated by civilizational and/or national identity conceptions and symbols whose
interaction with the geostrategic context defines the crystilization moment at which the
ultimate momentous decision to go nuclear is finalized.6
With this conceptual template at hand, the following pages put forth a survey of
the explanatory framworks on proliferation and their applicability to the INP.
Geostrategic Context
National Security Imperatives
Different strands of realist IR theory dominate the national security analytical
models on proliferation. Kenneth Waltz, for example, provides five major security
imperatives to explain the spread of nuclear weapons. These include counterbalancing
mechanism by great powers (the USSR); security independence solution (Britain);
security guarantee for a strategically lonely and atomically threatened state (China and
Pakistan); deterrence against conventionally superior adversaries (Israel); and security
independence solution at an affordable price (India).7 As Scott Sagan pithily puts it,

Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press,
2007). Ray Takeyh and Vali Nasr, "The Costs of Containing Iran: Washington's Misguided New Middle
East Policy," Foreign Affairs (The Council on Foreign Relations), January-February 2008. George
Perkovich, "Dealing With Iran’s Nuclear Challenge," (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) April
2003: 4.
6

An excellent generic template is Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation:
Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). As applied to Iran,
see Ardeshir Zahedi, interview by Bijan Farhoudi, IRAN US Relations- Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi's
Historical Perspective, Voice of America (VOA), 2006. Akbar Etemad, Barnameh-ye enerzhi-ye atomi-ye
iran, talash-ha va tanesh-ha (Iran's Nuclear Energy Program, Hopes and Challenges), ed. Gholam Reza
Afkhami (Bethesda, MD: Bonyad-e Motaleat-e Iran (Foundation for Iranian Studies), 1997).

7

Kenneth N. Waltz, "Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons,"Policy Papers, Institute on Global Conflict
and Cooperation (UC Berkeley, Policy Papers, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1995).

6

“from this perspective, one can envision the history of nuclear proliferation as a strategic
chain reaction.”8 Similarly, John Mearsheimer, writing in the offensive realist spirit,
views nuclear weapons as “the surest means of security,” arguing that: “Conventional
wars can be won rather cheaply; nuclear war cannot, because neither side can escape
devastation by the other, regardless of what happens on the battlefield. Thus the
incentives to avoid war are of another order of intensity in a nuclear world than they are
in a conventional world.”9
Considering Iran’s geostrategic location in an institutionally securitized Middle
East and its antagonistic relationship with the United States over the last three decades,
the security paradigm has been extensively applied to analyzing the Iranian nuclear
program after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Writing in this spirit, for example, Ray
Takeyh and Vali Nasr blame Iran’s regional security environment for its nuclear
behavior.10 From this perspective, the best counter-proliferation strategy against the INP
is to remove those strategic anxieties facing the Islamic Republic and once that has
happened, the nuclear challenge will, as it were automatically, take care of itself.
This approach, however, is not only too mechanical and deterministic in blaming
the external environment for Iran’s nuclear behavior, but strikes one as oblivious to
internal determinants of Tehran’s nuclear bid. Furthermore, as Trita Parsi cogently
argues, nuclear weaponization will likely intensify Iran’s security anxieties rather than

8

Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,"
International Security 21, no. 3 (1996-97): 58.
9

John J. Mearsheimer, " Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War ," The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 2
(August 1990): 35-50 .
10

Ray Takeyh and Vali Nasr, "The Costs of Containing Iran: Washington's Misguided New Middle East
Policy," Foreign Affairs (The Council on Foreign Relations), January-February 2008.

7

assuage them: “As long as the Middle East is kept as free as possible from nuclear
weapons, Iran will enjoy a conventional superiority vis-à-vis its neighbors because of its
size and resources,” he argues. “However, if Iran weaponizes, it will risk sparking a
nuclear arms race that may lead small states such as Bahrain and Kuwait to opt for a
nuclear capability as well. In such a Middle East, Iran would lose its conventional
superiority and find itself at strategic parity with states less than one twentieth its size,”
Parsi concludes.11 Therefore, despite having the Waltzian virtues of parsimony and
elegance, the Realist one-size-fits-all framework falls fairly short in accounting for
Tehran’s nonlinear and, at times, counterintuitive nuclear behavior.12
“Bigger Bang for a Buck”13
According to economics-driven proliferation explanations, nukes provide “robust
and affordable security.”14

Proponents of this school claim, “nuclear weapons are

cheaper to develop and to maintain than very large conventional force structures.” Costefficiency considerations were purportedly the main reasoning behind choosing nuclear
weapons over conventional munitions as NATO’s preferred defense strategy against the

11

Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale
University Press, 2007). 265
12

One such example is Tehran’s rejection, in January 2010, of an IAEA-brokered deal to exchange its low
enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile for 20 percent enriched fuel plates it needed for the Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR) while essentially agreeing to a comparable deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil a few
months later.

13

Joe Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Colombia
University Press, 2007).

14

Avery Goldstein, "Robust and Affordable security: Some Lessons from the Second-Ranking Powers
during the Cold War ," Journal of Strategic Studies, 15, no. 4 (1992): 476 - 527 . See also David Albright,
"South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50, no. 4 (July/August 1994).
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Soviet threat in Western Europe during the Cold War era.15 A well-known proponent of
this argument is Homi Bhabha, India's famous nuclear scientist who, advocating a
nuclear weaponization defense policy for India in 1964, contended, “atomic explosives
were some twenty times cheaper than conventional explosives.”16
As far as this author is aware, this cost-benefit calculus of nuclear vs.
conventional weapons has not been applied to Iran’s proliferation behavior in a
systematic way. One explanation for this analytical blind spot, especially in the postrevolution era, could be the hyper-securitized framework within which the INP is
conventionally conceived.
These hyper-securitized analyses either deliberately or subconsciously center their
explanation on an irrational regime with nuclear-adventurous eschatological clerics in
charge who are impervious or insensitive to consequentialist calculations. A natural
consequence of these analytical biases is uncritically relegating the INP to the
psychological realm17 or viewing it in apocalyptically offensive terms.18 Analyzed as a
non-secular, irrational and fatalistic regime, Tehran’s nuclear modus operandi is not
amenable to rational calculations of cost vs. benefit or risk vs. reward. Perhaps best
exemplifying this “mad mullahs” paradigm of thought on the Islamic Republic are
professor Bernard Lewis’ comments on the inherent un-deterrability of a nuclear Tehran
15

Stephen M. Younger, "Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century," Internal Report, Los Alamos
National Laboratory (2000).

16

Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 2, no. 3, 4
(September 1993): 210.
17

Sharon Begley, Newsweek,"When Nukes Become Sacred: The psychology behind Iranian support for the
country's nuclear program.,"January 8, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/id/229865/output/print (accessed
January 25, 2010).
18

See, among others, John Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations
(New York, NY: Threshold Editions, 2008).
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along the lines of the USSR during the Cold War era: “MAD, mutual assured destruction,
[was effective] right through the Cold War. Both sides had nuclear weapons. Neither side
used them, because both sides knew the other would retaliate in kind. This will not work
with a religious fanatic [like Ahmadinejad]. For him, mutual assured destruction is not a
deterrent, it is an inducement.”19
Bureaucratic Causalities
Advocates of this school see no reason why nuclear decisions should be lifted
above the “messy fray” of bureaucratic interests and organizational pressures within the
domestic national security decision-making apparatus.20 From this perspective,
“bureaucratic actors, with certain vested interests that may or may not be consistent with
the broader national interest, ultimately make the case for or against a nuclear weapons
program.”21
The body of literature on the INP utilizing this framework is laser focused on the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commonly referred to as the Sepah.22 In this
view, while the bureaucratic factor was virtually absent from the Shah’s nuclear decision

19

Bernard Lewis quoted in Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism
(New York, NY: Doubleday, 2007).

20

Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy
Implications," World Politics, 24 (1972): 40-79. Also see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear
Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security 21, no. 3 (1996-97): 54-86.
21
Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Colombia
University Press, 2007): 63.
22

Gregory Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons , ed.
Scott Douglas Sagan, James J. Wirtz Peter R. Lavoy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).
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making M.O., in the post-Revolution era the Sepah encapsulates the interests, ambitions,
and inertias of the “pronuclear lobby” in the Islamic Republic’s bureaucratic politics.23
Although intellectually more adventurous in prying open the black box of Iran’s
nuclear decision-making apparatus, the near-obsession of the bureaucratic model with the
Revolutionary Guards as the monopoly custodians of the INP leaves out a number of
other significant players not least among them the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
(AEOI). The latter played a noteworthy institutional role in de-politicizing the INP
domestically and in de-securitizing it internationally until the appointment, on 13
February 2011, of Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani (a former IRGC member designated by the
UNSC Resolution 1747 as “a person involved in Iran's nuclear or ballistic missile
activities”) as the head of the AEOI. This appointment stripped the AEOI and its
pronouncements on the INP of much of their de-securitizing credibility, as they were not
flowing from a purely scientific and technical entity anymore.
From the present work’s perspective, attributing and reducing Iran’s nuclear bid
to the bureaucratic interests of the Sepah pays inadequate attention to the
uncommunicative and highly centralized structure of decision-making in Iranian politics
where the Supreme Leader reigns truly supreme, unfettered by the bureaucratic
impediments traditionally associated with more diffuse power distribution mechanisms.
More specifically, this modality of analysis under-appreciates the private, even at times
esoteric, fashion in which Iran’s strategic nuclear decisions seem to have been
formulated. This reality makes discerning Iran’s “nuclear innermost circle” a highly
speculative exercise since the composition and configuration of the nuclear decision-

23

Charles C. Mayer, "National Security to Nationalist Myth: Why Iran Wants Nuclear Weapons," Thesis
(Naval Postgraduate School, 2004).
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making circle do not necessarily overlap with the existent distribution of political power
relativities among different factions or follow its fluctuations. Consequently, it seems to
be the case that the Sepah’s role in shaping the Islamic Republic’s nuclear behavior at the
strategic level has been hyperbolized in the West.
Technological Determinants
According to this school of thought, there is a causal relationship or proximate
correlation between nuclear technology and proliferation as the former acquires and
accumulates its own momentum and incrementally translates itself into the latter.24 From
this perspective, due to the inherent similarity in technology and infrastructural
requirements between civilian and military nuclear facilities, nuclear weaponization
rather quickly ensues nuclear capacity. The father of the Israeli nuclear program Ernst
David Bergmann most cogently drives this argument home: "by developing atomic
energy for peaceful uses, you reach the nuclear option. There are no two atomic
energies."25 In this view, the causal link between technology and weaponization is further
reinforced by the military’s fascination with the power and prestige attending nuclear
weapons.
Implicit in this technologically deterministic diagnosis of proliferation is a lack of
faith in international non-proliferation regimes (the NPT and the like) to intervene
between “nuclear capacity” and “nuclear weaponization” and institutionally discourage
proliferation. Viewed as such, the only way to hold technology in check is technology. In
other words, the most reliable antidote against weaponization is development of next
24
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generation proliferation-resistant reactors and fuel cycles: an ambitious prospect whose
full-fledged realization lies far in the future.
Technological determinism is one of the predominant paradigms within which the
INP has been analyzed especially after the 2002 revelations about the INP and Tehran’s
unflagging insistence on building an indigenous nuclear full fuel cycle infrastructure.
Having bought into this paradigm either implicitly or explicitly, prominent figures across
the INP epistemic community have assumed an unproblematic straight line from Iran’s
progressing nuclear advancements to its eventual drift toward weaponization.26 One
wonders whether this automatic securitization of Iranian nuclear know-how in the West
emanates from the United States’ nuclear experience where “latent capacity longevity,”
i.e., the time gap between a latent nuclear capacity and actual nuclear weaponization,27
was virtually zero. In this view, America’s nuclear socialization is institutionally
securitized and president Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace initiative was, by and
large, an unsuccessful attempt in de-securitizing Washington’s attitude toward civilian
nuclear technology especially by its rivals and adversaries. The Bush Administration’s
thinly disguised threats aimed at nuclear de-education of Iran through the use of kinetic
force snugly fits into this framework.28 On the other hand, Tehran’s obsession with the
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notion of “nuclear independence” and “fuel cycle self-sufficiency”29 and its domestic
articulation in purely technological, rather than security, terms after the 1979 Revolution
indicates a different Iranian nuclear identity dismissive of the notion of technological
determinism. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s August 2005 fatwa
(religious edict) categorically forbidding procurement, development, stockpiling, and use
of nuclear weapons, while underscoring the merits and virtues of a civilian program, can
be analyzed within this context as well.
Psychological Context
According to this paradigm, due to their revolutionary and extraordinary nature
and extreme rarity, proliferation decisions belong to a category of foreign policy
decision-making (FPDM) that is, at least partially, extricable from the geostrategic
context of the state’s international emplacement. Bomb decisions, in this reading, require
“an extraordinary effort of will” reflective of “the psychology of the leaders who make
them.” From this perspective, “there are discrete decision-making pathways leading from
different national identity conceptions, through emotions, to ultimate nuclear choices.” 30
Focusing the analysis on the “psycho-milieu” of the ultimate decision makers, these
cognitive behavioralist works aim to distill nuclear decisions into the idiosyncratic actorlevel interaction between the decision makers and the broader socio-institutional context
surrounding and shaping them. The agency factor in the form of each state’s unique
nuclear psychology figures prominently in these conceptual frameworks where decisions
29

Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, Protokole Elhaghi va Rahborde Jomhourye Eslamye Iran (The Additional
Protocol and The Islamic Republic of Iran's Strategy)) (Tehran: Expediency Council Strategic Research
Center, 2007).

30

Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Italics added.

14

are not structurally imposed through the state’s emplacement in the international system,
but agentially actualized by the decision-makers.31
A cursory survey of the INP literature reveals two distinctive pathways taken on
the application of the psychological paradigm to Iran’s nuclear enterprise: A Persian
narrative and an Islamic Republic rendition. Proponents of the Persian narrative subscribe
to a secular civilizational/national reading of the INP. In this view, Iran’s nuclear
program is a prestige exercise reflecting the nation’s glorious past and aimed at rediscovering and resurrecting its “rightful place” among the community of nations. Thus
conceptualized, Iran’s nuclear ambitions emanate --self-referentially, as it were-- from its
long-standing national and civilizational consciousness and the 1979 Islamic Revolution
hardly constitutes an inflection point in Tehran’s nuclear-thinking curve. In this view,
Iran’s nuclear interests are not susceptible to the ebb and flow of Iranian politics since
they belong to a uniquely Persian “level of analysis” with its own codes and modes of
decision and action that superimposes itself on the idiosyncrasies of decision makers.
Ardeshir Zahedi, the foreign minister who signed the NPT in 1968 on behalf of Iran, and
Akbar Etemad, the founder and first president of the AEOI, are among the most
prominent figures who see the INP in this secular national light.32
The second is the “Mad Mullahs” strand of thought that takes a religiously
imbued approach toward the INP. From this perspective, the 1979 Islamic Revolution
marks a genuine change of heart on the part of the Iranian state in terms of its strategic
31
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destiny. In this reading, Tehran’s nuclear efforts after the Revolution cannot be decontextualized from the broader Shi’a Islamic themes that were politically embodied and
actualized in the Islamic Republic. This is a cosmically laced interpretation of Tehran’s
nuclear consciousness and socialization whose proponents in the West see “nuclear
ayathollahs” --in an international system securitized toward religion in general and
especially antagonistic toward Islam—as an ominous harbinger for the future of
international peace and stability.
Advocates of this cosmic rendition of the INP conclude that Iran’s hermetically
sealed clerical establishment is not only reckless and fatalistic in its security speech-acts
(e.g. their attitude toward Israel and the Satanic Verses controversy) but also radically
insensitive to secular mechanisms of dissuasion and persuasion. These qualities make the
Iranian state all but impervious to the otherwise sobering effects of “nuclear
endowment,” hence rendering the Islamic Republic an unqualified candidate to be
educated into the secular doctrine of nuclear deterrence.33 Based on this reading Iran’s
apocalyptically offensive interests have already been conclusively and irreversibly
established and its rock-bottom intentions are static and unimpressionable.
With this theoretically informed review of the literature on proliferation and the
INP at hand, I will now turn to the present work’s perspective on how best to draw upon
these models in exploring Iran’s nuclear behavior and teasing out its atomic interests.
Before that, though, an important caveat is in order: The foregoing theoretical categories
are not, by any means, mutually exclusive and substantial overlaps are observable among
them. As a matter of fact, in an effort to bridge the psychological and geostrategic
33
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contexts of proliferation, a number of works on Iran’s nuclear thinking have traversed the
boundaries between these two paradigms.34
Although these analyses tend to be more broadly based as they have a longer
temporal horizon in sight and are more inclusive in their treatment of attention-worthy
developments, the generic problem of framework-intensive historical explanations
persists here too. From this perspective, as the explanatory model grows hegemonic it
dictates the inclusion, exclusion, and truncation of historical evidence and, subsequently,
the flow and direction of analysis. The latter is the unfortunate state of the bulk of
academic and policy scholarship on the INP where the analytical narrative plays second
fiddle to the theoretical or policy template.
Such a reversal of roles produces a number of pathologies: For one thing, it
creates “motivated reasoning” and emasculates the narrative’s ability to re-generate or
transform itself from within as new and contradictory information become available. In
this situation, framework-defying data are either not acknowledged or discounted or
altogether discarded.35 For another, it gives rise to cognitive rigidities that limit the
counter-proliferation decision maker’s capacity to devise imaginative policy solutions.
The need for such imaginative and breakthrough thought patterns is becoming
increasingly imperative as Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West is deadlocking as it is
inching toward its second decade.36
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Conceptual & Methodological Framework
As suggested above, the most intractable challenge to combining a theoryconscious and historically rich analysis on the INP is maintaining a dialogical and
constantly interacting balance between receptivity to time-sensitive and evolving
political, technological, and military processes (on both domestic and international levels)
on the one hand and structural nuclear intentions, interests, and inertias on the other. Such
a balance could only be struck successfully by utilizing a history-intensive (as opposed to
framework-intensive) and discourse-rich strategy that tracks the evolutionary trajectory
of the phenomenon under study along a unifying theme.
The present work endeavors to conduct one such intimate diachronic engagement
with the INP by adopting an “analytical process-tracing narrative.” This narrative, in turn,
will organically and incrementally generate a “conceptual framework” along the unifying
theme and guiding post of securitization.
Analytical process-tracing, as Alexander George and Andrew Bennett explicate it,
is a powerful tool in extrapolating a case study’s “explanation into a generalization.”37 In
other words, in analytical process-tracing an otherwise atheoretical narrative presented
“in the form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about” is
embedded into “an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical terms.”38
Such an analytical historical narrative, as applied to the INP, is bound to involve complex
and non-linear patterns of causality and correlation due to the infinitely complex
trajectory along which Iran’s nuclear socialization has evolved.
37
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In order to give cogency, clarity, and directionality to such a labyrinthine
phenomenon as the INP, it is imperative to define a powerful organizing theme around
which all relevant events, persons, and processes could find their proper context and
implications. In other words, the function of this organizing theme is to decide what
events, decision-makers, and historical junctures have been instrumental in terms of their
nuclear proliferation relevance in Iran’s half-century long atomic journey.
Deciding on securitization39 as the organizing theme to historicize the INP is not
an abstract or arbitrary or, for that matter, a compromise choice. Quite the contrary, one
could easily argue that the INP’s security designation defines, implicitly or explicitly, the
ultimate fault line along which the whole array of INP actors and events are deployed and
demarcated. This reality will obtain unless a comprehensive international desecuritization of the INP takes place through regime change or a drastic change of heart
in Tehran, a relatively unlikely scenario in the foreseeable future.
From this perspective, Iran’s nuclear story can be narrated as the unfolding of
constant interaction between domestic and international forces of “nuclear securitization”
and “nuclear de-securitization.” Within this framework, INP securitizers are state and
non-state actors whose threat judgments have national and/or international security
implications in that they noticeably politicize, securitize, and militarize Iran’s nuclear bid.
The threat-designation implications of these judgments could be immediate or delayed,
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implicit or explicit, direct or by association. These individual, institutional, and state
securitizing actors are present in the domestic and international context of the INP and
collectively pull the INP toward securitization and, ultimately, militarization. In what
follows, I will try and sketch out a template of who these securitizing and de-securitizing
actors are and how their roles have evolved:
At the international state level, especially after the 1979 Revolution, the United
States, independently or in conjunction with Israel, has been the INP’s core strategic
(hyper)-securitizer. The international de-securitizing force counterbalancing the United
States has come, on and off, from the Russian Federation and China. The latter force has
been inconsistent, trepidatious, reluctant, at times tactically driven and hence malleable
and vulnerable in the face of the INP’s more institutionalized and momentous securitizing
forces in the post-Revolution era. The European Union-- especially Germany, Great
Britain, and France (the so-called EU3)-- has had a swing role in the international
securitization and de-securitization of the INP. The thrust of the EU’s posture toward the
INP in general, though, has been toward bandwagoning with the United States either
under the structural pressure of the Cold War in the Shah era or fear of marginalization in
a unipolar post-Cold War world in the Islamic Republic era.
Since the general securitization pattern of the INP has been toward further
internationalization, one can observe a proliferation of state actors with alternating
securitizing and/or de-securitizing functions. The newest arrivals on the scene, at this
writing, are Brazil and Turkey both of which are currently playing a cautious desecuritizing role. The present work will place special emphasis on tracking the trajectory
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of asymmetrical interaction between securitizing and de-securitizing forces of the INP at
the international level with a special emphasis on the United States’ predominant role.
At the international institutional level, the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) is the most consequential securitizer of the INP. The UNSC has been actively
exercising this securitizing role through an incrementally tightening sanctions policy
since the referral to the United Nations of Iran by the IAEA in July 2006. The
counterbalancing institutional de-securitizing forces are the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC). The IAEA has oscillated between securitizing and desecuritizing the INP, although since the referral of Iran to the UNSC, its de-securitization
competence has grown substantially degraded at the expense of its more pronounced
securitizing functions. The dominant argument in Tehran after the 2002 nuclear
revelations has been that the IAEA actually triggered the institutional securitization of the
INP by stepping beyond its technical and legal job description and by politicizing the
issue of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle, otherwise an issue of pure technicality.
De-securitizing forces at the individual and bureaucratic levels have historically
dominated the domestic scene of Iran’s nuclear program. At the national level, the Shah
and the Supreme Leader have performed the function by consistently privatizing the
decision-making process on the INP and de-linking it from any military contingencies.
Some signs of the securitization of the INP before 1979 are traceable in Khomeini’s
critiques of the Shah’s ambitious nuclear program, although whether these
pronouncements had any tangible securitizing resonance and traction is open to
retrospective speculation. After the Revolution no consequential individual-level actor on
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Iran’s domestic political scene has securitized the INP. This situation almost changed
though, when the fallout of the 2009 Iranian presidential election gave rise to a highly
organized opposition movement whose leadership floated the idea of redefining the INP
in factional, as opposed to national, terms.40 At the domestic bureaucratic level, a
securitizing entity has always been absent from the scene. The de-securitization forces at
this level are bureaucratically represented by the AEOI whose leadership has traditionally
tended to transcend the ebb and flow of Iranian politics.
Between the above-mentioned domestic and international levels, there are a
number of important non-state network actors whose relevance for the securitization of
the INP became more visible after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and within the broader
context of the Global War on Terror (GWoT), securitization of Islam in international
politics, and the doomsday menace of nuclear terrorism.41 These are actors that confer on
the INP urgent international security implications that wouldn’t otherwise attend Iran’s
nuclear behavior even as a theocratic revisionist state. The Mujahedin-e Khalq
Organization (MKO or MEK), without doubt, resides at the securitization extreme of this
network level of analysis.
The INP elite constitutes the last group of actors influential in making historical
security sense of Iran’s nuclear drive. INP elite actors are domestic and international
individuals with political visibility and scientific, bureaucratic, legal, or security
credentials whose pronouncements on the INP have significant impact on the
40
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atmospherics and dynamics of its securitization. These actors’ function and significance
is most conspicuous in pronouncements of the INP’s “epistemic community” on domestic
or international levels. The non-state character of INP elite actors renders their scientific,
political, bureaucratic, legal, military, religious, or environmental judgments on Iran’s
nuclear bid objective and hence influential in accelerating or decelerating INP’s
securitization drift. For example retired general John Abizaid’s iconoclastic remarks in
September 2007 on the possibility of living with a nuclear-armed Iran had a tremendous
impact in slowing down the hyper-securitization of INP in the U.S. national security
community.42 Such also was the case with Thomas Schelling and Kenneth Waltz’s
sentiments regarding the deterrability of a nuclear Iran.
To conclude, these six:
1-International state,
2-International institutional,
3-Network,
4-Domestic bureaucratic, and
5-Domestic institutional
6-Nuclear elite
layers of analysis constitute the broad organizing layers of the present work. Each of
these layers has a securitization and de-securitization extreme with a gray middle area
along which the so-called “swing players” operate.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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VI. Elite Level
De-securitization

Securitization/Militarization

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tracking the crisscrossing interaction between these different securitizing and desecuritizing actors in a historical context constitutes the central task of this project. A
careful tracing of security-relevant events on these levels will reveal the broad contours
of the evolutionary trajectory of the INP and its future path(s). Out of this theoretically
conscious historical narrative, one can make educated observations about the overall
thrust of the INP along the securitization-desecuritization continuum.
I. Securitization Continuum
(Technological/Legal) Non-politicized Politicization

Securitization

Militarization

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->>

II. De-securitization Continuum
Militarization

Re-politicization

De-politicization

De-securitization

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->>

Within this framework, if international forces of securitization get the upper hand
(possibly further energized by the de-nationalization of the INP on the domestic scene)
complete nuclear securitization and even militarization of the INP would become a
distinct possibility. A rough analogy of this analogy would be the militarization of the
Iraqi WMD program that culminated in the Operation Iraqi Freedom of March 2003. This
scenario gains more plausibility and reinforcement by the triangulation of the Iran-nukes
nexus with international terrorism following 9/11, placement of Iran on the so-called
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“axis of evil” by the Bush administration and their atmospheric impact on how the INP
was contextualized afterwards.
On the other hand, if de-securitizing agents of the INP coalesce into a
consequential coherent force with international credibility, directionality and visibility
(an unlikely scenario under the circumstances) or if the United States’ ability to sustain
the INP at the top of international security discourse fizzles out in the face of more urgent
and intractable domestic and international concerns like the Arab Spring and the
Financial Crisis, the Iranian nuclear program could be re-prioritized as a technical/legal
proliferation challenge rather than an urgent existential security dilemma.
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CHAPTER 2
1957-1973: NUCLEAR INFANCY
This era marks Iran’s first exposure to, raw fascination with, and unsophisticated
socialization into the nuclear world. President Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace
Program rolled out the introduction of a host of Third World countries into the nuclear
age. Iran was no exception to this unfolding trend as the enervated country was trying to
find its self-confidence and define its regional and international role following the
strategically bruising experiences of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of August 1941, the
Soviet tardiness to leave Iran’s Azerbaijan Province in 1946, and the CIA orchestrated
coup of 1953 that toppled democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq.
The 14 July Revolution (1958) in Iraq and Brigadier General Abdul Karim
Qasim’s subsequent withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact were also instrumental in
rendering the young Shah sensitive to Iran’s external vulnerabilities through indirect
Communist subversion. Viewed from a strategic perspective, 1958 was the beginning of a
securitized era in Iran’s relations with its Arab neighbor to the west. This securitized
atmosphere was additionally reinforced by the Shah’s rather disproportionate alarmism at
the Soviet threat from the north and Moscow’s courting of Tehran’s Arab rivals and
adversaries in the Middle East and North Africa.
During this founding period Iran was gradually coming to conceptual grips with
the notion of the atom and its hardware and software implications. Lacking a
sophisticated conceptual framework (either domestically generated or externally granted
to or imposed on it) to help cultivate and calibrate its nuclear identity, Tehran lacked the
scientific, bureaucratic, and infrastructural foundations commensurate for a solid national
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nuclear enterprise. This was in contrast, for instance, to India’s nuclear journey where the
Atomic Energy Research Committee was founded by the government in 1946 (prior to
the country’s independence) with a prominent nuclear physicist Homi J. Bhabha as its
chairman.
In 1957, the Council of Ministers also established the National Iranian Atomic
Energy Commission (IAEC). The body was headed by the Prime Minister with the
Minister of Industry and Mines acting as his deputy. The IAEC was predominantly a
policy-formulating organization whose role in conceptualizing and streamlining Iran’s
nuclear efforts was only of symbolic significance.
In Iran, the Shah virtually embodied and encapsulated the country’s dabbling with
the atom in this period and almost single-handedly gave visibility, texture, and
directionality to it. As a matter of fact, the whole nuclear enterprise in this period
amounted to little more than an exercise in crafting the sorely needed prestige factor for
the person of the Shah following his humiliating escape in 1953 and his re-accession to
the throne in a foreign orchestrated coup d’état, events that ingrained his image as a U.S.
client figure for the decades to come.
The available archival evidence does not shed a definitive light on the initial
epiphany moment of the Shah’s nuclear fascination or its subsequent evolution into a
full-fledged obsession toward the mid 1970s. Having said that, one person has credited
himself explicitly with having been the inspirational figure behind the Shah’s nuclear
initiation. Abolfath Mahvi, the Shah’s cousin whose name as the owner of the consulting
firm, Iran Nuclear Energy Co. (INECO), appears sporadically in U.S. documents, relates
a story where he asks His Imperial Majesty (HIM) during his 1963 visit to the USA:
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“since the U.S. President will not support your request for America to increase its
purchase of Iranian oil that would, in return, allow you to purchase more arms, why not
consider acquiring nuclear weapons? It will reduce the need to purchase more
sophisticated arms and military hardware and will add to Iran’s prestige among the
international community.” Mahvi claims this conversation made a profound and lasting
impression on the Shah and how he came to approach to the question of the atom. Many
have, however, come to dispute and refute this claim of Mahvi’s in subsequent years. The
foundational figure of Iran’s nuclear program Akbar Etemad finds Mahvi’s claims
disingenuous at worst and hyperbolic at best calling him a run-of-the-mill influence
peddler who, riding on the Shah’s coattails, made a fortune on secret commissions and
not-so-secret kickbacks. Etemad, on the other hand, believes that the Shah’s riveted
nuclear fascination had as much to do with HIM’s principal conviction that “oil was too
precious to be burned up” as with anything else.43 In any event, a balanced reading of the
available archival evidence does not even circumstantially suggest that the Shah’s nuclear
consciousness was, as Mahvi claims, born with an eye on the atom’s national security
dividends. This is in sharp contrast to the Islamic Republic’s war-borne nuclear
awakening that has rendered a de-securitized narrative of the INP a hard sell to this date.
Based on a well-rounded reading of the available evidence, the trigger on the
Iranian side to enter the nuclear world seems to have come from the Shah’s personal
interest in the issue and embassy reports on nuclear cooperation between the United
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States and other Third World countries within the Atoms for Peace Program.44 For
example, on January 12, 1955 Ali Asghar Hekmat, the Iranian ambassador to New Delhi
informed the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indian and Pakistani nuclear efforts.
Hekmat specified the conference India had organized on various aspects of nuclear
technology and emphasized the personal interest Jawahar Lal Nehru had taken in
developing a nuclear infrastructure.45 Hekmat also mentioned a trip by a US delegation to
India to explore avenues for nuclear cooperation between the two countries.46 He
recommended officials in Iran follow India’s suit and start exploring various aspects of
nuclear technology as well.47
In 1956, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a report in which it
referred to a cable by the Iranian embassy in Amman, Jordan on the nuclear cooperation
between the US and Israel and arrangements to establish a nuclear science lab. According
to the report, this nuclear facility would enable Israel to make practical headway in the
nuclear field. The document also alluded to similar arrangements in place between the US
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and Lebanon.48 Impressed by the report, Iranian Prime Minister Hossein Ala inquired
why was it that the Iranian Government had not rolled out similar negotiations with the
United States.49
Following up on the Prime Minister’s keen interest in the issue, Tehran
University Chancellor Manoucher Eqbal started negotiations with Loy Henderson the
former US ambassador to Iran (1951-1954) and the director of the Office of Near Eastern
Affairs in the U.S. State Department. Looking favorably upon the issue, Henderson
pledged to take up the issue with the relevant American officials. Following Eqbal's
negotiations with Henderson, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs started a series of
preliminary talks with the US embassy in Tehran. Even at its most exploratory and
tentative stages the nuclear issue was not a purely technical matter devoid of political
overtones as far as Washington was concerned. For instance, in November of 1955
Washington sought the advice of the US embassy in Tehran regarding the favorability of
the over-all political situation for sending a physicist to Tehran to conduct informal
negotiations to initiate a nuclear research program in Iran.50
As Iran’s efforts to dip its toes into the nuclear world were assuming higher
priority, on July 18, 1956, in a letter to US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Iranian
Ambassador to Washington Ali Amini (who went on to become Prime Minister in 1961)
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“communicated to His Excellency the desire of the Iranian Government to enter into
negotiations looking toward the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement for
cooperation in matters concerning the civil uses of atomic energy.”51 On July 27, the
United States responded affirmatively to the Iranian request and on August 16, 1956, the
United States government presented a draft agreement to the representatives of the
Iranian embassy in Washington. The draft was subsequently sent to a "Scientific
Committee of the University of Tehran" for review.52
The draft agreement proposed by the United States followed the same guidelines
in place in agreements concluded "with 32 other countries." The main pillars of these
guidelines were “A) exchange of unclassified technology; B) lease of up to 6 kilograms
of U-235 for reactor fuel, as well as laboratory quantities of other special materials; and
C) Appropriate safeguards.”53
Iran’s main impediment, as far as the Americans could diagnose, in the way of
getting the ball rolling on a pilot-scale nuclear program was a virtual lack of trained
personnel in the country. Asked about "the nature of research facilities and trained
physicists in Iran, during a 1956 visit to the United States, an Iranian delegate to the
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IAEA replied, "there are about 40 full professors on the faculty of science at the
University of Tehran.”
During his visit to the U.S., the Iranian delegate tried to contextualize Tehran’s
nuclear quest in a broader setting citing the "political pressure, supported by popular
demand, which had descended upon the Government and thence the faculty of science, to
develop atomic energy for Iran." Rather interestingly, the Iranian delegate was adamant
that it was "imperative” for him to “return to Iran with the necessary information
prerequisite to initiating a reactor project." During the meeting, the Americans suggested
that considering its lack of trained personnel Tehran opt for the swimming pool type
reactor, as the water boiler type (the first reactor the Japanese had decided on and Iran
had an eye on) would require an "ample cadre of trained technicians".54
Following the delegate’s report to Tehran, in October 1956 the Iranians, through
the embassy in DC, signaled their willingness to sign the agreement as proposed by the
US. The Shah, right from the get-go, took a personal interest in the issue expressing his
desire to personally announce the agreement "on the occasion of the opening of a US
Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit” in Tehran.55 On November 1, 1956, the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) recommended to the President the approval of the Agreement
negotiated jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State in
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keeping with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The AEC considered the agreement "an
important and desirable step in advancing the development of the peaceful uses of atomic
energy in Iran” through “cooperation between the two countries with respect to the
design, construction and operation of research reactors."56 Thereupon, having made the
determination that it "would not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense
and security," President Eisenhower authorized the execution of the agreement in a letter
dated December 22, 1956 sent to the AEC.57
The agreement was finally signed at 2:30 p.m., on March 5, 1957 by Dr. Ali
Amini, the Iranian Ambassador to the United States, Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the
AEC, and William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State. The signing was formally
announced by the Shah at the opening ceremony of the US Atoms-for-Peace exhibit in
Tehran on March 6, 1957.58 Almost two years later, in a February 4, 1959 letter to the
AEC, the Iranian Embassy in Washington D.C. informed the Americans of the
ratification of the Agreement by both houses of the Iranian Parliament.59 Thereupon, the
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U.S. Government notified the Iranians of entry into force of the Agreement on April 27,
1959.60 Coming on the heels of the 1955 “Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations and
Consular Rights” between Iran and the United States, the 1957 nuclear treaty was signed
in an atmosphere of comity between the two countries and was of tremendous prestige
value to Tehran.
The press released to the media on the occasion of the signing of the treaty by the
Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission contained a lot of futurelooking sentiments on the potential for Iran and the United States to work in the nuclear
field. Chief among them was expression of “hope and expectation” that the initial
agreement would lead to “consideration of further cooperation at some future date of an
agreement in the field of nuclear power,” an ambition that proved more elusive than the
Americans and Iranians expected as the geopolitical terrain in the Middle East and the
Indian Subcontinent underwent some tectonic shifts with massive implications for
securitization of national nuclear programs as we will see in the next chapter.
The 1957 agreement also expressed optimism that it would "enable the Iranians to
enhance their own country's training and experience in nuclear science and engineering
for the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy within the framework of the
‘Atoms-for –Peace Program.” Mention was also made of the Iranian enrollees "attending
the reactor technology courses at the International School for Nuclear Science and
Engineering operated for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission by the Argonne National
for Atomic Energy and Outer Space General Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962 Box
500. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
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Laboratory in cooperation with Pennsylvania State University and North Carolina State
College.”61
Iran’s 1957 nuclear agreement with the United States should also be situated
within the broader context of the Baghdad Pact, a loose alliance modeled after NATO
and concluded (under US promise of military and economic aid) between Iran, Iraq,
Turkey, Pakistan, and Great Britain in 1955 to fend off Soviet infiltration into the Middle
East. As the United States and Great Britain deemed the pact membership an appropriate
platform to get the Middle East started on the Atoms for Peace Program, on March 31,
1957 Iraq’s King Feisal II formally inaugurated the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Training
Centre in Baghdad’s Salchiyah district. The center was conceived to provide training in
“nuclear physics, radiochemistry, electronics, medical applications, and agriculture” to
the scientific community of the Pact member states and other countries in the Middle
East.
The general assessment of the possible power-generating applications of nuclear
power at the time was that: “The application of nuclear power will not be worthwhile in
Iraq and Turkey in the foreseeable future, owing to the abundant supply of oil and hydro
power. Iran and Pakistan are, however, interested in the potentialities of nuclear power
units of medium output for some areas, and the Centre will help by advice to promote this
development.” Britain assumed an advising and supervisory role in the enterprise.62
Within this context Iran was also singled out as one of the countries in the Asian-African
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area with strong interest in the economics of nuclear power in a 1957 hearing before the
"Joint Committee on Atomic Energy" in the U.S. Congress.63
According to a report published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the
Baghdad Pact Nuclear Training Centre would also offer “post-graduate work in
radioactive isotopes” and include “facilities (electronic and radiochemical) to train 20
students” with Sir John Cockcroft as the chairman of the Center's council.64 The Center
posted a fairly successful track record over its short lifespan training about sixty nuclear
scientists from the Pact member states before the 1958 Iraqi Revolution terminated its
activities.65
Following the 14 July coup in Baghdad during which the anglophile King Faisal
was swept from power, Iraq drifted toward the Soviet orbit and withdrew from the
Baghdad Pact. Consequently, as per the decision to re-establish the Baghdad Pact Nuclear
Centre in Tehran taken jointly by the CENTO countries in January 195966, the CENTO
Institute of Nuclear Science officially replaced the Bagdad Pact Nuclear Center, its
headquarters moved to Iran and was officially inaugurated by the Shah in Tehran
University’s newly built Faculty of Science building.67 One could mark the occasion as
an embryonic sign of His Imperial Majesty’s operational interest in the atom.
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As the Center’s director, H. A. C. McKay described the internal workings of the
Center in Nature, “All the CENTO countries contributed to the running of the Institute.
Its scientific policy was in the hands of the Scientific Council consisting of a leading
scientist from each of the four countries; the United States sent an observer. The
Scientific Council reported to the Economic Committee of CENTO, and in general
administrative matters the Director of the Institute maintained liaison with the Deputy
Secretary General for Economic Affairs of CENTO.”68 The main thrust in the Center’s
research and training activities was on “radioisotope work, with some bias towards
agricultural applications.”69 There is some evidence in CENTO meetings minutes,
coming especially from Pakistani representatives, suggesting the United States should
consider deploying nuclear weapons in CENTO countries à la NATO. Iran, nervous
about the Soviet Union’s nuclear saber rattling over its CENTO membership and
uncertain whether US extended deterrence would alleviate or aggravate its security
anxieties, never embraced the idea.
In the very same year, Iran made preliminary arrangements to establish a 5MWe
reactor at the Tehran University for which, on May 8, 1959, Tehran requested an
amendment to the 1957 agreement allowing Tehran to receive HEU (90% enriched U235) and Plutonium from the United States.70 The U.S. government, after inquiring as to
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the design and construction of the reactor, the organizational configuration for its
operation and utilization, the key personnel of the facility and "particularly the research
and training program which was planned for the utilization of the reactor", and the
“particular objectives” that had prompted Tehran to shift from the initially proposed
1MWe to the 5MWe reactor, did not grant Tehran’s request.71 After an exchange of
multiple letters, the United States, in anticipation of the fact that Tehran Research
Reactor (TRC) would not be completed until the nuclear agreement’s expiration on April
27, 1964 decided not to go along with amending the agreement. The Department of State
instead, citing the policy of the US government "to encourage its bilateral partners,
wherever practical, to satisfy their requirements for special nuclear materials through the
International Atomic Energy Agency," referred Iran to the IAEA to obtain the HEU and
plutonium it required.72
As time wore on, the Shah’s fascination with atomic energy went beyond
cooperation with the United States within the Atoms for Peace framework (this was in no
small part thanks to Washington’s stringent conditions for cooperation) and expanded
toward Europe. For instance, on May 7, 1959 during a three-day visit to Great Britain the
Shah paid a high-profile visit to the Atomic Research Establishment at Harwell during
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which Lord Edwin Plowden, Chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (AEA), gave
him a guided tour of the Dido reactor.73
As touched upon earlier, the Shah’s personal fascination with nuclear technology
and the pomp and circumstance accompanying it is testified to by his enthusiastic
presence in the extravagant inauguration ceremony marking the conclusion of the first
nuclear agreement between Iran and the USA in April 1957.74 Along the same lines was
the replacement in 1959 of the Bagdad Pact Nuclear Center by the CENTO Institute of
Nuclear Science headquartered in Tehran and inaugurated by the Shah.75
This was followed, in July 1960, by Iran hosting the Cento Symposium on
Nuclear Science in Hamadan. Experts from the CENTO member states, the US and
France attended the symposium. Among the issues discussed was the possible uses of a
large research reactors, and the value to the region of some of the larger nuclear
instruments. During the meetings Tehran hinted at its interest in exploring the more
operational aspects of the atom like nuclear energy.
Although amounting to no more than some preliminary gestures geared toward
generating personal gravitas for the Shah and symbolic prestige for the country, the issue
of the atom for Iran in the late 1950s and early 1960s could also be situated within a
broader context. The nuclear effort, in addition to highlighting the Shah’s efforts to
broaden and consolidate his domestic prestige and authority base in the post-Mosaddeq
era, also marks the initial phase of the young monarch’s maturation into the “national
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security leader” he became toward the 1970s. As professor Ramazani aptly points out, in
this period “Iran’s foreign policy became clearly the Shah’s foreign policy after the
overthrow of the Mosaddeq regime. As such, it primarily reflected his perception of the
Iranian position in world politics, his assumptions about the nature of the Iranian
problem, and his projected solution for that problem.”76
Arguably “modernization” as a broadly conceived theme best encapsulates the
gist of HIM’s strategy of choice to energize Iran’s leap forward and assuage its multiple
social, political, and economic ailments. The theme figures prominently both in the
substance and stylistics of the Shah’s modus operandi in this period. Again, as Ramazani
points out, “Unlike Mosaddeq, who assumed that the root cause of Iranian malaise was
the pernicious influence of the British, the Shah might appear to have assumed that the
social and economic backwardness of Iran was the most fundamental reason.” Military
security assumed such a prominence within this framework for the Shah that he observed,
“freedom-loving peoples forget—but Communist powers never forget—that most of the
world’s economically underdeveloped countries are also militarily underdeveloped.”77
This inextricable and mutually reinforcing correlation between modernization and
military prowess remained a bedrock component to the Shah’s international posture with
manifest implications for the intense politicization and securitization drift of Iran’s
nuclear program under his rule.
A natural consequence of this paradigm was that the Shah’s resource allocation
priorities were grossly lop-sided in favor of military purchases. This translated into
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unremitting US concern over the Shah’s long-term or subterranean intentions since he
would invariably tilt toward defense at the expense of development even under the most
trying financial straits. One could argue that within this generic framework (defined by
HIM’s laser-focused attention on the security dividends of modernization) the eventual
securitization of the Iranian nuclear program under the Shah by Washington was
inevitable. Put crudely, the kind of cart blanche the monarch had given his nuclear
superstar and bureaucratic celebrity Dr. Etemad was simply hard to reconcile with a
purely civilian nuclear enterprise with no military rewards to extract down the road.
Viewed from this perspective, a case can be made that the decision to play with
the idea of the nuclear was a by-product of the Shah’s fascination with modernization.
This was a perennial leitmotif in HIM’s addresses to the nation as he was trying to
transplant the modern world’s (donya-ye motejadded as HIM used to call it in Persian)
politico-economic values and socio-psychological attitudes onto the country’s national
psyche. Having said that, it is hard to gauge the outer limits of the Shah’s nuclear
imagination and expectations in this era as his eagerness to overcome the puppet image
that had bruised and scarred his image after the 1953 coup and his desire to project
hegemonic power onto the domestic and regional scenes evolved significantly in this
period.
Closely monitoring the evolutionary trajectory of the Shah’s passion for
hegemonic power, the Americans were also extremely mindful lest they might
excessively whet the Shah’s appetite in the nuclear direction. Despite this cautiousness,
though, the declassified evidence demonstrates that Washington briefly gave some
thought to the idea of deploying nukes on Iranian territory considering the country’s
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geostrategic indispensability to the Cold War. This was not to be, however as it would, in
Washington’s judgment, introduce unnecessary escalatory kinks to US relations with
Moscow. Although the Americans went so far as to consider using nuclear weapons
against the Soviet Union to defend Iran against a strategic Soviet attack in the 1950s78
and a 1957 “Special National Intelligence Estimate” placed Iran squarely at the heart of
the Soviet Union’s strategic concerns, the US national security apparatus stopped short of
recommending deployment of nuclear weapons systems in Iran on the grounds it “would
probably cause the most serious concern of all possible areas of deployment. US
deployment there would involve the possibility that, "in spite of the risk of counteraction
by the US and the Baghdad Pact countries, the USSR might move forces into Iran, citing
the provisions of the 1921 treaty. It would, in any event, be a reversal of previous US and
Western policy against stationing troops in Iran.”79
Providing NATO-like extended deterrence to the CENTO was also deemed ill
advised by Washington. “In keeping with U.S. policy and legislation”, the United States
Department of State advised against giving the CENTO members “encouragement that
the United States intended to provide to them, or share with them, any of its nuclear
capabilities.” Not to completely alienate CENTO countries (and to confer some
semblance of defensive alliance on the CENTO), however, Washington made known its
discretionary “unilateral plans to use tactical nuclear weapons in support of CENTO
forces in time of global war,” adding that “the nuclear weapons which will be allocated
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for this purpose will not be deployed to the CENTO area until the United States
determines that the requirement exists.”80 This combination of ambiguous security
guarantees, however, fell well short of Iran’s security expectations as the most vulnerable
CENTO country that didn’t enjoy Turkey’s NATO or Pakistan’s SEATO status.
The Monarch’s Security Expectations
As the 1960s wore on, the Shah’s “almost pathological fear” of Nasserism and its
metastasis into the Persian Gulf region came to dominate HIM’s list of national security
concerns. In 1964, in an attempt to “immunize” the region against Nasser’s venomous
influence and to consolidate Iran’s position in the region in anticipation of British
withdrawal in 1971, Iran embarked on a comprehensive effort to cultivate economic ties
with Kuwait, Qatar, and Trucial Sheikhdoms. 81
The Shah’s exaggerated feeling of vulnerability from the Persian Gulf coupled
with his “burgeoning self-confidence”, as some US Embassy cables put it, was a
perennial theme in Iran’s foreign relations in the mid 1960’s. The Americans felt the
actual manifestation of this newfound sense of hegemony on multiple fronts. Chief
among them was HIM’s brutal repression of the domestic opposition, his reformmindedness specifically the so-called "white revolution," and his new policy of closer ties
with the USSR and the Communist Countries of Eastern Europe. The most consequential
of the Shah’s novel grandstanding postures, however, was a rabid public opinion
campaign to “demonstrate that he was no longer an American stooge” and to cultivate a
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new image of himself by decreasing his dependence on the United States for military
procurements aimed at throwing Iran’s weight around in the Middle East and North
Africa. Also contributing to the Shah’s “new-found self-confidence” in this era were: (1)
the division, dispiritedness, and disarray created in leftist circles, particularly in the
Communist movement, by the growing friendliness of the Soviets for the Shah; (2) the
general disarray of other opposition elements, such as the National Front and certain
religious circles; (3) the general detente between the USSR and the Western world and
the new Soviet policy of wooing Iran rather than, as in the past, demonstrating hostility;
and (4) the Shah’s soaring oil income which made his independent policy economically
possible.82
One also has to bear in mind that that Shah’s independent policy was arguably as
much a by-product of Iran’s changed fortunes and circumstances as the brainchild of the
Shah’s thinly disguised admiration for and his effort to emulate France’s foreign policy
under General Charles de Gaulle. Trying to take a page from de Gaulle’s “politics of
grandeur” (politique de grandeur) that saw Paris adopt a highly independent foreign
policy posture and turned France into the world’s fourth nuclear power, the Shah viewed
Iran’s placement in the Middle East comparable to that of France in continental Europe.
Adopting this new paradigm, in the Shah’s view, would enable Tehran to break itself
loose from being a helpless hostage of politics of alliance and its vicissitudes in a tightly
bipolar international system. This, in Chubin and Zabih’s words, “involved ‘bridge
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building’ with Iran's communist neighbor and its socialist allies in Eastern Europe, and
included a diversification of foreign policy interests.”83
The Shah’s gravitation toward a more independent –hence less manipulable and
responsive to US persuasion and dissuasion- defense posture and his desire to devise
mechanisms to deal with Tehran’s security challenges “as he sees them” is well captured
in a 1966 document where the Shah is described as literally “shocked” by the military
treatment Pakistan, a close Iranian ally in the CENTO, received from the United States in
the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The war was a transformative experience for the Shah
and put him in a “new mood” vis-à-vis Iran’s security precariousness and the depth and
staying-power of Washington’s security commitments:
“Although the Shah values the American security commitment contained in our
1959 bilateral agreement, he considers the Soviet threat less ominous and believes that in
any case it is in America’s interest that Iran be able to cope with regional threats (to
preclude further Vietnams)… Developments affecting one of Iran's close allies have
reinforced the Shah in his conviction that Iran must be prepared to stand on its own feet.
U.S. action cutting off military assistance to Pakistan during the Indo-Pak crisis
apparently left him profoundly convinced that not only might the United States not help
Iran militarily in a conflict with the Arabs, it might cut off the flow of assistance it is now
providing. Thus, the Shah was also disturbed to discover that when it comes to making
available U.S.-supplied equipment (even that which he had purchased) to an ally such as
Pakistan, delivery can be thwarted by the requirements of U.S. law. To the Shah this
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means that his two closest allies, Pakistan and Turkey, cannot assist Iran militarily
against a non-communist aggressor without the risk of United States interference.”84
Within this context, in Washington’s judgment, having consolidated his position
as both the monarch and the supreme ruler and decision-maker, the Shah in the mid
1960’s, after a quarter century on the throne, enjoyed considerable self-confidence and
self-sufficiency in his strategic judgments about “what [was] best for his people and how
to achieve it.”85
Also vividly detectable in this era is the Shah’s dissatisfaction with the United
States’ under-appreciation of his contributions in turning Iran into “a progressive
twentieth century nation-state” following the example of Cyrus and Darius. The Shah of
the mid-1960’s, ambitiously and “with a messianic zeal,” assumed a “constructive role”
for Iran in a Middle East “plagued by negativistic sloganism.” Brimming with selfconfidence, the Shah, by the mid 1960s, had turned into a security-first leader for whom
military aspects of the national interest took absolute precedence over and were
prerequisites for social progress and economic prosperity. Following this ever-ingraining
philosophy of viewing socio-politico-economic flourishing as derivatives of security, the
Shah was rapidly increasing his military procurements. In 1966, for instance, he was
pushing for “a second Hawk battalion, super-sonic interceptors, gap-filler radars and antiaircraft guns, Sheridan tanks, additional war reserve ammunition, a destroyer, and an air84
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to-ground missile.” The monarch also made no secret of his willingness to secure and
procure the military hardware he deemed imperative from anyone willing to sell. For
example, he made known to the Americans the availability of a Soviet high-speed
interceptor aircraft at a “favorable price.” 86
The disagreements in judgment between the Shah and the Americans on the
strategic threat environment Iran was presently and prospectively facing were steeply
spiking as the 1960s was drawing to a close and Iran’s petrodollars were bulging. For
instance, in a November 4, 1968 cable Stuart Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, took issue with the Shah’s thesis about “a serious
threat requiring an all-out defense effort by Iran” in the Persian Gulf.87
This independent mindset came even more conspicuously to a fore when HIM
arrived more definitively at the realization that "the [US] commitment [toward Iran] was
closely related to Soviet involvement in any threat to Iran" as opposed to being a purely
bilateral commitment. With the Soviet threat growing "relatively latent,” the Shah
became more concerned about “a radical Arab nationalist threat from the South" that he
preferred to fend off with indigenous Iranian force.88 Within this context, for example,
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Iraq’s acquisition of “more MIGs from the USSR and Lightnings from the UK” only
intensified Iran’s rapidly escalating anxieties from the Nasser-inspired Arab world.89
This international factor played an unmistakable role in circumscribing the scope
and depth of the Shah’s reliance on the United States for sub-existential security needs.
As touched upon before though, reinforcing the international factor in HIM’s more selfreliant posture was an indispensible domestic ingredient: Iran’s ever-swelling national
coffer thanks to windfall oil revenues and other financial resources. This domestic
economic factor was essentially shifting Iran-US relations away from one of “donorrecipient” onto a more “commercial basis.” One obvious manifestation of this
transformation was the United States “terminating its AID assistance” and decreasing the
grant component of its military cooperation to Iran and imposing more stringent credit
terms on the Shah’s insatiable appetite for military hardware.
The INP Muddles Through
As the fissures in threat judgment between Iran and the United States were
widening and proliferating, Tehran’s burgeoning and predominantly symbolic nuclear
program was slowly edging forward. The trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program received a
vigorous conceptual jumpstart with Akbar Etemad’s return to Iran from Switzerland in
June 1965. The son of an affluent merchant from the ancient city of Hamedan in
northwestern Iran, Etemad received his secondary education in the elite American
College of Tehran known as Alborz High School before pursuing a higher education in
electrical engineering in Switzerland’s École polytechnique de l'Université de Lausanne
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(EPUL). Upon graduation, Etemad took up a research position in Baden (Switzerland)
based Brown Boveri, a company specializing in nuclear power generators. Thereafter, he
moved to Switzerland’s main reactor research center Institut Federal de Recherche en
Matiere de Reacteura while pursuing a doctorate degree in Reactor Physics at the
University of Lausanne. Following graduation in 1963, Etemad continued working at the
Institut for two additional years and established himself as an internationally known
figure in the field of “nuclear reactor shielding” giving consultation to the IAEA.90 In
1956, having severed his ties with Iran’s communist Tudeh Party, a disillusioned Etemad
heeded his inner calling and decided to return to Iran and “give back to his home
country.”
Upon his return to Iran in 1965, Etemad took on a managerial position in
accelerating the completion of The Tehran Research Reactor whose commissioning had,
much to the Shah’s annoyance, almost ground to a halt. Etemad, whose bureaucratic
dexterity was increasingly shining through, also engineered the relocation of the Iran
Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) from the Ministry of the Economy to the Plan
Organization in 1967. The new IAEC in the Plan Organization, whose founding charter
Etemad drew up, would streamline and synchronize all policy-formulating and decisionmaking functions related to nuclear energy. As Etemad later recalled, the relocation of
the Iran Atomic Energy Commission coincided with the time the Plan Organization was
preparing Iran’s Fourth Development Plan (1968-1973) in which no mention was made
of possible uses of nuclear energy for generating electricity.
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With the establishment of the Ministry of Science, Scientific Research, and
Higher Education in 1968, Etemad was placed in charge of its Scientific and Research
Department that took on all nuclear R&D responsibilities previously falling under the
Plan Organization. While the responsibility for conceptualizing and operationalizing the
atom was being shuttled between different government agencies, thanks to a lack of a
meaningful national-level priority for the issue—despite HIM’s avid personal interest in
it– no major tangible breakthroughs transpired until late 1973. In the meantime, Etemad
stayed in the Ministry of Science performing various duties as the head of the Institute for
Research and Science and Education Planning and later as the Chancellor of his passion
project, the newly founded Buali Sina (Avicenna) University in his hometown of
Hamadan.91
Among the most significant functions of the Plan Organization in the field of
atomic energy was to "prepare for submission to the Atomic Energy Council drafts of
legislative bills, decrees, and regulations” related to atomic energy. It was also tasked
with assuming "direct control over all atomic installations and radioactive material.” The
IAEC also exercised “direct control over activities in the field of atomic energy within
the ministries of government affiliated agencies, to establish coordination between the
agencies and to examine atomic energy plans and budgets.” As part of this function it was
mandated to “encourage various government agencies to use atomic energy to implement
or to assist in the implementation of Development and Industrial Plans such as the
generation of power, the desalination of sea water.” Also falling under the IAEC’s tasks
were preparing “necessary programs for training scientists and technicians in the fields of
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atomic energy” and “attracting foreign aid of all kinds as well as for distributing it among
the various government agencies.”92
Related to this bureaucratic reshuffle, on its April 22, 1967 meeting the Iranian
Council of Ministers approved a decree establishing the "Atomic Energy Council" under
the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The body’s broad platform was to convene every
three months to "concentrate activities in the field of atomic energy." The Council
comprised of the Minister of Economy, the managing Director of the Plan Organization,
the Chancellor of the Tehran University, the Chancellor of another university, and four
Atomic Energy experts selected by the Prime Minister. The most important function of
the newly established body was to “determine overall policy in the field of atomic energy
as well as to determine priorities.”93
In this period, the 1957 nuclear agreement between Tehran and Washington went
through two revisions in 1964 and 1969 respectively. The 1964 amendment was
especially of operational significance since it would provide for the transfer of highly
enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and for gram quantities of
other nuclear material for research projects. The most significant change in the 1969
amendment was that it modified the 1964 agreement to "permit fueling of reactor
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experiments in addition to research reactors."94 Iran also signed an agreement with
Canada on January 7, 1971 for “Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.”
On November 25, 1967, the 5MWe swimming pool-type Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR) was inaugurated on the newly constructed Amirabad campus of the
University of Tehran. TRR, built in two vaults and a five-story building and dedicated by
the Shah and the Queen, was part of the contract the University of Tehran had concluded
with AMF atomics in 1958. The reactor was comparable to the ones the United States had
constructed for Israel and Pakistan and was capable of producing up to 100 grams of
plutonium per year.95 The reactor, built within the Center for Nuclear Studies and the
research labs it housed at the University of Tehran, was constructed under the Shah’s
direct authority. At this point the Center for Nuclear Studies staffed some seventy nuclear
experts and technicians trained in Europe and the United States. As part of the TRR
project, in September 1967 the United States supplied about 5 kilograms of HEU (93%
enriched) to Iran to fuel the TRR in addition to about 100 grams of plutonium as "start-up
sources for research reactor."96 Iran, the USAEC, and the IAEA concluded an agreement
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in June 1967 that would authorize the transfer of enriched uranium and plutonium to Iran
under the IAEA supervision.97
The TRR went critical on November 4, 1967 in coincidence with the Shah’s
inauguration of the "Atoms in Action" Exhibition on Tehran University’s Amirabad
campus. This was an exhibition operated by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
(USAEC) scheduled to run through November 1967. Referred to by the Department of
State as “the largest combined educational-cultural-scientific foreign exhibit program of
this nature of the U.S. Government and the most comprehensive on science and atomic
energy,” its objectives were to "advance the knowledge that atomic energy is one of the
most effective means to further the betterment of mankind" and "to negate the notion that
atomic energy and destruction are irrevocably associated.”98
In his message to the ceremonial occasion, US President Lyndon B. Johnson
called the Nuclear Science Demonstration Center and Exposition “an exposition of
progress in Nuclear Science… and an operating laboratory and a meeting-ground where
your [Iranian] scientists and ours will work side-by-side to learn more about nuclear
energy and the many blessings that its peaceful development promises for mankind.” He
further expressed hope that the Center would prove a platform where “ideas about

97

No. 8866 Contract for the transfer of enriched uranium and plutonium for a research reactor in Iran.
Signed at Vienna, on 10 March, at Teheran, on 10 May, and at Vienna, on 7 June 1967.
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/.../volume-614-I-8866-English.pdf (Accessed July 15, 2011).

98

Unclassified. Department of State to US Embassy Tehran, Participation and Assistance, AEC Atoms in
Action Nuclear Science Demonstration Center and Exposition, Tehran. July 24, 1967. National Archives at
College Park, College Park, MD.

55

nuclear science will find a useful forum for exchange, will encourage other similar
projects of mutual benefit for our countries and other nations of the world.”99
But arguably the most consequential of Iran’s nuclear actions in this period was
Tehran’s rush to accede to a host of international organizations and treaties aimed at
establishing an international nuclear regime. As part of this policy, Tehran ratified the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) statute on May 16, 1958, less than a year
after the nuclear watchdog agency’s establishment on 29 July 1957. On August 9, 1963
Iran signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and ratified it on 23 December
1963. Tehran also signed and ratified the Seabed Arms Control Treaty in 1971.
The most significant of these treaty accessions, however, was Iran’s signing of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons commonly known as the NPT on
the day it was opened for signature on July 1, 1968. Tehran ratified the NPT on February
2, 1970 and concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA that entered into force on
May 15, 1974 establishing its rights and responsibilities under NPT articles. Some have
speculated that Tehran was coerced into signing the NPT by the United States as the
finalization of the sale of F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers was implicitly conditioned on the
treaty’s ratification.100 Whatever might have prompted such a hasty decision, however,
there exists a near consistency and consensus in the declassified documents and people
who have commented on the subject that a serious debate never took place on the pros
and cons of joining the treaty. Assad Homayoun believes that the decision was made
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personally by the Shah simply to avoid antagonizing the Americans who were pushing
hard for garnering maximum signatures for the treaty.101 This was a decision that many in
the Iranian nuclear “epistemic community” later came to lament. Chief among them was
Akbar Etemad, the father of the Iranian nuclear program who, with his characteristic
candidness, frequently referred to the “inherently discriminating nature” of the treaty,
called the decision to join it “imprudent in the first place”, and underlined the Western
countries’ consistent violation of articles IV and VI, and advocated Iran’s withdrawal
from it.102
The Shah’s nonchalant attitude toward Tehran’s non-proliferation obligations
under the NPT regime when he was being pushed on the question of Iran’s nuclear
ambitions in the mid 1970s was a manifest symptom of Tehran’s reluctant membership in
the treaty. This got some Iran observers wondering whether the conspicuous absence of
the NPT as a proliferation dissuader in Iran’s nuclear discourse was a sign that by 1974
the treaty had grown “too dated to be relevant” as far as a completely transformed Iran
was concerned.103
On another front, in 1972 Iran’s nuclear thinking inched closer to finding a
preliminary sense of strategic direction when the government went public with its
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principled intent to build multiple nuclear power plants within the next decade or so.104
The country, however, still woefully lacked the requisite financial, scientific, and human
resources capabilities commensurate with such a declaratory vision.
Things took a dramatic turn in 1973, however, following the October oil crisis
when the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries or
OAPEC (consisting of the Arab members of OPEC, plus Egypt, Syria and Tunisia)
proclaimed an oil embargo "in response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli
military" in the Yom Kippur War. As we will see in the next chapter, Iran’s refusal to
jump on the Arab bandwagon and the windfall revenues generated by the ensuing oil
bonanza gave the Shah both the requisite strategic latitude and the financial wherewithal
to embark upon an ambitious and cost-intensive nuclear enterprise.
Deterrence Creeps into the Monarch’s Security Lexicon
The problem of keeping the Shah’s military appetite within proportional
dimensions entered a paradigmatically new era in 1969 with the finalization of the British
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf region slated for 1971. The Shah, still wary of the
USSR’s sinister, subversive, and aggressive intentions-- albeit now cloaked in a more
surreptitious fashion-- considered the Peacock Throne as heir apparent to Whitehall and
deemed Tehran a natural candidate to fill London’s stabilizing role in the region and to
stem the feared radicalization drift of the emerging Arab nation-states.
Although the Nixon administration continued, just like its predecessor, to insist
that the Shah’s security anxieties were hyperbolic, his security expectations were
hegemonic, and his reading of Iran’s role was “overdrawn”, there was decidedly a
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generic sense of recognition in Washington that HIM was irreversibly "wedded" to his
judgment on Iran’s strategic environment, its operational imperatives, and the fact that
the country had the "wherewithal to look to other arms sources if he decided the US
(was) not sufficiently meeting his demands for arms." The alienating, alarming, and
provocative impact of this maximalist security posture and insatiable thirst for
sophisticated weaponry figures prominently in the United States’ appraisal of power
relativities in the Middle East and Iran’s placement in it.
Also with the advent of the Nixon administration, one notices a new theme with
potential nuclear overtones entering the tenor of the Shah’s security posture: deterrence.
The Shah, starting as early as the early 1970s, developed a rather novel security
preoccupation essentially to the effect that “only a strong deterrent posture can provide
the necessary guarantee of Iran's security against radical Arab nationalist incursions into
the Gulf region."105
The Shah, on many occasions, kept reminding the Americans of the Soviet
Union’s “grand design” to penetrate the Middle East following the British withdrawal
and the need for Iran to have a credible deterrent posture to fully implement its own and
the region’s vital security and stability requirements within the framework of the Nixon
Doctrine. His Imperial Majesty even went so far as to admonish the Americans for
having sidetracked themselves onto a marginal and distracting theater in Vietnam and for
not fully appreciating the high-stakes global game unfolding in the Middle East. This
time around, he was even more scathing in his criticism of the way Washington was
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patronizingly deciding for Iran what military wherewithal it needed while shying away
from offering iron-clad NATO style security guarantees to Tehran.
For the Shah, the most vivid manifestation of the half-heartedness of the United
States’ security commitments to Tehran was its refusal to join CENTO as a full-fledged
member. Further aggravating the Shah’s concerns was Washington’s dismissive attitude
toward and lack of sympathy for his diagnosis of the gravity of the unfolding situation in
the Persian Gulf, Iran’s pivotal role in it, and the formidable odds Tehran was up
against.106
In the U.S. intelligence community’s judgment, the Shah viewed US reluctance,
denial, or deferral on providing sophisticated weaponry to Iran as emblematic of the
United States’ dwindling “regard for him and for his policies” and as a sign of Iran
getting “downgraded” on Washington’s priority list. As a matter of fact, the intelligence
community projected, in as early as 1970, that HIM would reorient his policies away
from the United States “in the direction of closer ties with certain West European states, a
more accommodating attitude toward the USSR, resistance to U.S. advice on
international issues, probably increased pressures on US oil interests, and possibly
termination of US special facilities and military over-flight rights.”107
One can logically expect the new theme of deterrence, along with the Shah’s
condescending attitude towards international norms and regimes, to have played at least a
permissive and facilitating function in the securitization drift of a full-fledged Iranian
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nuclear program, especially considering Tehran’s uncompromising insistence on
possessing full fuel cycle and reprocessing rights in the mid-1970s.
Another theme that crept into the Shah’s security judgments in this era was one of
Iran emerging from under the shadow of the United States and other great powers and
Tehran’s eagerness to embrace the operational imperatives of acting like a hegemonic
power in the Persian Gulf. As early as 1969, the Monarch conveyed his unequivocal
judgment to Washington that he had come to believe "time had passed when great powers
could intervene in the Middle East and Asia," and that Iran should be given broad latitude
in regaining its authority as the master of its own house capable of accurately diagnosing
its security shortcomings and the ways and means to address them.108
This theme in the Shah’s foreign policy posture was additionally reinforced by
HIM’s growing conviction that as the prevailing systemic atmosphere had deescalated to
one of détente, the United States would leave Iran to its own devices or at least pull its
nuclear punches were it to be attacked by the USSR or its regional allies.109 These two
factors had undeniable implications for the Monarch’s insistence on nuclear
independence in the mid-1970s and the trepidation with which the United States was
monitoring Iran’s nuclear leap forward. In other words, the ubiquitous desire for selfsufficiency that began in the realm of security gradually grew into a predominant theme
in the Shah’s strategic thinking subsequently finding expression in the nuclear field with
Iran insisting on an indigenous full fuel cycle capacity.
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Iran’s strategic concerns in a radicalizing Middle East and the Shah’s relentless,
yet reluctant, efforts to outgrow Tehran’s subservient dependence on the United States
and alleviate its adverse implications are recurrent themes in the Shah’s conversations
with the Americans. By way of example, in a 1970 cable, US ambassador to Iran,
Douglas MacArthur II makes mention of the Shah's "absolute conviction-- or obsession-that unless he substantially strengthens his military posture, the Arab side of the (Persian)
Gulf will, after British withdrawal, fall before massive radical Arab campaign of
subversion encouraged by Soviets with Iran standing alone."110 Washington, however,
questioned the validity of these threat judgments by the Shah indicating that the Shah’s
“exaggerated” threat perception and his craving for preponderant deterrent capability
were deliberate plans that betrayed a more subterranean motive. This assessment threw a
thoroughly different light on the Monarch’s hysterical threat assessments following the
anticipated British withdrawal from the region.
America’s disagreement with the Shah’s threat perceptions reached a pitch in
September 1970 when the Defense Department asked the intelligence community to do a
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on the "military threat" facing Iran.
The resultant memo, drawing a parallel between Iran's predicament and that of
Israel, noted that the Shah was not simply seeking to deal with “visible threats” (those, in
the memo’s judgment, were not imminent or massive enough to “justify” the military
hardware he was seeking), but was keen on a military posture formidable enough to have
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a “deterrent” impact on the would-be aggressors so that Iran would be above challenge at
least in the Persian Gulf.111
Such a force would dissuade potential aggressors from attacking the Persian
homeland or fettering with Iran’s maneuverability in the Persian Gulf and the Indian
Ocean. According to the 1970 SNIE on Iran’s international position, the Shah, “acutely
conscious of Iran’s great past”, saw the British disengagement as presenting not simply a
threat but also an historic opportunity for Iran to project power and reassert the kind of
leadership it was entitled to.112
The Shah called such an impressive posture by Iran in the Middle East a “Policy
of Wisdom,” one that purported to portray Iran as a country that made rational decisions
and whose strength was the keystone of security in the Middle East. A theme the Shah
was fond of sounding to the Americans every opportunity he got was that “insofar as the
Middle East is concerned, it is important to the U.S. and the Free World that Iran be
capable of providing for her security and that of the Gulf. … Iran must be capable of
handling local conflicts and she should not look to the U.S. to become involved except in
case of general war.” Yet, to the Americans, the operational military imperatives of
Iranian-style wisdom were steeply moving upward and bordering on extravagant.113
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To address this issue in the early 1970s Washington was engaged in a diplomatic
campaign to put a reality check and a sense of perspective on HIM’s power expectations.
As part of this policy, for instance, the U.S. Secretary of Defense urged Under Secretary
of State Elliot Richardson to knock some sense of proportionality into the Shah in his
1970 visit to Iran:
“Although the Shah is aware of these facts, it does not appear that he fully
recognizes, or is willing to recognize, the special position and consideration Iran has in its
military relationship with the U.S. As you are aware, these include the largest MAAG114
outside SEA115, almost one third of our FMS credit116, the USAF F-4 Technical
Assistance Field Team (TAFT), one-half of all our foreign jet pilot training spaces, and
DoD assistance in the M-47 retrofit program.”117
In December 1970, having sensed the United State's sense of trepidation and
suspicion over Iran's purported lack of proportionality in seeking military equipment, the
Shah informed the Americans, in his newfound point blank style, that he was not after a
“great imperial armed force like Kaiser Wilhelm or like Hitler,” rather his strategic
objective was to possess a nimble, efficient, and compact military that could "counter
anything but a major Soviet attack."118
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In analyzing the Shah’s changing posture vis-à-vis Washington, one should also
take stock of Iran’s amicable relations with Israel during this era and that relationship’s
indispensability for a Shah up against a reluctant U.S. administration to satiate his everincreasing thirst for military hardware. For instance, following reports that the United
States Congress might be stonewalling the consummation of an F-4 deal, a disillusioned
Shah in December 1970 made no bones about his true feelings “acidly” reminding his
American audience that he could obtain all he wanted from Israel.119
One should also be cognizant of the fact that the Shah’s Soviet allergy was
diminishing in parallel with Iran’s bulging oil revenues and his growing self-confidence
coupled with Iran’s perceived demotion in Washington’s strategic calculus during the
détente. The Monarch’s independent attitude hit a new high mark in 1970 when the Shah
reminded the Americans of his readiness to purchase military equipment from Moscow–
particularly T-62 tanks—if the West were to give him the runaround on his military
needs.120 This attitude, if operationalized and were the Soviets to sell significant amounts
of military equipment to Iran, would be tantamount to a major defeat for the Americans
as it would provide the Soviets with a foothold in Iran, a scenario to which the United
States was avidly averse.
Another important factor that started developing in the late 1960s and early
1970s and appreciably contributed to the subsequent securitization drift of the Iranian
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nuclear program in the mid-1970s was a gradually institutionalizing feeling in
Washington that the Shah had an obsession with national prestige and was willing to go
to any lengths to secure its hardware prerequisites. This was undermining, in
Washington’s judgment, the legitimacy of HIM’s security concerns that he claimed were
the main driving force behind Iran’s quest for added power differentials vis-à-vis the rest
of the Persian Gulf states. Pushed to its logical conclusion, this would entail the Shah
seeking to follow Israel and India’s suit in its vicinity and develop, at a minimum, a
readily weaponizable nuclear capability.
As a matter of fact, in January 1972 in two separate meetings with US officials,
Senator Stuart Symington and Ambassador MacArthur, the Shah underscored Tehran’s
opposition, on principle, to the nuclearization of “the Middle East and South-Asian areas
adjacent to Iran.” The Monarch, however, was quick to emphatically observe, “should a
country such as India develop nuclear weapons capability at some future time, perhaps
with Soviet assistance having China in mind, Iran would have to reconsider its present
policy and would probably itself wish to develop a nuclear capability.”121 The utter
disregard for the NPT in the Shah’s articulation of Iran’s future nuclear posture a mere
month before the treaty was up for ratification in the Iranian Parliament was hardly a
reassuring sign of Iran’s commitment to its contractual non-proliferation obligations.
Reinforcing these troubling comments by the Shah and contributing to the
securitization slide of the Shah’s nuclear program in the 1970s was also the Monarch’s
discounting, at times flat-out dismissive, attitude toward the Iranian armed forces’ simple
numerical superiority. The Shah, rather, wanted the kind of qualitative supremacy
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complete with state-of-the-art weaponry that would be unmistakably deterring of any
would-be aggressors. Naturally, for a decision-maker with such a predisposition the
nuclear option would be irresistibly tempting. In the Shah’s view, the key imperative for
Iran to properly discharge its role as the sole "guardian and protector" of two third of
world's oil reserves in the Persian Gulf was unrestricted access to state-of-the-art military
hardware.
For a leader with an acute encirclement mentality (the Shah felt particularly
vulnerable in the Strait of Hormuz or as he called it Iran’s “jugular vein”) possessing a
formidable military apparatus assumed existential proportions. For instance, in a 1973
trip to the United States, he was seeking to purchase Grumman’s swing-wing F-14
Tomcat Navy fighters complete with its "full suit of sophisticated equipment" including
the Hughes AIM 54-A Phoenix missiles and a long-range state-of-the art radar.122 It is
interesting to note that these Phoenix missiles were capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
The Shah justified the interest in the F-14 purchase as a response to frequent high-altitude
flights by the Soviets’ MIG-25 over Iranian territory for which Tehran’s existing F-4s
were no match. To further boost Iran’s air supremacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its
Baath Socialist ally in Baghdad, the Shah also expressed interest in the McDonnell
Douglas's F-15 Eagle, the most advanced tactical combat fighter in the U.S. Air Force at
the time.123 This insatiable appetite for sophistication and supremacy in the military
wedded to HIM’s “impatient and Napoleonic vision of history” (where Iran was
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“destined to become one of the five great powers of the world by 1983”) was hardly
reassuring for the Americans.124
In the early 1970s the Shah became even more vocally concerned over an allimportant question for Iran: What, in operational terms, did the special relationship
between Iran and the United States mean and to what extent did Washington appreciate
Iran’s uniqueness and indispensability? The issue assumed core strategic status in late
June 1973 when the United States and the USSR signed the Agreement on the Prevention
of Nuclear War. Especially troubling to Tehran was Article II of the Agreement where
Washington and Moscow agreed to “refrain from the threat or use of force against the
other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in
circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.”125 Tehran, on pins
and needles over whether it belonged to the “ally” or “other countries” category within
the agreement, tasked foreign minister Abbas-Ali Khalatbari to inquire Secretary of State
William Rogers and National Security Advisor Kissinger on the exact meaning and
implications of Article II and seek the US government’s public or private clarification
and reassurance on the matter.126 After much contemplation, Washington decided to
remain ambiguous on Iran and CENTO’s placement within the agreement. This was, as
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far as the Shah was concerned, a clear signal that the US was not prepared to extend
unequivocal NATO-esque assurances to Tehran.
The irritated Monarch decided to push the issue again in his visit to Washington a
month later. In a July 1973 conversation with Henry Kissinger, the Shah reiterated “that
Iran should not be looked at as just another Middle Eastern country” confident in the fact
that “in 5-10 years time, it will be very different and will stand out from its neighbors.”
He conveyed with his characteristic aplomb the same sentiment to the Soviet ambassador
to Iran calling on the superpower to the North to treat Iran “the same as other big
countries in the world." Elaborating on this theme to Henry Kissinger, he went on to
claim, “what is important is for the Russians to understand that we are not afraid of
fighting them.”127 Excessively self-confident, HIM also warned his American audience
that the U.S. could descend into anarchy and “move from a first-rate power to a fifth or
even a tenth-rate power.” When the issue of Iran’s arms procurement came up, the Shah,
emphasized the fact that “he knew what he was doing” and reminded Dr. Kissinger he
had “a friend in the U.S. that was ready to provide anything he needed --short of atomic
weapons and they are not an issue.” 128
These allusions by HIM to Iran’s “indispensible” past and prospective
contributions toward the United States’ interests in the Persian Gulf were recurring
themes in Iran-US relations whose initial signs one could trace back to the earl 1970s.
The rather hyperbolic assertions as to Tehran’s entitlement to the strategic rewards of the
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“special relationship” (if it was genuinely special) did lead the Americans to develop
second thoughts as to the Shah’s ambitious nuclear program in the mid 1970’s. One could
safely speculate that getting some leeway and latitude on the nuclear issue was on the
Shah’s mind as Tehran was pushing against the boundaries of the special relationship to
see how much nuclear diversion it could get away with. Gary Sick, a veteran observer of
Iran who served on the U.S. National Security Council under Presidents Ford and Carter,
believed that the United States was highly unlikely to extend the “Israel treatment” to the
Shah on the issue of nuclear weaponization.129
Of course, as we will see in the next chapter, with the Carter administration
coming to power, the Shah, much to his chagrin, found out that his room for maneuver
was not as expansive as he thought on the nuclear issue as the Iranians and Americans
came to loggerheads on the issue of reprocessing. The United States’ denial to grant Iran
the “Israel treatment” in the nuclear field came as a rather shocking realization for HIM
reminding the Monarch that Tehran’s indispensability in U.S. strategic thinking was more
circumstantially, than directly (like Israel’s) driven and was therefore prone to
reprioritization should the atmospherics of the Cold War radically transform.
These were early indicators that the Shah was thinking big on the nuclear issue
and if the Shah’s nuclear enterprise was not explicitly identified and designated as a
“proliferation threat”, it was under the de-securitizing pressures at the international level
where Washington couldn’t simply run the risk of alienating its key ally in the Middle
East. In other words, all the elements for legitimately securitizing the INP under the Shah
were there only lying fallow as their articulation and designation in proliferation threat
terms would require operational imperatives that would go against the thrust of the more
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urgent and macro securitization between the international archrivals. After the 1979
revolution and once that indispensability element was eliminated, even more so after the
implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, once the systemic level pressures were gone, the
Iranian nuclear program came under massive securitization and gradually assumed a
central position in the threat package the United States assembled against the Islamic
Republic.
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CHAPTER 3
1974-1978: NUCLEAR EXUBERANCE
The years from the establishment of the Iran Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO)
in March 1974 until the heady months of late 1978 mark the golden age of Iran’s atomic
program. This was an era when the state’s elite bubbled with nuclear enthusiasm and the
program picked up operational and, concomitant with that, visionary and futuristic steam.
In this period windfall revenues generated by the 1973 oil bonanza coupled with
atmospherically amicable ties to the Western bloc made for unprecedentedly ideal
material and normative platforms for the Shah to push through with a grandiose nuclear
enterprise.
In this period, an all-important bureaucratic layer was established and added to
the INP and a remarkable socio-cultural engineering campaign was launched to wean the
Iranian bureaucracy and public off of an oil-dominated energy policy re-gearing it toward
a genuine appreciation for the cutting-edge nuclear technology. One can hardly overstate
the impact of Swiss-trained nuclear scientist Akbar Etemad in shaping and orienting the
INP in this era. As a matter of fact, it was Etemad who took upon himself the
responsibility of educating His Imperial Majesty into the world of the atom and the sociopolitical and bureaucratic imperatives of establishing a visionary and truly national
nuclear program.
In an era in Iran’s nuclear journey probably best characterized as the
institutionalization period of the INP, Akbar Etemad who, in no small part, thanks to a
lack of personally entrenched ties to either the United States or Great Britain, ran the
AEOI as independently of great power politics as feasible. An almost puritanically
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nationalistic figure, Etemad made the devising of an indigenous capacity on all matters
nuclear a top strategic priority. One might go so far as to claim that the roadmap Etemad
chartered for the INP created a path dependency along which Iran’s nuclear program
evolved even after the 1979 tectonic shifts in the political configuration of power in
Tehran. One wonders what an Islamic Republic nuclear program would have looked like
had the Shah not gotten the enterprise off the ground in that particular direction.
Apart from that, in this era one could also detect the initial signs of the
intertwinement of a nuclear capability with national security imperatives in the Shah’s
long-term calculations. The links are especially poignant within the context of India’s
“peaceful nuclear explosion” of May 1974, a monumental event that exercised an
indelible atmospheric impact on the gravitation of INP towards security thinking in these
years.
Establishment of the AEOI and the Indian PNE
In early March 1974, Reza Ghotbi, the Queen’s cousin and the head of Iran’s
National Radio and Television Organization, informed Etemad that the Shah, unhappy
with the lethargic pace and rudderless movement of Iran’s nuclear projects, had made a
final determination to get the ball rolling on a massive atomic program and was
contemplating putting Etemad at the helm. In a preliminary meeting, the Shah tasked
Etemad with charting a roadmap for Iran’s nuclear energy program within two weeks. In
a follow-up meeting, Etemad gave HIM a fifteen-page concept paper that laid out the
broad contours and overall trajectory of a national nuclear enterprise for Iran. The Shah
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went through Etemad’s proposed plan a few times and approved it on the spot as the
country’s strategic nuclear document.130
Following that meeting between Etemad, Hoveyda, and the Shah, on March 9,
1974 in an imperial decree addressed to Prime Minister Hoveyda, HIM ordered the
creation of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI):
“In view of the importance that we attach to the utilization of nuclear power in
the country's industrial and agricultural development programs, under this firman
(decree) the government is duty bound to set up organizations which will establish
coordination and supervision over all matters pertaining to the use of nuclear power as
well as in the construction of nuclear power generators and desalinization plants and in
preparing the necessary scientific and technical infrastructure necessary to implement
these projects.
We also stipulate that Mr. Akbar Etemad be assigned to prepare the organization
and the duties of this establishment, in a maximum period of 1 month, to be implemented
upon approval.
Because of the importance of the matter, these organizations will carry out their
duties under our direct supervision.
Niavaran Palace Esfand 18, 1352 (March 9, 1974).”131
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Following the decree and leaving no doubts on the significance he attached to the
nuclear issue, in his address to the nation on the occasion of the Iranian New Year
(March 21st), the Shah reiterated the importance of atomic energy and promised that Iran
would “enter the era of utilizing nuclear energy ... as soon as possible so that the
consumption of oil, this vital and exhaustible material whose nobility we have been able
to prove, is reduced to a minimum and so that this precious substance can be used to
produce chemical and petrochemical products instead of being used as ordinary fuel."132
The AEOI had a unique inception in that its establishment as an autonomous
organization in March 1974 was consummated by an imperial decree. What made the
organization even more an object of curiosity was its rather “unusual authority to hire
staff” unencumbered by the Iranian bureaucracy’s established SOPs133 and the
unprecedented latitude it was granted to jumpstart a massive nuclear enterprise
encompassing functions as wide-ranging as generating electricity, nuclear R&D,
international nuclear diplomacy, nuclear technology, and human resource training.134 The
exponential soar in the AEOI’s official budget from hardly over $30 million in 1975 to
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almost $1.5 billion in 1976 and about $3 billion in 1978 was testimony to the nuclear
programs absolute top priority in Iran’s hierarchy of national goals.135
As touched upon in the previous chapter, the upsurge in demand for nuclear
energy as a strategic alternative to oil following the October 1973 Arab oil embargo
against the United States and the Netherlands set both the feasibility and necessity
conditions for the Shah’s nuclear enterprise. The Shah’s ubiquitous emphasis on the
imperativeness of redirecting Iran’s hydrocarbon endowments toward producing high
value-added derivatives like petrochemicals defined the political economy of the Shah’s
civilian nuclear program.
Apparently, left underexplored in the Shah’s visionary paradigm was the
sustainability of high oil prices to bankroll an extravagant nuclear infrastructure over the
long-term and an ambitious reading of the Iranian economy’s absorptive capacity for the
projected 23000 megawatts of nuclear electricity to be generated by 1994. This figure
would essentially amount to some fifty percent of Iran's projected power capacity by that
time.
The AEOI director laid out more concretely the extravagant dimensions of Iran's
nuclear program in a December 1975 interview with Le Monde: “Iran's power capacity
today is in the order of 5,000 MWe, half of which is linked to the [national] grid. Of this,
80 percent is produced by thermal power stations and 20 percent by hydroelectric power
stations. In 18 years' time, we want to possess an installed power capacity of 70,000
MWe.” Pressed by the befuddled interviewer on the practicability of and the rationale for
such a steep surge in power production, Etemad condescendingly intoned, “In terms of
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Western norms this development plan does indeed appear unrealistic, but we consider it
accessible for several reasons. Our human resources are far from fully mobilized, our
finance possibilities are enormous and never before has there been such a political and
national will to achieve rapid and continuous industrialization."136
A lack of an explicit securitized response by the United States to this ambitious
goal later became a theme that the Islamic Republic constantly used as ammunition in
response to the nuclear weapons allegations leveled against it by Washington. The
Islamic Republic’s position was that whereas the issue of Iran’s hydrocarbon resources
was skated around by Washington and never militated against the Shah’s nuclear
program, the West constantly trumpeted it as justification for internationally designating
and marketing the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program as a security threat.
In any event, as Iran’s fledgling nuclear industry suffered from a severe lack of
trained manpower in 1974, the establishment of the AEOI serendipitously coincided with
an available pool of highly experienced nuclear professionals on the market. This came
about, Etemad later recounted, as shortly before the establishment of the AEOI there
transpired a mass exodus of nuclear scientists from Argentina following the populist
Peronist government’s academic purge in the early 1970s. The exodus only worsened
with fears of “budget cuts or of anti-upper-class terrorism” gripping the nuclear industry
under Peron’s widow.137 Chief among those who left was Rear Admiral Oscar A.
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Quihillalt, the director of the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA138)
for almost two decades (1955-1973) whom Etemad hired in May 1974 at a whopping
monthly salary of $10,000 to act as senior advisor to the AEOI.139 Quihillalt brought
with him a handful of former CNEA scientists and technicians that were indispensible in
jumpstarting Iran’s embryonic nuclear bid.
As a matter of fact, it was Quihillalt and his close associates who constituted the
technical and operational core of Iran’s nuclear program at this initial phase. In order to
maximize the transfer of technical and logistical know-how and create an intimate
atmosphere of collaboration, Etemad recalls, three or four Iranian technicians were
assigned to work under the supervision of an Argentinean professional. In time, the
camaraderie between the two in the AEOI grew so strong that the Argentineans started
referring to themselves as Argentine Iranians.140
Quihillalt’s legacy as a fierce advocate of indigenizing the full spectrum of the
nuclear energy cycle in Argentina was hardly a reassuring factor for the U.S. national
security elite. The Argentine connection was instrumental in how Tehran’s nuclear
activities became an object of suspicion for Washington later in the 1970s. Quihillalt’s
presence in Iran was specifically disconcerting to the Americans since under his
directorship, Argentina catapulted itself to the avant-garde of the nuclear industry in
Latin America. In 1958, for example, Argentina was the first Latin American country to
commission a research reactor. A decade later, in 1968, it was the first nation to operate a
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pilot chemical reprocessing plant in the region and again in 1974 Latin America’s first
nuclear power plant was commissioned in Argentina.141
The Indian PNE and its Fallout
As the Shah and his visionary nuclear mastermind Dr. Etemad were meticulously
setting the domestic and international stage for the newly founded Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI) to hit the ground running, the entire architecture of the
international nuclear industry was thrown for a loop on May 18, 1974. On this day, India
detonated a 12-kiloton plutonium device -rather oxymoronically termed a “peaceful
nuclear explosion” (PNE)- in the Rajasthan desert. This development touched off a
quantum shift in the tenuous equilibrium of power in South Asia with unmistakable
proliferation implications for the Middle East.
The timing of India’s PNE couldn’t have been worse for Iran as it caused a
change of heart in Washington about national nuclear programs and cast a long shadow
over the prospects for nuclear cooperation between the United States and Iran. The fact
that India used the research reactor provided by Canada and the United States for
producing the required fissile material for the PNE marked the beginning of the
designation of nationally run full fuel cycles and reprocessing facilities as proliferation
threats in successive U.S. administrations from Nixon on. The Indian explosion also
incorrigibly stigmatized the Atoms for Peace Program bringing to the fore a host of
proliferation pathologies associated with indigenous nuclear efforts.
From this perspective, the coincidence of the establishment of the AEOI with the
Indian test was the most fundamental impediment in the way of a nuclear deal between
Iran and the United States. This timing factor essentially turned the deal with Iran into a
141
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trendsetting and precedent-defining phenomenon for the White House. In other words,
even if Washington was willing (and the declassified evidence hardly lends credence to
this argument) to give the Shah the benefit of the doubt on proliferation, being at the
forefront of the United States’ new nuclear export policymaking process following the
Indian PNE made the nuclear deal with Iran an impossibly sensitive and thorny issue. On
this score, Washington’s argument was that cutting the Shah too much slack would make
it difficult to demand more stringent control mechanisms elsewhere.
The Nixon Administration’s National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 202
(imposing additional restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment, and
fuel to receiving countries) was the immediate manifestation of a drastically changed
atmosphere.142 Right on the heels of NSSM 202 came National Security Decision
Memorandum (NSDM) 255 of June 3, 1974, a watershed document that explicitly
securitized national chemical reprocessing and uranium enrichment programs and
advocated their replacement by “multinational enrichment, fuel fabrication and
reprocessing facilities.”143
Under these changed circumstances, the United States introduced a new policy of
enforcing “special bilateral controls” – beyond those required by the IAEA—on transfer
of nuclear reactors and fuel. This dramatic policy shift following the Indian explosion
was decidedly a departure from NSDM 235 of only a few months earlier (October 1973)
when the United States had declared that it would “not require as an essential
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precondition of supply that fuel fabrication and reprocessing take place in the United
States or in multi-nationally owned facilities.”144
The United States’ proposal, however, didn’t sit well with the Iranians (This was
true especially in the Ford Administration when the concept of multilateral chemical
plutonium reprocessing facilities as a mechanism to reduce proliferation risks in
instability-prone regions like the Middle East came to the fore). Tehran’s core argument
against such an arrangement was premised on feasibility and logistical grounds. The
Iranians believed that, due to the severe trust deficit between Iran and its periphery in the
Persian Gulf, working out the operational requirements of such an enterprise would be a
nightmare. Tehran, furthermore, viewed such a multilateral concept as impinging on its
national sovereignty rights as, in Iran’s judgment, it essentially amounted to depriving
Iran of the economic and strategic benefits accruing to stockpiling plutonium on its
territory.
Immediately following the Indian explosion, Tehran adopted a declaratory policy
of nuclear ambiguity with the Shah's spokesman emphasizing HIM "would have no
immediate comment on India's explosion."145 Tehran’s continued failure to publicly and
categorically condemn the Indian explosion gave rise to speculation in Washington that
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi "might have told the Shah of the scheduled detonation of a
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nuclear device" when Tehran and New Delhi concluded a communiqué in Tehran to
cooperate in the nuclear field just shortly before the May explosion.146
It is important to note that Iran’s official position on the issue of nuclear
proliferation was less than clear-cut even before the Indian explosion heightened the
Shah’s anxieties that Tehran was falling behind in the nuclear field. Despite being a
signatory to the NPT, Tehran’s official position on non-proliferation was that “the issues
[related to non-proliferation] will become more and more difficult as time passes, and
therefore a universally acceptable agreement should be approved as soon as possible on
the basis of the US-USSR proposals.147 This statement was a clear indication of a
carefully calibrated policy by Tehran to de-emphasize the NPT as a strategic response to
the challenge of proliferation in South Asia.
The Indian explosion, however, brought to the boiling point an already simmering
strategic competition between Tehran and New Delhi in the Indian Ocean basin. Within
this context, remarks by K. Subramaniam, director of the Indian Institute for Defense
Studies and Analysis, on the Shah's (and other Middle Eastern countries’) military
buildup were unmistakably poignant. In his rather condescending remarks, Subramaniam
dismissed the notion that the Shah’s sophisticated military buildup “in an area where the
societies are yet to make their transition into modern age” was simply a reaction to
Tehran’s legitimate security needs.148 Depicting such a conflicting relationship between
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Tehran’s security needs and its developmental imperatives by a prominent Indian
strategist exactly mirror imaged the Shah’s judgment on New Delhi’s nuclear explosion
which, in HIM judgment, showcased India’s striving to punch above its strategic weight
at the cost of its people’s welfare.149
The Shah, on the other hand, partly in resignation to the fact that Iran as a late
comer to the nuclear game was bound to trail India and Pakistan for some years to come,
redoubled its efforts to procure state-of-the-art conventional military hardware to
compensate for Tehran’s inferior nuclear status. As part of this policy, he developed a
keen interest in putting the Iranian navy in such a formidable position that India’s nuclear
test wouldn’t drastically tip the balance of power in the Indian Ocean. This would foil, in
HIM’s judgment, New Delhi’s efforts to put the Indian Ocean beyond the pale for
Tehran. Within this paradigm, one of the primary objectives of the Shah’s foreign policy
in the early 1970s was to maintain a permanently projective naval capacity in the Indian
Ocean. As an operational component of getting a credible and durable foothold combined
with maximum maneuverability in the Indian Ocean, the Shah sought to purchase and
incorporate Spruance-class destroyers to the Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) during his July
1973 trip to Washington.150
Whether deliberately or by default, during these years in the mid 1970s,
Washington was also embracing of the Shah’s conventional build-up concept viewing it
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as a strategy to conventionally bribe the unquenchable Monarch away from getting any
big nuclear ideas. The notion fit so well into the Shah’s military thinking in the mid1970s that it convinced him to put a premium on obtaining conventional supremacy. This
vision of the Shah was most cogently expressed at the conclusion of the Imperial Air
Force air show on March 14, 1977: "Our army will be nonnuclear and will defend our
peace and security. Naturally, a nonnuclear army ought to be much stronger than a
nuclear army in both numbers and the quality of equipment."151
Well aware of the Shah’s mode of thinking on the issue, in June 1974, a Defense
Department official revealed Washington's agreement to sell three Tang-class submarines
and six Sprunce class destroyers to the Shah. On top of that, mention was made of
tentative plans to sell a small carrier to the Imperial Iranian Navy suitable for amphibious
operations. As Tehran didn’t have any use for the submarines in the Persian Gulf, the
Shah’s interest in purchasing them could only be tied to HIM’s vision on the Indian
Ocean basin as Iran’s natural sphere of influence where a Persian balancing act was
imperative. In concurrence with HIM’s judgment, Washington believed that since both
India and Pakistan possessed some submarine capability, their provision to the Shah
would be a fitting addition to Iran’s naval strength.152
It is worth mentioning here that the documents declassified so far do not shed a
definitive light on whether the United States consciously viewed and sold the cart
blanche it granted the Shah to acquire a formidable conventional capability as a
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dissuasive mechanism to hedge against the Shah’s potential nuclear weapons ambitions.
Such an inside logic in Washington is not far-fetched, however, considering the fact that
the United States pursued such a strategy vis-à-vis Israel in the 1970s.153 As a matter of
fact, in 1976 the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a prestigious UK
based think-tank, floated the idea that the United States’ proliferation concerns could be
manipulated by countries like Iran to extract non-nuclear concessions in other issue areas.
According to this analysis, these weaponization concerns could potentially “enhance the
risk that” for countries like South Africa, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, “a minimal
nuclear option might become attractive, not for reasons of military security but as a lever
to bargain for American concessions in non-nuclear fields, particularly over the supply of
conventional arms.”154
But it is also equally plausible to argue that Tehran’s evidently insatiable thirst for
conventional armaments might have had an intensifying impact on the threat designation
of its equally ambitious nuclear program. From this perspective, one could argue that the
military dividends of Iran’s nuclear program were contextualized within the broader
theme of its enthusiastic bid for “supremacy” – a cherished term in HIM’s strategy
nomenclature—in the Persian Gulf and ultimately in the Indian Ocean.155 Having a
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nuclear capacity would, from this viewpoint, broaden Iran’s maneuverability and powerprojection perimeter by ensuring—through nuclear deterrence-- its homeland security.
Just to give some sense of perspective to the latter point, according to one expert,
“unless other nations engage in similar military buildups, when the Shah’s orders of F14s, attack helicopters, antisubmarine reconnaissance aircraft, tanker aircraft, destroyers,
TOWs, Mavericks, Hawks, Tigercats, Rapiers, and Sidewinders are in inventory, Iran
will be one of the ranking conventional military powers in the world.” Within such a
context, even if Washington’s private strategic thinking was one of dis-incentivzing Iran
toward the nuclear option by rendering such a capability cumbersome and redundant
through giving HIM a carte blanche to buy conventional weapons, the regional narrative
might have been one that placed Tehran’s civilian nuclear program within a broader
military-strategic context.
In this regards and as we will see in the following pages, the Shah’s remarkable
success in securing conventional armaments from the U.S. also had a deleterious impact
on the conclusion of a comprehensive Nuclear Agreement between the US and Iran as it
further spooked and antagonized an already alarmist anti-Shah U.S. Congress.
The First Proliferation Red Flags Emerge
The Shah’s (purportedly misquoted) statements just a few weeks after the Indian
explosion gave even more credibility to fears in Washington that a nuclear arms race
between Iran and India might be rapidly unfolding. Pressed on the question of whether
Iran would go nuclear in the future, the Shah, allegedly in some off-the-cuff remarks,
quipped, "certainly, and sooner than is believed, but contrary to India, we have first
thought of our people and then of technology." Although these remarks were later
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categorically retracted and denied by the Iranian embassy in Paris, their impact on the
designation of Iran as a proliferation threat down the road were undeniable. During the
same interview with the French weekly Les Informations, on June 23, 1974 the Shah
referred to his sophisticated military machinery and his ambitious future plans to advance
it as a “force de dissuasion et de frappe."156 To some apprehensive observers, the
deterrent connotations of the phrase clearly betrayed a Shah harboring nuclear capability
ambitions. To heighten Washington’s consternation even further, in a later interview
broadcast on French TV, a visibly irritated Shah took to task the notion that it was
“totally normal” for countries like Great Britain to possess nuclear weapons while
“automatically” enjoying NATO’s protective nuclear umbrella whereas a strategically
lonely Iran’s right to self defense was viciously being touted as problematic.157
Shortly afterward, the Shah’s interview with Le Monde during his state visit to
France didn’t help dispel or assuage concerns either. This time around, the Shah
pointedly declared that if small Middle Eastern countries embarked on a nuclearization
path, no matter how primitive or crude, then Iran’s “national interests” would compel it to
follow suit.158
Following these remarks, in an immediate cable to the Secretary of State, the U.S.
Ambassador to Tehran and former Director of National Intelligence (DCI), Richard
Helms, commented that the Shah had Egypt and Israel in mind when referring to other
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countries’ nuclear behavior.159 Israel seemed to be the most credible referent object in the
caveat clause of the Shah’s speech as HIM specified “little” countries in the region. As is
evident, the external circumstances were not helping curb the Shah’s nuclear appetite.
In this connection, it is also worth remembering that in 1974 Iran was aware of
Israel’s capability to make the atomic bomb as in December 1974 Israeli President
Ephraim Katzir went public, for the first time, with his country’s possession of nuclear
weapons know-how.160 Furthermore, a few days before these statements by the Shah, on
June 14 1974, President Nixon and President Sadat had signed an agreement entitled
“Principles of Relations and Cooperation between Egypt and the United States" that
provided for Washington to supply Cairo with nuclear reactors and fuel.161
These major developments seem to have injected a sense of urgency in the Shah
that Iran was lagging behind in the nuclear field and had to, rhetorically at least, play
catch up. This was part of HIM’s reasoning to refrain from categorically ruling out the
nuclear option in Iran’s security paradigm in his multiple interviews after the Indian
explosion where His Imperial Majesty chose to keep the United States guessing by
linking up Tehran’s non-proliferation posture to the continuation of the status quo in the
Middle East’s strategic environment. This was a decision that infinitely compounded
Washington’s proliferation apprehensions. Following the Indian explosion, in the U.S.
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intelligence community’s judgment, Iran was “likely to reassess the recent warming of its
relations with India” in light of the fact that the Shah was “determined to develop Iran
into the region's paramount power, and was probably miffed at having been upstaged by
India.” From this perspective, the Indian test would further accelerate Tehran’s quest for
nuclear energy facilities in Iran.162
It is also worth mentioning that lurking beneath Iran’s heightened threat
perceptions in the wake of India’s explosion was an opportunistic desire by the Shah to
get maximum mileage out of an air of nuclear inevitability created by India. For instance,
in a joint communiqué issued at the end of the Shah's visit to India on October 4, 1974,
the two sides made a point of emphasizing the "importance of insuring that access to
nuclear technology is not confined to a few countries" underlining its implications for
economic development and human welfare."163
The international community’s, with the exception of Canada and the U.S., fairly
tolerant and lenient response to India’s 1974 explosion was also another factor in
accentuating the United States’ worst fears that countries like Iran would push against the
boundaries of the non-proliferation regime in a tightly bipolar international system to see
how much nuclear adventurism they could get away with. France, Iran’s main nuclear
partner during the mid 1970s was at the forefront of Washington’s countries of concern
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about the transfer of proliferation-prone technology to Third World countries in exchange
for financial gains.
It was within such context that the United States came to internalize the
inadequacy, unenforceability and potential credulity of the IAEA safeguards and the NPT
commitments as counter-proliferation measures. The intelligence community was
specifically concerned that these international contractual mechanisms would fall short
either in detecting clandestine diversion of nuclear materials and equipment or in
dissuading "any state bent on developing a weapon." Thus viewed, in Washington’s
judgment, this shortcoming coupled with the French and German governments’ subpar
commitment to prioritizing their non-proliferation interests over their commercial and
political gains made for a permissive, if not promiscuous, proliferation environment in
the international system.164
In such an atmosphere in mid-1974 and as the securitizing factors were piling up
on Iran’s nascent nuclear program, the Shah made a determination to take the lead, along
with Egypt, in initiating the idea of establishing a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ)
in the Middle East. As part of this de-securitizing posture, on July 13, 1974, Tehran made
a request to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to take up an item entitled
"Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East." The
conventional wisdom at the time was that the Shah had a broadly-conceived notion of the
term Middle East that included Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt whom Tehran feared were
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predisposed to make a run for the bomb following the Indian explosion.165 It is worth
mentioning here that although Iran had made the original proposal in 1968 for the
international community to recognize the Middle East as a nuclear-free zone, in the hectic
circumstances surrounding the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, it was not put on the UNGA
agenda. Despite its lack of substantial traction, as State Department documents
demonstrate, this initiative had some moderate impact in ameliorating the United States’
worst proliferation fears especially following the controversy over HIM’s remarks in
Paris on June 23, 1974.
On a more pragmatic level, Iran’s advocacy of the NWFZ idea also fell well in
line with the argument marshaled by nuclear pundits as a possible determinant holding in
check Iran’s proliferation desires. This line of thinking was essentially based on the
strategic imprudence of initiating a potentially game-changing nuclear arms race by a
country of considerable strategic depth and conventional superiority. From this
perspective, considering the “equalizing” function of nukes in neutralizing conventional
quantitative and qualitative power relativities, it would be self-defeating for Tehran to
nuclearize its strategic environment, as it would trigger a proliferation domino effect in
Iraq, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.166
Tehran’s Nuclear Standoff with Washington
As previously touched upon, despite Tehran’s high hopes and keen interest in
securing maximum nuclear cooperation from the United States, the fallout of the Indian
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explosion nipped, for all practical purposes, its materialization in the bud. This situation
was in stark contrast with the prevailing atmosphere in Western Europe where Iran made
fairly smooth and long strides in securing both nuclear hardware and software
acquisitions. As the Shah attached infinitely more strategic weight to nuclear partnership
with the United States though, however, the standoff with Washington incrementally
turned into the litmus test of the resilience and profundity of the latter’s commitment to
Tehran as an indispensible ally.
Following the Indian explosion, a major impediment in the way of finalizing a
strategic nuclear cooperation document between Tehran and Washington was the United
States’ dogged insistence on long-term sole source fuel contracts with the U.S.,
disposition of plutonium, and physical security. The United States’ new position was
based on a new policy of enforcing “special bilateral controls” – beyond those required
by the IAEA—on transfer of nuclear reactors and fuel. These new requirements were
diametrically opposed to Etemad’s insistence on Iran having full command & control
over its indigenously enriched and processed fissile material.
Although Washington initially played with the idea of settling only for IAEA
safeguards and the NPT obligations as satisfactory counter-proliferation measures, a host
of second thoughts, partly associated with the high concentration of power in Iran and
transition of power contingencies associated with Iran’s political system quickly kicked
in. These apprehensions emanated from HIM’s peculiar decision-making style that
betrayed a deteriorating “Super Shah syndrome,” and its accompanying “invincibility”
delusions.167
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For instance, according to a June 1974 State Department Internal Memorandum,
“Although Iran is a currently stable, that stability is heavily dependent on the Shah's
remaining in power. In a situation of instability, domestic dissidents or foreign terrorists
might easily be able to size any special nuclear materials stored in Iran for use in
bombs…. An aggressive successor to the Shah might consider nuclear weapons the final
item needed to establish Iran's complete military dominance of the region.”168
Washington’s concerns with the stylistics of the Shah’s mode of governance were
even more candidly articulated in the mainstream U.S. media. For instance, a 1974
Newsweek article quoted a Washington strategist warning the United States against
creating a “Frankenstein monster” that would prove an unstablizing force “with his
egomania and his expansionist vision of the revival of ancient Persia's power.”169
It is worth remembering that the United States’ concern with the stylistics of the
Shah’s rule as a potential source of uncertainty and instability and an obstacle for a
smooth transition of power went back at least to the mid-1960s. A 1966 State Department
cable, for instance, reads: “Despite the fact that the Shah is presently riding tall in the
saddle serious weaknesses remain on the Iranian scene. The Shah’s life continues to be at
the mercy of the fanatic or disgruntled who may be prepared to give his life to eliminate
the Iranian ruler. This, of course, is an internal security threat by no means peculiar to
Iran. However, the narrowness of the political base in Iran renders this threat more acute
than in other countries enjoying a broader base of political support and greater prospects
168
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for an effective follow-on-government.”170 Under these atmospherics, as the symptoms of
popular discontent grew visible in 1977, Washington grew even more apprehensive of the
prospect of a sophisticated nuclear infrastructure in a country in imminent danger of
regime-change with anti-Western Islamists pounding on the door.
Well aware of these domestic uncertainties in Iran and mounting anti-Shah
sentiments on the home front, the Nixon Administration came to the position that only an
agreement along the lines concluded with Egypt and Israel, which had made allowances
for additional safeguardability beyond the IAEA and NPT mechanisms, stood a realistic
chance of passage through a U.S. Congress increasingly leery of Iran’s sable-rattling and
the Shah’s military extravaganza in the Persian Gulf. Iran, adamant about having
indigenous reprocessing capacity, vehemently opposed the special safeguards stipulation
partly on the grounds that Tehran, while a member in good standing of the NPT, was
essentially being (mis)treated as a non-member.
It should be noted here that the implications of this last point apply equally to
both the Shah and the Islamic Republic era and have to do with differing modes of
interpreting the NPT between Iran and the United States. Put simply, Washington, as the
progenitor and custodian of the international non-proliferation regime, viewed the NPT
commitments of member states as constituting only a bare minimum mechanism to
establish the country’s non-proliferation credentials –hence in need of being reinforced
and fortified through auxiliary reinsuring measures like bilateral safeguards agreements
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). From Iran’s perspective, however, NPT
membership denoted a clean bill of health on the signatory’s nuclear activities whose
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bona fides shouldn’t be constantly second guessed. But the reality of the situation was
that not only was the United States impossibly reluctant to put the Shah on a long nuclear
leash, it was not even fully willing to grant Iran the indigenous fuel-cycle privileges that
were completely within its NPT rights.
At a time when Iran was bending backwards to wean itself from oil and move
toward the atom to meet its industrial electricity demands, in Etemad’s assessment, denial
of these rights to Iran was tantamount to a breach of Nuclear Weapons States’ NPT
obligations under Article IV of the treaty.171 Etemad believed that the imposition of
rigorous extra-NPT control mechanisms blurred the difference between civilian and
military nuclear technologies that lay at the very foundation of the bargaining between
nuclear haves and have-nots that roped the latter into the NPT regime in the first place.172
Etemad’s reasoning for Iran’s go-it-alone philosophy on the fuel cycle was that Iran
couldn’t afford to be held hostage to any foreign country for its fuel requirements and
live with that vulnerability since any reneging by the foreign supplier on its contracts
would render Iran’s nuclear investment and infrastructure operationally useless.
This rationale of Etemad was not entirely lost on the Americans either. In point of
fact, numerous State Department cables drew the Ford Administration’s attention to the
inherent incompatibility, both in spirit and substance, between pursuing draconian extra-
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NPT restrictions across the board and championing universal membership for the
embattled treaty.173
Additionally, the Shah believed that, due to its domestic stability and its pivotal
position in stabilizing the Middle East, Iran shouldn’t be treated like Egypt and Israel,
countries that in HIM’s judgment, were trouble spots and potential sources of instability.
Put simply, from the Shah’s perspective, lumping Iran together with Israel and Egypt in
the same category was Washington’s way of saying that Iran was not a mature state. As
far as HIM was concerned, nothing could be farther from the truth.
On the basis of these realities, the Shah was unyielding about his demands to
receive “preferential treatment” in technology and fuel supply. Such a treatment would
essentially exclude the additional stringent measures the United States had included in its
agreements with non-NPT member states like Israel and Egypt. These measures included
“reprocessing, fabrication and storage of U.S. material and plutonium produced from the
use of U.S. supplied material or equipment outside the [recipient] country; offering the
U.S. first option to "buy back" produced plutonium; the provision of mutually agreed
physical security measures; expressed confirmation that the recipient would not use U.S.
material for PNEs and that all future nuclear material and facilities entering the country
would be subject to IAEA safeguards.”174
Over almost four years of intense negotiations with Iran (that practically made
Iran part of the legislative debates leading to the Jimmy Carter’s Nuclear Non173
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Proliferation Act of 1978), the United States envisaged four possible scenarios in striking
a nuclear deal with Iran. The first and least favored option by Washington was to
conclude a civilian nuclear deal without any additional controls on top of those imposed
through the NPT and IAEA mechanisms. Washington reasoned that the option, referred
to as the standard agreement, would have the great merit of rewarding the Shah’s
adherence to those two non-proliferation regimes while not discrediting their efficiency
by imposing additional restrictions. Concluding an agreement along those lines would
essentially grant Iran the “most favored nation” status on a par with Japan and Western
European states, a privilege HIM deemed Iran was fully deserving of in light of its
“special relationship” with the United States.
The State Department’s reasoning against this option, however, was based on
three grounds. For one thing, being ill-timed, on the bureaucratic front, such an
agreement had only minimum chance of passage through an alarmist Congress without
some serious and potentially time-consuming arms wrestling. Furthermore, on
“substantive” grounds, such a deal would expose U.S supplied technology and fuel
supply to a slew of potential risk situations, not least among them diversion, sabotage,
terrorism, theft, and regime change. Last, Washington was nervous that the Shah’s
commitment to Iran’s NPT obligations was not ironclad and irreversible and, when push
came to shove, His Imperial Majesty might decide to reverse course and pull out of the
NPT.
The second scenario consisted of concluding an agreement within the parameters
set by the IAEA safeguards and the NPT commitments with the bare minimum of
additional “physical protection” controls. Although this via-media option, the State
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Department argued, stood a fighting chance of clearing a gun-shy and foot-dragging
Congress, it would not alleviate the Shah’s ever mounting suspicions that Iran was being
“singled out” by receiving subpar and double-standard treatment.
The third scenario, most favored by the Department of State and the Atomic
Energy Commission, fell between the first two scenarios. According to this option, the
United States would have “veto rights over reprocessing, fabrication, and storage of U.S.
material and plutonium produced from the use of U.S. supplied material or equipment.”
This option would modify the one-size-fits-all approach of subjecting all the future
nuclear agreements to the stringent and sweeping cautionary measures applied to Israel
and Egypt, both non-signatory to the NPT at the time, and reward Iran’s NPT
membership by not requiring the external disposition of plutonium as required of Egypt
and Israel. It is interesting to note, however, that the U.S. State Department thought even
the veto rights incorporated in the third scenario were inadequate in finalizing the nuclear
deal with the Shah. State officials’ rationale was that the physical presence of plutonium
on Iranian territory constituted a potential proliferation risk. In the State Department’s
judgment, this option only stood a minimum chance of receiving the Shah’s blessing as
HIM would interpret veto rights as discriminatory, infringing upon Iran’s sovereignty and
dignity, and running afoul of the spirit of Iran’s relations with the United States.
The fourth option entertained by the United States was one of subjecting Iran to
the same maximalist and proliferation-proof standards imposed on Israel and Egypt.
Although this option, the Americans argued, would be ideal in placating proliferation
concerns of the Congress, it had its own major drawbacks: for one thing, it would have a
detrimental atmospheric impact on the credibility of the international non-proliferation
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regime on the eve of the First NPT Review Conference in May 1975. The thrust of the
argument was that, if the United States failed to offer “preferential treatment” to the NPT
signatories like Iran, it would deal a paralyzing blow to the incentive mechanisms
envisioned and enshrined in the NPT to consolidate the treaty into the cornerstone of an
all-inclusive universal non-proliferation regime. For another, the State Department
reasoned, the Shah would find “especially onerous” the explicit preclusion of any
reprocessing, storage, and fabrication involvement by Iran in the U.S. supplied fuel and
technology.175
The very existence of such wide-ranging scenarios was testimony to massive
chasms in the US government on how best to cope with the nuclear wishes of a major
ally constantly knocking on the door. The time constraints imposed on the situation-with an anxious AEOI chomping at the bit to cut a deal with the Washington, the U.S.
nuclear industry turning up it lobbying pressure, and the mercantilist Europeans waiting
in the wings to gobble up lucrative nuclear deals—made the emergence of a consensus
opinion practically impossible. For example, whereas Richard Helms was on the most
liberal side of the spectrum, calling for the administration to give the Shah the benefit of
the doubt on proliferation, the Department of Defense positioned itself on the
conservative extreme advocating the imposition of the most stringent conditions on
chemical reprocessing and plutonium stockpiling rights.
The DoD’s position was that the issue of chemical reprocessing in sensitive
proliferation-prone areas like the Middle East should be “delayed as long as possible”
before diversion-resistant mechanisms, like multinational reprocessing facilities, could be
175
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adequately conceptualized and realistically operationalized. Based on this judgment, the
DoD believed that Tehran’s push for reprocessing rights was premature at least by a
decade since Iran wouldn’t need such a facility until the mid-1980s. Put simply, the
Pentagon’s advice was one of “we will cross that bridge when we come to it,” advising
the administration to avoid jumping the gun on reprocessing and trapping itself into an
inflexible commitment.176 Heeding such advice would require leaving the issue in as
malleable and noncommittal shape as possible, an arrangement certain to be construed by
an already skeptical Etemad and company as a dilatory, if not outright obstructive,
attitude.
Under these circumstances, Etemad’s inflexible insistence on establishing such a
capital-intensive reprocessing facility for a budding nuclear program, in the face of
concrete evidence against its short-term economic viability, only helped exacerbate the
United States’ proliferation concerns. In the U.S. judgment, under the prevailing
circumstances, anticipated to obtain for another decade or so, “the value of the products
from reprocessing (enriched uranium and plutonium) exceeded the costs of
reprocessing,” thus rendering the spent fuel rods of no commercial value.177
Richard Helms, on the other hand, was arguably the most sympathetic figure in
the U.S. Government toward concluding a relatively lenient nuclear deal with Iran. As
U.S. Ambassador to Iran from March 1973 to January 1977, Helm’s friendship with the
Shah went way back to the days they were schoolmates in Switzerland’s prestigious
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boarding school, Institut Le Rosey. Putting aside their interpersonal affinity, Helm’s core
argument was that a compromise deal with the Shah should be sealed in the interest of
time. In the Ambassador’s judgment, considering the fact that Washington’s nearmonopoly position on nuclear power plants and fuel supply was rapidly wearing out,
finalizing an expeditious agreement would not only secure the United States’ commercial
interests but would, more realistically, be in line with its non-proliferation interests as
well. Pursuing a long-drawn-out principle-based-- as opposed to time-sensitive and
pragmatic-- negotiating strategy with Iran, in Helm’s judgment, would push an otherwise
reluctant Iran toward European suppliers who were more likely to bend their counterproliferation standards to reap lucrative power-plant deals. Under such circumstances,
Helms argued, perfectionism in negotiating a bilateral deal would be a self-defeating
strategy, as it would estrange Iran from the U.S. nuclear community and deprive
Washington of a hands-on monitoring advantage to detect proliferation symptoms early
on.
In 1975 and arguing against measures that might be construed by the Shah as
draconian and discriminatory, Helms maintained, the administration should undertake
whatever measures required and in a timely manner to become Iran’s “principal supplier
for fuel and plant.” Helms believed that fostering such a high-density interaction with
Iran would make Iran’s “most vital interests” so vulnerable to and dependent on the
United States that Washington would gain “ultimate sanction against an Iranian desire to
develop a nuclear weapons capability.” This mechanism, according to Helms, along with
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the NPT and the IAEA guarantees, would give the United States a capability to go for the
full-court press should Iran’s nuclear program went awry.178
The Iranians, on the other hand, stuck to their guns in demanding a nationally
built, managed, and operated indigenous chemical reprocessing facility. The issue
constituted the most significant reason for the threat designation of the INP in mid 1975.
For the Americans, Iran’s apparently unexplainable reluctance to act as a site for the
United States’ multinational reprocessing concept could only stem from an “unspoken
unwillingness” to submit Iran’s nuclear facilities to “foreign surveillance.”179
Cognizant of the strategic implications of concluding a nuclear agreement with
Tehran in a timely fashion, in late 1974 Washington showed some readiness to temper its
maximalist demands, especially on the issue of US veto rights on indigenous plutonium
reprocessing by Iran suggesting it would “look sympathetically” on the issue. The
mechanism the United States was entertaining to preclude the diversion of plutonium for
proliferation purposes was the establishment of multinational reprocessing plants assisted
and monitored by the United States. As this promising development on the executive
level was being entertained and as Iran was signaling tentative receptivity to the idea of
multinational reprocessing, however, the Ford Administration was forced to re-calcify its
negotiating under the pressure of two factors. First, came a hardening of US position due
to an increasingly anti-Shah Congress some of whose members had now developed
country-specific
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circumstances, Iranian concessions, on the concept of multinationalizing reprocessing
facilities, wouldn’t simply cut it.
The second factor emanated from Washington’s proliferation concerns in
Pakistan. On this score, as any nuclear deal with Iran would define the broader contours
and set a precedent for the United States’ post-India nuclear policy, Washington was
concerned lest an excessively lenient approach toward Iran have a detractive impact on
US efforts to discourage other suppliers from giving Islamabad the reprocessing
capability it was feverishly shopping around for.180
In any case, a cursory survey of the foregoing four scenarios demonstrates a
seemingly irreconcilable disharmony of objectives in the U.S. Government’s efforts to
negotiate a comprehensive nuclear deal with the Shah. The misalignment of interests
flowed, in no small part, from the fact that Washington’s macro-security interests,
epitomized by the US-USSR superpower rivalry, were inherently clashing with and had a
dampening impact on its non-proliferation interests applied to its strategic partners.
The discordance of interests at macro and micro levels in a tightly bipolar
international system during the Cold War provided invaluable maneuverability for
nuclear aspirants strategically allied with either pole to run proliferation-prone nuclear
activities without being publicly singled out or treated as security threats. Iran, for its
part, tried to make the most of the gap generated by this incoherence at the geostrategic
and doctrinal levels.
As previously mentioned, further widening this gap was the fact that, despite
Washington’s strenuous efforts, the designation of indigenous nuclear programs as
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proliferation threats following the 1974 Indian test was not universally shared. Western
European countries, specifically France and Germany, didn’t construe the Indian
underground explosion as warranting the subordination of their commercial interests to
security concerns (as Washington expected) and forged ahead with power plant sales
under relatively permissive conditions. It was under such circumstances that Germany’s
Kraftwork Union AG (KWU) commenced construction of Bushehr Nuclear Power Plants
(known as Iran-I and Iran-II) in November 1974 simply based on a letter of intent (LOI)
pending the conclusion of a formal contract.
Under these circumstances, as the United States’ dominant (its monopoly had
already been compromised by now) position in both technological and fuel supply fields
was eroding, the divergence in proliferation risk judgments had real consequences if
Washington failed to bring Bonn and Paris onto the same page with its threat perceptions.
This was exactly the reality of the situation on the ground in the mid-1970s as the United
States’ efforts to nudge the Shah’s nuclear program away from the purely commercial
zone into the security zone met with relatively little success in Europe. Put crudely, as far
as Germany and France were concerned, the 1973 oil embargo trumped the tentative
proliferation implications of India’s 1974 explosion and Western Europe’s energy
imperatives and commercial stakes were just far too high to be abandoned or even put on
the backburner.
Additionally

adding

to

the

Ford

Administration’s

subpar

success

to

institutionalize its proliferation concerns in Europe was an underlying inconsistency and
conflict of interests between crucial commercial incentives and long-range security
concerns existing in Washington. For instance, at the same time as Washington was

104

perceptibly worried about the scope and depth of the nuclear net the Shah was casting,
the U.S. State Department was encouraging the Bechtel Corporation to “approach” the
Shah about investing some $300 million in a future private uranium enrichment facility in
the United States181 and was anxious to finalize a six to eight billion dollar reactor and
fuel deal with Iran.182
Still further complicating the delicate juggling game Washington was playing in
the post-1974 era was the unpromising prospect of obtaining the approval of an
increasingly trepidations and anti-Shah Capitol Hill whose imprimatur the White House
needed before consummating any nuclear deal with Iran. Under these untoward
conditions, finding a mutually satisfactory common ground without alienating the Shah in
an evolving strategic environment had an air of squaring the circle to it.
In any case, as the Ford Administration was endeavoring to mollify Capitol Hill’s
heightened non-proliferation concerns without alienating a nettled Shah from the US
orbit, a whole slew of external factors were introducing new challenges to an already
difficult situation. Important among them was the Shah’s dissatisfaction with the
treatment he was receiving from Washington when Iran was not invited to the newly
established Nuclear Supplier Group’s (NSG) first meeting in November 1975 in London.
This non-invitation happened despite HIM’s expressed strenuous desire for the NSG

181

Confidential. From New-Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. OES/ Nelson F. Sievering Jr. to Secretary of State.
Nuclear Energy Agreement for Cooperation with Iran. December 6, 1974.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc04.pdf (Accessed July 16, 2010).

182

Secret. Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State. Draft Agreement on Atomic Energy. April 1975.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc05b.pdf (Accessed July 24, 2010).

105

members to adopt an interactive approach with the nuclear technology recipient countries
instead of blackballing them through the cultish London Club.183
Unimpressed by Iran’s exclusion from the NSG, in a December 1975 interview
with Le Monde, Etemad unleashed a most scathing critique of the NSG’s mode of
operation: “I find it rather difficult to understand the attitude of the seven [NSG]
countries which meet in London regularly with a view to coordinating their attitude
toward their nuclear customers,” Etemad observed. He then called into question the
NSG’s “ostensible” objective of preventing nuclear proliferation and charged it with
creating an “international atmosphere marked by mistrust and suspicion.” The AEOI
director went even further wondering, “whether the real motives of the "London Group"
did not extend beyond the proclaimed objectives.” “If it is true that only non-proliferation
is being discussed,” Etemad challenged, “why are these talks held behind closed doors?
Why are some countries that are more directly concerned with these problems are not
asked to join the group?” The AEOI director’s rather disturbing prediction was that “as a
result of this behavior the nonproliferation treaty [was] being endangered without any
real new guarantees being added to the nonproliferation measures already extant."184
As evident in these remarks, in Iran’s judgment, the NSG epitomized a selfdefeating cloak-and-dagger approach toward proliferation by the Ford Administration
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whose net result was making the atomic option even more intriguing for nuclear
aspirants.
Miffed at Washington’s purportedly discriminatory and arbitrary policy of
exclusion and inclusion (during a conversation with Ambassador Helms in June 1976) the
chairman of the AEOI clearly laid out Tehran’s nuclear weapons thinking. Etemad
argued that Iran, on geostrategic grounds, thought proliferation “anathema” to its interests
and had a much more tenacious vested interest than the United States did in maintaining
the Middle East a proliferation-free region. Etemad went on strongly urging the United
States to practically help ease a Pakistan “traumatized” by India’s May explosion out of
its “desperate frame of mind” if Washington didn’t wish to see a nuclear Islamabad and
its spillover into the Middle East.185
In the meantime, as Washington was gaining a fuller understanding of the scope
and scale of Iran’s nuclear enterprise, the White House’s concerns over the Shah’s longterm nuclear intentions were growing more acute and pronounced. Now, U.S.
Government’s secret documents were explicitly questioning the Iranian economy’s
absorptive capacity and maturity for 23000 MW of nuclear electricity over a matter of
two decades. Further undercutting the exclusively electricity rationale for the existence of
the nuclear program, in the US judgment, was the fact that Iran’s Ministry of Energy, the
presumed consumer of the atomic energy, was not institutionally in the decision-making
loop of the AEOI. This bureaucratic anomaly further intensified proliferation concerns.
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Around this time, the Americans also started viewing through a jaundiced lens
His Majesty’s “lively personal interest” in the issue of the atom. The net result was an
unprecedentedly candid judgment that "the components of the [Iranian Government's]
motivation to acquire this complex and extensive technology [were] not entirely clear."
Even less unmistakable was speculation that “it [was] possible that Iran’s interest in
acquiring nuclear knowhow and plutonium [was], in part, motivated by the desire to
preserve the option of developing nuclear weapons should the region’s power balance
shift toward the nuclear.” 186
These misgivings notwithstanding, the Ford Administration was hard at work,
with much back and forth going on between different government agencies, to assemble a
coherent action plan before a scheduled state visit by the Shah to the United States in
May 1975. Knowing full well that the nuclear issue would figure prominently in his
negotiations with HIM and succumbing to the Administration’s proliferation concerns,
President Ford, in NSDM 292, decided to stick with a strict policy of maintaining US
veto rights over chemical reprocessing of US supplied fuel on proliferation-risk grounds.
The decision was made despite recognition in the Administration that the Shah might
interpreter a hardened US posture as an “affront” to his dignity and his country’s
sovereignty, a scenario that could derail Iran-US relations off their strategic path.187
Just as expected, the Shah’s high-profile visit to Washington fell well short of
extracting concessions on the nuclear front from the Ford Administration. Nor did the
186

Secret. From Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State, Multinational Nuclear Centers: Assessment of
Iranian Attitudes toward Plutonium Reprocessing. July 17, 1975.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc07.pdf (Accessed May 25, 2011).
187

Secret. National Security Decision Making 292, US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation. April 22, 1975
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc05d.pdf (July 25, 2010)

108

May 1975 NPT review conference and the meetings between Etemad and the American
delegation prove fruitful in surmounting the formidable dilemma of Iran’s right to
reprocessing American supplied fuel rods. If anything, these meetings further widened
the trust gap between the Shah and the Americans.
In such an atmosphere, shortly after HIM’s U.S. trip, a July 1975 report
conducted by the Hudson Institute, founded by Herman Kahn, came down heavily on the
possibility of Iran pursuing a deterrent-worthy nuclear option at least within a regional
context. The thrust of the report’s argument was that the Shah’s decision to acquire the
nuclear option did not need to be driven exclusively by the developments in Iran’s
strategic regional environment. Rather, Lewis Dunn, the ACDA188-contracted report’s
author, argued, an ambitious Shah’s desire to acquire military hegemony in the Persian
Gulf would constitute enough inducement for Iran to go nuclear in the mid 1980s.
This judgment essentially amounted to a refutation of the Shah’s repeatedly
articulated position that Tehran would not self-referentially and without being provoked
seek a nuclear capability simply to throw its weight around in the Middle East. The report
also mentioned an Israeli decision to shed the amimut189 and start brandishing its nuclear
arsenal or a Pakistani, Libyan, or Egyptian move toward nuclearization as possible
scenarios under which Iran would nuclearize.
Following the Hudson Institute report, in an October 1975 cable to Richard
Helms, Secretary of State Kissinger drew the Ambassador’s attention to the fact that Iran
seemed to have calcified its position with Etemad categorically rejecting U.S. demand for
188
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veto rights on chemical reprocessing and appearing unreceptive to the concept of
multinational reprocessing. As mentioned before, in the Secretary’s judgment, Iran’s
logic-defying reluctance to act as a site for the United States’ multinational reprocessing
concept could as well flow from an “unspoken unwillingness” to submit Iran’s nuclear
facilities to “foreign surveillance.”190
In the cable, Dr. Kissinger contextualized the proliferation concerns emanating
from such an inflexible stance by Tehran within the broader framework of Pakistan’s bid
to purchase a pilot reprocessing facility from France and the Shah’s September interview
with veteran Egyptian journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal.191 In that interview the
Shah had conveyed expressively the reversibility of Iran’s nuclear weapons abstinence by
saying, “We do not want Iran to procure nuclear weapons just for the sake of having
them,” before imperiously adding, “But I tell you quite frankly that Iran will have to
acquire atomic bombs if every upstart in the region gets them.”192
His Majesty brought this point home more poignantly again in an interview with
the New York Times in September 1975: “Honestly, I am not really thinking of nuclear
arms. But if 20 or 30 ridiculous little countries are going to develop nuclear weapons,
then I may have to revise my policies. Even Libya is talking about trying to manufacture
atomic weapons- God knows for what purpose.”193
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The subsequent interview by the Shah with Business Week in November 1975
further deepened the fissures in Iran-US ties and made visible the spillover impact of the
nuclear standoff in eroding the relationship’s strategic depth. In his remarks the Monarch
made known his bafflement at the United States’ failure to fully appreciate the situation
by holding the future progression of such a mutually rewarding strategic partnership
hostage to some disagreement over the seemingly trivial issue of chemical reprocessing.
Venting out his frustration over the nuclear impasse, the Shah, in thinly disguised
language, warned the deadlock could have a systemically detrimental impact and derail
Iran-US relations. In the Shah’s judgment, the uncompromising treatment Washington
was meting out on Tehran’s nuclear effort simply symbolized Iran’s downgraded status in
the United States’ strategic hierarchy where, following the euphoric Salt I & II Treaties
and the Helsinki Baskets, détente was the order of the day in US-USSR relations.
Following the sensational coverage the interview received in Tehran’s pro-Shah
daily Kayhan, the U.S. Ambassador to Tehran sent a sobering cable to Washington. The
cable first quoted the Monarch’s sentiments in the interview where he contrasted
Europe’s forthcoming attitude on the nuclear issue with the United States’ humiliating
demands which the French or Germans, in the Shah’s view, would never even dream of
making. Helms then elaborated on the Kayhan piece’s unmistakable purpose in
conveying the broader implications of the nuclear deadlock and lamented the fact that the
United States had been so off the mark in assessing the depth and scope of Tehran’s
disillusionment over the nuclear issue.194
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In another cable sent to State shortly afterward, Helms spoke more concretely
about the dilemma, this time offering operational advice to overcome it. Corralling the
proliferation concerns associated with chemical reprocessing, the Ambassador drew the
State Department’s attention to the verity of Etemad’s judgment that the concept of
multinational reprocessing didn’t stand a realistic chance of operational and logistical
success considering the impossibly intractable issues like "joint management, distribution
of costs, and actual physical arrangements for storage, transport, and processing of
material" associated with it in the Middle East. In order to propel the stalled, now almost
deadlocked, talks forward, Helms recommended the United States give up on the
multinational concept and instead pursue a stringently safeguarded “binational
reprocessing plant to be managed and operated by Iran and the United States."195 This, in
Helms’ view, would ensure the US nuclear industry benefitted from the Shah’s deep
pockets before the lion’s share of Iran’s nuclear contracts slipped through to the
European competitors.
Obviously, conceding so much leeway to Tehran would require the presumption
of innocence regarding HIM’s ultimate proliferation intentions, a leap of faith the White
House was profoundly unprepared to take. Upon close scrutiny, however, one could
detect some hardheaded realism combined with a sense of resignation in Ambassador
Helms’ reading of the Iran-US nuclear cooperation dilemma. The same sense of realism
also lodged at the root of the Ambassador’s lamentations of the United States’ unrealistic
obsession with the issue of proliferation. From Helms’ vantage point, since Iran’s
national security imperatives would ultimately reign supreme in its proliferation calculus,
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whatever precious little contractual concessions the White House managed to squeeze
from Tehran would only be of feel-good cosmetic value.
In his characteristically point-blank language, Helms noted, "We have little
choice but to accept at face value Iran's stated policy that it intends to honor its NPT
commitments. Given the options it now has or may have in the future, it appears to us
that the essential point is that Iran could develop a reprocessing plant and proceed to
construct a nuclear explosive device if it so desired regardless of any additional
safeguards we may succeed in writing into our bilateral agreement. India is an obvious
example. Although Iran does not at present have the R&D cadre to compare with India's,
it probably would not take it long to collect or buy the necessary talent to do what India
did. With the means in hand, whatever commitments Iran may have made to the US or
under the NPT is likely to fall by the wayside if Iran's perception of its national interests
so dictate."196 As the passage sharply illustrates, Helms was convinced that India’s
“original sin” could have set off a domino effect, especially in the Middle East, whose
dynamics couldn’t be manipulated through contractual and legalistic mechanisms. These
sentiments were very much in line with those Dr. Etemad expressed in his numerous talks
with the American officials.
As the trust deficit between the Peacock Throne and the White House was
progressively deepening, Akbar Etemad’s late December 1975 visit to India ruffled even
more feathers in Washington.197 During the trip, one that took place in an atmosphere of
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Iran-India nuclear solidarity, Etemad lavished praise on India’s nuclear achievements
expressing optimism Iran could "import Indian expertise for developing her atomic
research laboratories.” Etemad also made mention, in Madras, of Iran's ongoing plans to
"set up a chain of atomic research laboratories" that could benefit from India's
experience.”198 These sentiments were more vehemently reiterated by the AEOI director
on the sidelines of the conclusion of a sweeping nuclear cooperation agreement in
Mumbai between him and Dr. H.N. Sethna, chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy
Commission on February 25, 1977. In those remarks, Etemad indicated Iran's interest to
"get as much as it can from India, rather than rely too much on Western sources" in the
nuclear field.199
Particularly alarming to the Americans were insinuations in Etemad’s remarks
that Iran would be interested in pooling resources with India to explore the possibility of
PNEs, an undertaking not explicitly prohibited under the NPT. These sentiments
combined with Iran’s consistent refusal to condemn the Smiling Buddha200 gave further
impetus to concerns that Iran was viewing PNEs as a potential loophole in the nonproliferation regime it could capitalize on to position itself in an ambiguous gray zone
with possible deterrent benefits. Admiral Quihillal’s presence in Tehran only helped
intensify these concerns as there was real anxiety in Washington that Brazilian and
Argentinean moves toward PNEs would leave Iran with no choice but to follow suit. As
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one observer noted in this context, it was “easy to suspect linkages between an interest in
explosives in Buenos Aires and in Teheran.”201
In the wake of Etemad’s remarks in India (that smacked of endorsement of and
interest in PNEs by Iran) the U.S. embassy in Tehran sprang into action pushing AEOI’s
chief for sharper clarification on whether the comments marked a change of heart in
Iran’s nuclear policy. Etemad’s response was as vague and double-edged as the
sentiments expressed in India. While claiming his India remarks had been decontextualized, Etemad went on to reiterate his firm conviction that Iran’s nuclear
position was “analogous” to that of India. Furthermore, he refused to categorically rule
out PNEs as a nuclear route Iran might take – although he said the option wouldn’t be
taken unilaterally and in breach of Iran’s NPT commitments and IAEA safeguards.
Most important of all, however, were the AEOI chief’s unequivocal remarks that
Iran was determined not to subject its nuclear enterprise to any restrictions imposed by
nuclear weapons states (NWS) so long as those were not incorporated into a revised and
universally applicable NPT that put equal emphasis on non-proliferation and
disarmament.202
As time wore on, the virtual nuclear deadlock between Tehran and Washington
and its spillover repercussions were growing more visible. For instance, in a January
1976 interview with the Kuwaiti Arabic daily Al-Siyassa, the Shah expressed frustration
over the nuclear issue even more crisply: "we have given the Americans a pledge that we
will use the nuclear reactors [obtained from the U.S.] for peaceful purposes and that we
201
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will not produce nuclear weapons. They have asked for more pledges. We believe there is
no reason for such pledges."203
Palpably concerned over the escalating tensions, the White House stepped up its
efforts to find the lowest common denominator with Iran to conclude a civilian nuclear
agreement as promptly as possible. Reflecting the sense of urgency, in February 1976,
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft in an unmistakably blunt memorandum-addressed collectively to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Director of
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and The Administrator of the Energy Research
and Development Administration-- relayed the President’s "anxious" desire to see an
accord with Iran in a timely fashion. Despite its urgent language, however, the memo
revealed that Washington was yet to capture a sharp picture of the conditions the Iranian
would find absolutely non-negotiable.
This sense of loss was as much a function of the protracted nature of the talks and
changing circumstances--that made the evolution of the two sides’ positions inevitable—
as the shift in Iran’s appraisal of the indispensability of the U.S. to get its nuclear
program off the ground (especially with regards to the issue of fuel supply). Under such
dynamic circumstances, the Ford Administration’s efforts to find common ground
between "US proliferation interests, US-Iran mutual interests, and US domestic nuclear
politics” was as unrealistic as Washington’s exhortations with Iran to forsake national
reprocessing and become a role model for the rest of the world.204
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Under these circumstances, as the February 2, 1976 meeting between the Shah
and the U.S. delegation (director of the Energy Research and Development
Administration, Robert Seamans and Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Caryle
Maw) produced no concrete results, the Administration showed signs of receptivity to the
Iranian redlines. The United States, in the talks, agreed to further concessions by
scrapping the “veto rights” stipulation and by granting Iran the right to operate a
“rigorously safeguarded” national reprocessing facility on Iranian soil. But Washington
was still concerned that even these concessions might fall short of meeting Iran’s
demands regarding a genuinely indigenous full fuel cycle if “rigorously safeguarded”
meant “assigning [American] staff to an Iranian national facility to supplement IAEA
safeguards."205
As the Ford Administration was stepping up its efforts to work out a viable modus
vivendi with the AEOI, Ambassador Helms’ hardnosed appraisals of the situation proved
somewhat instrumental in softening the contours of the U.S. nuclear posture toward Iran.
Arguably the most consequential result of Helms’ exhortations for the Administration to
be pragmatic was that the notion of multinational reprocessing was dropped, at least
informally, from the United States’ list of counter-proliferation solutions. In a May 12,
1976 meeting with high-ranking State Department officials, secretary Kissinger revealed
his change of heart on the issue as well: “I am frankly getting off the multinational
concept. I have endorsed it publicly, but in any region you look at it is a fraud. Pakistan
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does not want to be in a plant located in Iran and a plant in Pakistan would just be a
cover…. I am not sure we should fall on our own swords to push others into
multinational projects.”
The Secretary of State didn’t just stop there. In some eerily candid remarks,
reminiscent of Ambassador Helms’ hardheadedness, Kissinger undercut even further the
sustainability of the whole concept of multinationalizing fuel cycles, wondering what
would happen if the host country “kicked out” the other participants once the facility was
up and running. On top of that, Kissinger appeared to have serious second thoughts
whether multinationalization on the cheap would contribute to the proliferation of
reprocessing technology to countries that wouldn’t otherwise have access or, for that
matter, even interest in it.206
Just as the shedding of the multinational reprocessing concept was promising to
pave the way for the conclusion of an agreement with the AEOI, the Iranian side
managed to rekindle Washington’s worst fears when the Shah’s purported desire to
purchase fast breeder reactors (FBR) became widely known.207 This desire was more
concretely articulated in July 1976 when Tehran officially informed the United States of
“the construction of experimental and commercial fast breeder reactors [as] part of Iran's
atomic energy program.”208 FBRs are essentially plutonium-fueled reactors, a technology
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that makes weapons-grade fissile material readily available for weaponization. This was
exactly the path India took to acquire the plutonium used in its 1974 nuclear explosion.
Right about the same time, alarming news trickled out that the Shah’s nuclear
enterprise was being rushed forward at an alarmingly accelerated pace. For instance,
there was word circulating in the nuclear industry sector that the Shah was pushing
Germany’s KWU to finish the Bushehr power plant’s first unit by October 1981so it
could be ready for Prince Reza’s 21st birthday when he would be crowned as Crown
Prince.209 The venturesome fashion in which Iran was pursuing the full spectrum of
almost all available and futuristic nuclear possibilities exuded a feeling of urgency that
the Washington couldn’t help but associate with some imminent threat perception by
Iran. Although the U.S. didn’t explicitly raise the hurried pace of Tehran’s nuclear
journey as a matter of substantive concern in the negotiations with the Shah, its
atmospheric impact in breeding the United States’ proliferation anxieties was
unmistakably perceptible. For example, the very fact that the area adjacent to Halileh was
abruptly re-allocated from its original purpose as a petrochemical plant site to host the
Bushehr Power Plants is quoted in a State Department cable as evidence that the nuclear
issue enjoyed unusual prioritization.210
In this connection, it is worth mentioning that the issue of site selection for Iran’s
nuclear plants was also an object of curiosity. This had to do with the very fact that
Iranian territory, due to high seismic activity where water was abundant, was hardly a
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hospitable ground for building power plants. As a matter of fact, only four regions in the
entire country could even be considered as candidates for nuclear power construction. Of
these feasible areas, the Caspian Sea coast was dismissed due to a host of environmental
and geological reasons, water level fluctuations, and strategic considerations associated
with its proximity to the Soviet Union. High seismicity rendered the Persian Gulf coast
only a marginally better candidate. The Karun River banks was another possibility that
the AEOI decided upon by contracting two 900 MWe power plants to the French
company Framatome. The last option was to build air-cooled nuclear plants on the banks
of the Zayandeh River near Esfahan for which the AEOI was in preliminary talks with
KWU. On the Bushehr plants, critics expressed concern that KWU and the AEOI had
compromised safety measures, as the plants were not suitable for an earthquake prone
region.211
As the rift between Iran and the United States was widening, another layer of
uncertainty began to capture the Americans’ attention: Visible signs of growing antiAmericanism had crept into the corporate culture of Iran’s now sizable and fiercely
nationalistic nuclear bureaucracy. Under the prevailing conditions, the AEOI’s antiAmerican bias could only intensify over time as Etemad and his senior staff were coming
to internalize the fundamental contrast between Washington’s hardball nuclear politics
with the Western Europeans’ easygoing attitude. This reality and its bearing on the future
trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program was of great concern to the United States.
In April 1976 and May 1977, for example, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran put
together two comprehensive character sketch profiles of key personnel involved in the
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AEOI’s main decision-making offices and domestically affiliated subcontracting firms.
These rather detailed cables made a point of going into the key personnel’s backgrounds
and political orientations. In the 1977 cable, for example, Dr. Ghassem Arabian, the
AEOI Deputy in Charge of Raw Materials and Fuel and one of Etemad's "first and
foremost trusted assistants" was singled out as having an "anti-American bias."212 In this
regard, in an August 1976 cable explaining the roots of the AEOI’s obdurate attitude
toward the nuclear bilateral, Ambassador Helms placed the blame squarely on Etemad’s
“senior staff.”213
Lame-duck Ford Replaced by Anti-Nuclear Carter
As the Ford Administration was going through its lame-duck year, the real
damage done to the U.S. nuclear industry started to dawn on the White House. The
sobering news came in April 1976 when the U.S. embassy in Tehran informed the State
Department that due to the United States’ lethargic pace in concluding a comprehensive
nuclear deal with Iran and the Shah’s dwindling oil revenues, the ambitious 23000
megawatts nuclear electricity generating program would be “stretched out over a longer
period” than initially conceived.
This meant that new orders on top of the four already concluded with Germany
and France would be “deferred.” The cable, in an apparent effort to at least partially shift
the culpability from the U.S. government to the nuclear industry, blamed American
companies’ reluctance to enter into the so-called “super turn-key contracts” (that the
212
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European vendors were willing to do) for failing to secure a solid foothold for the U.S.
companies in Iran’s lucrative nuclear market.214
It is noteworthy that the notion of “super turn-key projects” was a term coined
specifically to describe the terms and conditions the AEOI was demanding of vendors
bidding to build nuclear reactors in Iran. Such an arrangement essentially required the
foreign contractor to not only supply the project to the AEOI in ready-to-operate shape
but also develop and initially manage all the “ancillary facilities” like “water supply,
homes for the personnel” and the like “in places where there literally was no electricity at
all.” According to one source, “the ‘outside the fence’ costs for these projects would
exceed the ‘inside the fence’ costs for a number of years” since “the provision of water
and housing and mosques could cost more than the nuclear equipment itself.”215
In any case, with Iran scaling back its ambitious nuclear program and the election
season coming up in 1976, the finalization of a bilateral nuclear agreement with Iran lost
its urgency toward the end of the Ford Administration. Despite the Ford Administration’s
strenuous efforts to conclude a bilateral agreement to supersede the Nuclear Agreement
between the US and Iran signed on March 5, 1957 and amended and modified by the
follow-up agreements of June 8, 1964, and March 18 1969, the three shots Washington
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took at the issue in February and May 1975 and May 1976 alongside a massive
diplomatic effort fell well short of sealing a deal.
The last draft, submitted to the government of Iran on May 31, 1976, in
Washington’s judgment, contained the most ground the United States could concede
without jeopardizing its non-proliferation interests and the uniformity of policy and
practice it was seeking to adhere to in its future peaceful nuclear cooperation deals. An
increasing self-confident and assertive AEOI’s feedback on the US proposed draft,
however, was nothing if not defiant. For instance, diametrically opposed to the United
States’ position of demanding “veto rights” over the reprocessing of US supplied fuel, the
AEOI proposed “the Imperial Government of Iran” be granted "the right to effective
control of the management and operation of the reprocessing facilities."216
At the core of this fundamental disagreement were two different attitudes towards
the issue of reprocessing in Tehran and Washington: Washington viewed the issue as a
privilege (with security implications) to be granted under the most parsimonious of
circumstances to some of the United States’ strategic allies, but the AEOI and especially
its chairman Akbar Etemad viewed it as an inalienable right (with sovereignty
implications) Iran could not be arbitrarily or discretionarily deprived of. In Etemad’s
perspective, Iran was entitled to the full spectrum of “nuclear technology, including
reprocessing.”217
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Again, it was Ambassador Helms who, in his characteristically sympathetic tone
to Iran’s nuclear sentiments, laid out his appraisal of Iran’s reprocessing rights
counterproposal in disarmingly simple terms:
“Iran considers reprocessing as an important ‘downstream’ activity, and for
obvious security of supply and economic reasons seriously intends to have it performed
in facilities established in Iran. The United States, desiring to sell a large number of
power plants, in all fairness, should be prepared to supply Iran with the means to
establish all facilities which in the opinion of the Iranian government constitute integral
parts of its nuclear power program.”218
If presidential-hopeful Jimmy Carter’s campaign rhetoric was any indication, one
could see a further tightening of U.S. nuclear technology transfer and conventional arms
sales to Iran if he became president. Indicative of this was a presidential debate on
October 6, 1976 during which Carter launched a scathing critique on the lavish shipment
of military hardware by the Ford Administration to the Shah: “Iran is going to get 80 F14s before we even meet our own Air Force orders for F-l4s, and the shipment of
Spruance-Class Destroyers to Iran are much more highly sophisticated than the SpruanceClass Destroyers that are presently being delivered to our own Navy. This is ridiculous
and it ought to be changed.”219
Before long, with Jimmy Carter winning the White House came sweeping
changes to U.S. nuclear policy and further hindrances to the finalization of a bilateral
218
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agreement between Tehran and Washington. The person in charge of devising the United
States new strategy was Joseph Nye, Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security
Assistance, Science, and Technology who also led the National Security Council Group
on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran’s response to the change in the Carter
administration’s introduction of more stringent guidelines on nuclear materials,
technology, and equipment was expectedly incompliant. For example, in a February 1977
press conference, Iran’s top nuclear official, while soft-pedaling Tehran’s obdurate
reprocessing position, defiantly reiterated a well-known Iranian theme: that “no country
or group of countries” should think they have the “right to dictate nuclear policy" on
Tehran.220
With Carter in power, Iran soon found itself on the receiving end of his
Administration’s more stringent nuclear policy in mid 1977 when its request for 20.2
kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
received skeptical reception in Washington on the grounds it exceeded the 6-kilogram
ceiling stipulated in the last amendment to the bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
(NCA) in 1969.
The AEOI’s request for an increased amount of HEU was part of an effort "to
replace existing plate-type fuel elements to extend core lifetime and boost power level
from five to ten megawatts" at the TRR scheduled for mid 1978.221 President Carter’s
failure to sanction the transfer of HEU occurred despite the American Embassy’s blunt
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warning that it would "feed" Tehran's "worst fears concerning the reliability of the US as
a future supplier of nuclear materials" likely to be construed in Iran as yet another
indication that Tehran was not receiving a nuclear treatment commensurate with its
strategic weight as a close ally.
This issue acquired even more prominence when, as the U.S. Embassy in Tehran
noted, set against the backdrop of May 4, 1977 "presidential announcement of approval
of significant quantities of HEU to 8 projects in Canada, the Netherlands, Japan,
Belgium, and the FRG." This discriminatory authorization reinforced already held
suspicions in Tehran that "the U.S. has and will continue to differentiate between various
customers in favor of the industrial west."222
This differentiated treatment became even more conspicuous with President
Carter’s commencement speech at Notre Dame University in June 1977. The tenor of the
speech couldn’t have been more foreboding for the person of the Shah. “We are now free
of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who
joined us in that fear,” the President intoned, before adding, “I’m glad that that’s being
changed.”223
Visibly miffed, Tehran took an expeditious and unprecedentedly visible
leadership role on the international stage in response to the Carter administration’s new
nuclear policy announced on 7 April 1977. The high-profile venue for this trailblazing
role was the AEOI-sponsored Iran Conference on Transfer of Nuclear Technology held at
Persepolis a mere three days after the introduction of the U.S. new policy.
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Enthusiastically attended by the nuclear have-nots and the biggest nuclear energy
conference in the world, the event brought together some 500 nuclear scientists and
officials “from the West, the Eastern bloc and the developing countries.”224
In his message to the Conference, President Carter supplemented his
backhandedly complimentary comments by raising the pathologies associated with
nuclear technology. “I am profoundly interested in nuclear energy and am acutely aware
of its possibilities and potential danger" the President noted, adding, “In this connection,
all countries ought to be aware of their responsibilities in enabling the human community
to benefit from the knowledge of nuclear technology within the framework of preventing
its destructive consequences."225
The Shah’s response to Carter’s message was equally double-edged: “Your
Excellency: I wish to emphasize the fact that I fully realize your special interest in the
nuclear energy issue. I am fully aware of the dangers and problems which might arise for
the human community from an irresponsible policy. In this regard, I wish to reiterate that
Iran has devoted its efforts solely toward the peaceful use of nuclear energy and that in
the future we will continue to cooperate with all countries of the world toward realizing
this objective in the interest of the entire human community."226
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At the conference, the Indian delegation caught the Americans off guard by
labeling “anything that smacked of restriction” on nuclear technology by the nuclear
haves “as a direct threat to [India’s] prospects for economic growth.” This position jibed
well with the Iranian position proving yet again how intertwined Iran and India’s nuclear
positions had grown over the years. The tenor of the panels and discussions at the
conference left the American delegation with a most sobering impression: that “nuclear
energy policy in the future will be used in fora as a focus for rallying Third World unity
vis-à-vis the United States.”227
On the sidelines of the conference came surprising pieces of news by the AEOI
Director in charge of Prospecting, Extraction, and Fuel according to whom Iran would no
longer allow “foreign investors” to participate in the projects on the enrichment of
uranium on its territory. The AEOI also announced it had concluded contracts with
several countries to purchase some 30,000 tons of enriched uranium to be delivered in
installments by 1994. The IAEOI also disclosed plans to “invest 300 million in the
exploration for uranium at home over the next 10 years.”228
An unintended consequence of the event was that even if the United States was, in
principle, willing to give the benefit of the doubt to Iran as a reluctant NPT member, the
Persepolis conference in April 1977 threw Iran’s stance on the issue into sharp relief as it
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betrayed an Iranian effort to position itself at the forefront of cultivating an alternative
nuclear energy paradigm in the developing world.
Following the Conference and pressing ahead with his defiant posture toward
Carter’s nuclear policy, in an April 1977 official visit to Tokyo, the AEOI director
unleashed another round of blistering criticisms of Washington’s nuclear behavior.
Reiterating Tehran’s indignation at the London Club, Etemad warned, “Many countries
who have signed the NPT have lost their previous confidence and trust in this
agreement.”229
Shortly following the Japan trip, during a meeting between Etemad and a US
State Department delegation in May 1977, the Iranian position on the new US nuclear
energy policy became even more cut and dry when the AEOI chief aired a litany of
complaints against Washington. On the NPT, Etemad lamented a lack of "distinction" by
the United States "in its handling of NPT and Non-NPT countries," claiming Tehran had
"not benefitted" from joining the treaty. Also prominently figuring in Etemad’s list of
grievances was the United States’ discriminatory treatment of different articles of the
NPT. Chief among Tehran’s remonstrations on this score was Washington’s reluctance to
“give full weight to its responsibilities under article 4 of the NPT” that called for “the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”230 between nuclear haves and havenots. Etemad took the U.S. to task for its lack of systematic cooperation on full
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technology transfer as a matter of overriding concern to Iran. The London Club, another
of the perennial items on Etemad’s woe list, was raised with the United States delegation
as well. The AEOI chief made no secret of the Iranian government’s “bad feeling” about
the news trickling out of the NSG’s sub-rosa meetings that essentially amounted to the
excommunication of the nuclear have-nots from the inner circle of international nuclear
decision-making and threatening their relegation into an outcast nonentity.231
It is worth mentioning here that the allegedly cultish nature of decision-making in
the London Club continued to be a recurring bone of contention between Iran and the
west in the Islamic Republic era. The Iranians alleged that the London Club had morphed
into a mechanism to perpetuate the atomic powers’ “apartheid” monopoly on nuclear
technology, a reality that belied the latter’s adherence to the spirit, if not the letter, of the
NPT’s article IV.
At pains not to pass up any opportunity to take jibes at Washington’s nuclear
policy, in September 1977 the Shah dispatched a critical message to the 21st General
Annual Conference of the IAEA in Vienna. HIM, in unusually candid language, called
“any attempt to replace” international non-proliferation regimes “by bilateral and
multilateral agreements a real danger for [their] solidarity and effectiveness."232
As the tumultuous clouds were looming on Iran’s domestic political scene, the
Shah-sympathetic Richard Helms’ departure from Tehran in December 1976 and the sixmonth delay in his replacement (on June 1, 1977) added yet another complicating wrinkle
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to an already nebulous ambiance between Tehran and Washington. Helms’ replacement,
William Sullivan, couldn’t have been a worse candidate to bridge the gap between
Tehran and Washington’s nuclear negotiating positions. A career diplomat deeply
disillusioned with the Shah, the new Ambassador tended to view with resignation the
gathering storm unleashed by the clerics on a seemingly doomed monarchical regime. To
make matters worse, he also visibly lacked the kind of authority and judgment on the
nuclear issue that his predecessor had brought to the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Under
Sullivan’s ambassadorship there are essentially no visible signs in the cables of Helmsstyle efforts to smooth over nuclear matters with Washington.
As Tehran was progressively moving apart from Washington in charting its
nuclear program, Iran’s ties to France and Germany were growing tighter. On November
10, 1977 Tehran signed a declaration of intent with the German firm Kraftwork Union
(KWU) to build four additional power plants (on top of the two previously under
construction by KWU) near the town of Saveh in central Iran. These reactors would
collectively generate 4,800 MWe and were slated to come online between 1984 and
1987. Dr. Etemad described the agreement, the largest and most comprehensive ever
entered into by the AEOI, as "the most important event in the economic relations between
the Federal Republic [of Germany] and Iran." The timing of the announcement of the
agreement, described by diplomatic circles as a "shot across the bow" of the United States
by Iran just five days ahead of HIM’s scheduled state visit to Washington, could hardly
have been more rankling for the White House. The U.S. nuclear industry was especially
irked since the Shah was scheduled to discuss with President Carter the issue of eight
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nuclear reactors Tehran had been seeking to purchase from Westinghouse for over a
year.233
In such an atmosphere, in May 1978, the United States submitted yet another draft
of an NCA to Iran following a round of negotiations held in Vienna in February 1977.
The draft reflected Iran’s half-hearted acquiescence in the face of U.S. pressure to have a
decisive say on the chemical reprocessing of spent fuel rods. It stipulated that Iran would
not have the right to reprocess or engage in any reprocessing activity without
Washington’s prior consent.234
But even here there was only a partial meeting of minds as the devil in the details
soon reared its head. The United States was in favor of a two-tiered arrangement for the
"disposition of irradiated special nuclear material" that gave priority to storage of spent
fuel either in Iran or the United States and only entertained reprocessing as “an option of
last resort” if the storage option proved “impracticable” due to unfavorable “technical,
economic, or political” circumstances. The Iranians, on the other hand, were pursuing an
arrangement that would grant them the reprocessing right as “an equal option” on par
with the storage option.235
This last remaining complicating wrinkle was never completely ironed out as the
United States got wind of a sweeping change-of-heart in Iran’s nuclear energy policy on
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August 15, 1978 that cast serious doubt on the feasibility for Iran to purchase eight
nuclear reactors from the U.S. nuclear industry as initially conceived. The news came in
the form of a front-page article in The Kayhan International entitled “It's Time to Call a
Moratorium on all New Negotiations in Nuclear Sector” that took to task the United
States’ brassbound approach on reprocessing and its dilatory attitude toward the
conclusion of the NCA.
Throwing into doubt the expediency of finalizing the NCA in a rush mode and at
a time when a comprehensive overhaul of Iran’s energy policy was on the cards, the
editorial counseled, "Iran should not rush into an agreement [with the US] whose
implications over the next decade or two are at best unclear, and at worst undesirable."236
The Kayhan editorial’s prediction was on the money as shortly afterward, Iran
scrapped all new nuclear power plant projects except the four units already under
construction in Halileh by KWU and Darkhovin by Framatome. This came about, partly,
thanks to plummeting oil prices that rendered the Iranian economy incapable of buoying
the AEOI’s nuclear extravaganza. Aside from the dwindling oil revenues, the INP was
further plagued and started showing signs of faltering by two new elements: a host of
domestic

opposition

pressures

leveled

by

various

interest

groups

like

the

environmentalists237 further complicated by intergovernmental turf wars especially with
the Ministry of Oil. Amid the mounting domestic opposition to the nuclear program and a
charged political atmosphere, the AEOI was stripped of a big chunk of its decision-
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making power over “planning, constructing, and operating power plants” as these powers
were transferred to the Ministry of Energy. An immediate result of the rethinking of
Iran’s unrealistically ambitious nuclear program was the scrapping of four plants under
negotiation with KWU, two with Framatome, and some eight plants with Westinghouse.
Shortly following the bureaucratic and policy overhaul, in October 1978, the
Shah’s “bureaucratic superstar” and AEOI director, Akbar Etemad, now commonly
perceived as the father of Iran’s nuclear program, along with a handful of his highranking deputies resigned their posts amidst “allegations of mismanagement and
embezzlement.”

238

Etemad’s replacement was his deputy in charge of Power Plant

Projects, Ahmad Sotoodehnia, a U.S. trained nuclear engineer who had worked for the
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) before joining the AEOI.239
On the environment front, the AEOI received a lot of public criticism following
some headline grabbing news that the AEOI was making arrangements with the Austrian
government, with the Shah’s consent, allowing the latter to use Iran’s Kavir Dessert for
nuclear waste disposal purposes in exchange for receiving technological cooperation
from Vienna. Concerns were also raised by a senior nuclear safety member at the IAEA
alleging that the Bushehr reactors, in the interest of time, had not gone through some
significant design modifications that would be imperative to make it operationally safe
for a "relatively high seismic area." Not surprisingly, the AEOI officials categorically
denied these allegations claiming no safety standards had been compromised.240
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Ayatollah Khomeini and his allies in the anti-Shah political movements also
mounted domestic pressure against the INP. The Ayatollah categorically repudiated the
full gamut of nuclear options as un-Islamic, taghooti (idolatrous) and ethically
reprehensible white elephant projects.
The India Resemblance Raises More Eyebrows
As Iran’s nuclear enterprise was moving along, the parallels between its nuclear
development strategy and those of India were becoming more curious and visible. One of
these areas was Iran’s keen interest and heavy investment in R&D that betrayed an Indian
connection. At the core of Iran’s nuclear R&D program was an ambitious plan to build
the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTEC) as the primary center for as diverse
functions as nuclear reactor operator training, fuel fabrication, and uranium chemistry.
Modeled after India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the overall
function of the massive facility, containing some 15 buildings, was to maximize the
facility, velocity, and scope at which Iran could generate, absorb, or indigenize all
manner of nuclear technology. As much as the ENTEC in its entirety raised suspicions in
the United States, the main concern of the Americans was the Metallurgy division at the
ENTEC whose function was “to study materials to be used in reactors and other facilities
in which radioactive substances are manipulated.” In U.S. judgment, the ENTEC’s
inclusion of a “hot cell for handling highly radioactive substances” constituted an
important “first step toward a reprocessing facility.”241
These concerns came to a sharp relief following a February 1977 tour by an Oak
Ridge National Lab (ORNL) delegation of the ENTEC designed by the French
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Technicatome Company. The ORNL team couldn’t help but notice the similarity in
location, sandwiched between two mountains, between the ENTEC facility and the U.S.
Sandia Weapons Laboratory. On top of that, in the U.S. delegation’s judgment, the
facility's "unusually large size" made it technically suitable to “produce weapons-grade
plutonium.” Based on these disconcerting factors, the U.S. delegation deemed the
ENETC facility a potential cause for alarm that merited “watching.”242
The AOEI’s extensive plans to build an extensive manpower base to completely
indigenize its technological platform also seemed to have been modeled after India.
According to one expert, the AEOI had about 150 personnel with nuclear physics training
in 1975. The number was slated to increase by 100 times to 15,000, according to one
estimate, to indigenously staff the projected nuclear facilities by the mid-1990s.243
This goal was pursued vigorously in two phases: identifying and luring nuclear
scientists and technicians in Diaspora, especially in the United States, back to Iran and
concluding academic cooperation programs with foreign institutions to train Iranian
students in the field of nuclear engineering. In the interim, the AEOI started hiring
internationally where Iranian nationals were not on hand. As part of implementing the
first objective, the AEOI, on Dr. Etemad’s initiative, launched a comprehensive program
to send Iranian students for training in nuclear engineering to countries as diverse as the
USA, the UK, France, Belgium, Austria, Germany, and India.
In 1978, Iran had almost 2000 students in various countries receiving all manner
242
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of nuclear training. The most strategic of these relations were the educational and training
relations AEOI had established with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the MIT.244
The relationship with the MIT proved an extremely controversial issue. Modeled on the
Indian experiment of establishing a national flagship technical university at Kanpur (IITK
or Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur) whose primary purpose was to serve Indian
national interests, the AEOI-MIT collaboration, worth $1.3 million, was a two-year
“special Master’s program” to train Iranian students “at a premium.” The program,
geared toward the technical and HR needs of the AEOI, was devised to train thirty
Iranian students every year in cooperation with MIT’s Departments of Physics and
Nuclear Engineering. The partnership soon infuriated much of the MIT faculty.245 Things
reached a crescendo when a Computer Sciences professor wrote the polemically titled
“Selling MIT: Bombs for the Shah” article in which he argued “the Iranian nuclearengineering students would end up making bombs for the Shah."246 MIT’s collaboration
with Iran was not limited to the AEOI as, for example, the United States’ most advanced
missile technology center at MIT’s Draper Laboratory was in preliminary talks with
Aryamehr University of Technology (AMUT) in Tehran to “to provide a comparable
facility” to Iran.247
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As a matter of fact, the issue of human resources-- in all aspects of a vibrant
nuclear

program

including

nuclear

operators,

technicians,

researchers,

and

administrators-- was of such a high priority for the AEOI that Eemad, along with two of
his most qualified confidants, Mahdi Sarram248 and Cyrus Manzour249, were in charge of
coordinating and streamlining this effort.250
AEOI’s Strategic Hedging
As the prospects for the conclusion of a mutually satisfactory agreement between
Tehran and Washington were growing dimmer, Iran was stepping up its efforts to reach
full-fledged independence in the fuel cycle from whatever source it could lay its hands
on. The bulk of this effort was directed toward securing long-term fuel supply sources. In
this period, the Shah’s nuclear footprint was practically everywhere as Etemad was
travelling all over the world to secure nuclear deals, some public, others secret.
According to one source, the AEOI had some fifty-four joint exploration projects
searching wide and far for uranium across five continents.
The U.S. documents describe the pace and scope of the AEOI’s efforts “to
procure supplies of uranium and to obtain mining concessions as “feverish.” As part of
this effort, the AEOI launched a three-year comprehensive uranium-prospecting program
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conducting aerial radiometric and gravimetric survey of half Iranian territory for
economically viable uranium deposits.251
Another component of Iran's hedging strategy consisted of adopting a nuclear
development policy with maximum supplier diversity. The choice of pressurized water
reactors (PWR) over heavy water or boiling-water power stations constituted a significant
chunk of this policy. Apart from the technical and industrial advantages of PWRs, as
Etemad later explained, the decision was part of a conscious policy to have
maneuverability between suppliers: "We have, for instance, made a comparison between
light-water power stations and the Canadian heavy-water power stations. The Canadian
power stations seemed to us rather more expensive, and there has been less industrial
experience with this type of reactor. Furthermore, we would only have had one
supplier.”252
On the international front, the AEOI concluded agreements with Australia, Gabon
and Niger for uranium prospecting. However, arguably the most important aspect of the
Shah’s strategic hedging effort to secure nuclear fuel supply was focused in South Africa.
In 1975, rumors were afloat that South Africa had “negotiated a [secret] agreement with
Iran according to which Iran would invest in the South African enrichment project in
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return for the enriched uranium” Tehran needed for its nuclear program.253 On October
12, 1975 The Washington Post reported that the agreement provided for the purchase of
some “$700 million-worth of uranium from South Africa and put up part of the money
for a huge uranium-enrichment plant to be built in South Africa.” Following the
agreement, speculations were rife that this was the reason why the South African
Uranium Enrichment Corporation (UCOR) withdrew from a massive deal with the FRG
Company Steag.254
Iran’s non-compliance with OPEC’s oil embargo on South Africa was
undoubtedly instrumental in Tehran’s nuclear ties with Pretoria. It is worth noting that
South Africa in the mid-1970s was deemed by the nuclear expert community a “near
nuclear” state on a par with Germany and Taiwan well ahead of Brazil and South
Korea.255
The AEOI also launched a massive effort to obtain shares in different uranium
enrichment joint stock companies. The most important of these was European Gaseous
Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium commonly known as Eurodif. In 1975 Iran
invested some $1 billion to obtain 10 percent share that initially belonged to Sweden in
the consortium. This made Iran a stockholder alongside France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium
in the France-based facility entitling the AEOI to 10 percent of the uranium enriched at
the plant. The financial contribution of the Shah to Eurodif gave Iran “a blocking power
253
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in the consortium” as “the largest shareholder.” This would enable Iran to have a decisive
say “on ‘sensitive’ production lines, in particular those of enriched uranium for military
use.”256 Iran also held a 25% participation share in another uranium enrichment facility in
France named COREDIF.257
In June 1974, Iran also signed a liberally articulated blank agreement with France
under which the two countries would cooperate, in Etemd’s words, on “almost all aspects
of the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology.”258 The inking of this Franco-Iranian
agreement essentially made Iran the first oil-producing country trying to get a foothold in
the elite league of nuclear energy.259
As time wore on, Tehran and Paris signed more concretized agreements to
operationlize the initial agreement. One of the most important of these was an agreement
concluded in November 1974 for the construction of two 900 MWe power plants, to
come on stream in 1982 and 1983, on the banks of the Karun River. The Light Water
Reactors (LWR) were essentially Westinghouse reactors manufactured under license by
Framatome, a French affiliate of the Creusot-Loire. France and Iran also concluded an
agreement in May 1975 to build the Esfahan Nuclear Research Center (ENTEC) by 1980.
The ENTEC was conceived by the AEOI to act as “the mainstay of Iran's nuclear
energy program.” Iran, in Etemad’s words, intended to station some 1000 nuclear experts
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in the center and use it for "training its team of experts and to perform "operation and
maintenance" of power stations. Additionally, the center was planned to be equipped with
a Minerva-type research reactor to conduct “research on power reactors, particularly
breeder reactors, and for access to installations enabling [Iran] to familiarize itself with
fuel cycles.” According to Etemad, Tehran was “particularly” interested in manufacturing
"the fuel elements of the light-water power stations and learn to handle uranium and
plutonium."260
Iran’s nuclear ties with Germany didn’t hit a major snag like the one with
Washington under the Shah either. As a matter of fact, the FRG’s close ties with Tehran
was an issue of concern in Washington as the Americans were concerned what would
happen should Iran enter into a comprehensive nuclear deal with Bonn that included
transfer of reprocessing technology, training, and equipment. The issue came up a few
times during internal deliberations in the State Department on proliferation and reached a
pitch during a July 2, 1976 conversation between the FRG Ambassador to the United
States Berndt Von Staden and Secretary Kissinger. The Americans, visibly miffed at the
fact that the Germans had not kept them in the loop prior to making a commitment to the
Shah on the issue of reprocessing and before signing the FRG-Iranian Agreement for
Nuclear Cooperation, let the Ambassador know that the agreement would not be “greeted
with enthusiasm by the US.” According to the U.S., although Washington was not
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looking for “controversy with the FRG,” it couldn’t avoid registering its displeasure at
the agreement.261
Toward the late 1970s, the Americans were especially concerned over the issue of
spent fuel rods from the four nuclear reactors under contract at Bushehr and Darkhovin.
According to one estimate, the combined capacity of the four reactors already under
construction (42,00 MWe) would give Iran the capability to “produce enough plutonium
to fabricate about a bomb per day” if Tehran acquired reprocessing capability.262
Tehran also initiated nuclear cooperation with Japan in the late 1970s. The most
important component of Tehran-Tokyo nuclear cooperation materialized in December
1977 with the conclusion of a protocol with a Japanese consortium to construct two
"nuclear energy operated water desalination plants" near Bushehr. The plants, to be
powered by the nuclear reactors IR-I and IR-II under construction by KWU, would
produce "about 100,000 cubic meters of desalinated water daily from the Persian Gulf.
This project would make the otherwise desolate city of Bushehr the most large-scale
water desalination site in the world.263
In the United States, Iran, through its private sector companies, was testing the
waters to enter into a joint venture contract for a gaseous enrichment facility with
Bechtel, Goodyear, and Williams. Apart from that, the AEOI had visionary plans to
261
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invest in new enrichment technologies like jet nozzle, gas centrifuge and laser enrichment
techniques in the United States.264
The AEOI also had forged a very close relationship with the Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission (PAEK) both within the multilateral context of the Regional
Cooperation for Development (RCD)265 and the close bilateral bonds between
Mohammad Reza Shah and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The center of gravity of this relationship
in the nuclear context was the close personal ties between Etemad and PAEK’s longtime
chairman Munir Ahmad Khan. As Etemad later recounted, the Pakistanis and especially
Khan were exceptionally unreserved with the AEOI about divulging their private
thinking on the atom and its military applications.
As a matter of fact, Etemad recalls Khan arguing with him that Iran shouldn’t be
dismissing the military dimensions of a nuclear program out of hand. This was apparently
part of Pakistan’s tentative plans to foster an intimate and strategic AEOI-PAEK
relationship especially in the R&D sector where the Shah’s deep pockets and Pakistan’s
know-how could generate a symbiotic thrust forward.266 A clear indication of this
willingness could be traced in Prime Minister Bhutto’s courting of the AEOI to jointly
operationalize the reprocessing facility Pakistan had signed a contract to obtain from
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France in March 1976.267 Islamabad was basically interested in Tehran financing the
reprocessing facility to be located on Pakistani territory.
It is noteworthy that although such an arrangement would have jibed rather well
with Washington’s notion of multinational reprocessing facilities, Etemad was against
entering into it particularly if it was located on foreign territory. The other concern Iran
raised with the Americans was that Islamabad was actively pursuing a nuclear weapons
program Iran had no interest in.268
According to Etemad, at the heart of Khan’s arguments for strategic partnership
with Iran was a longing to create esprit de corps between the two countries against those
Western nuclear weapons states that wanted to perpetuate their monopoly on nuclear
technology and put it beyond reach for the orient. Etemad later recalled extensive talks
with the Shah regarding the feasibility and advisability of fostering such team with
Islamabad. HIM’s consistent judgment was that the strategic equilibrium of power
between Iran, India, and Pakistan was so delicate and fragile that it could not
accommodate a close nuclear cooperation between the AEOI and the PAEC. In such an
atmosphere, the broader regional considerations forestalled the two countries’ nuclear
solidarity from going operational despite the fact that Iran kept the communication
channels with Islamabad open for contingency and intelligence purposes.
As much as Iran’s neighbor to the east was eager to pool resources and join forces
with Tehran to put up a united nuclear front, Iran’s Baathist adversary to the West was
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bent on a keeping its nuclear program as shielded from Tehran’s piercing eyes as
possible. This was such an unnerving cause for concern for the Shah and the AEOI that
Etemad exhorted the French to keep Iran in the loop on Baghdad’s nuclear dealings with
Paris.
Further afield, the AEOI had also initiated preliminary contacts with China as
Beijing in the mid-1970s was exploring the idea of having a nuclear energy program
alongside its military program. Etemad recalls that during his visit to China in early 1977,
the Chinese showed great interest in receiving legal, administrative, and logistical advice
on how to kick-start a civilian program comparable to Iran’s. During the trip, the
Chinese, already alienated from Moscow following the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960’s,
were enthusiastic to test the waters for a strategic cooperation with Tehran as they
considered Iran a viable gateway to the West.
As part of its strategic hedging policy, in April 1977, Iran also held an
International Conference on Transfer of Nuclear Technology in Persepolis. As mentioned
before, the conference, organized by the AEOI (mainly planned by Mahdi Sarram, AEOI
Deputy in Charge of Nuclear Safeguards and Training), came right on the heels of
President Carter’s anti-nuclear energy policy that essentially amounted to a paradigmatic
shift in Washington’s energy policy away from nuclear technology269 especially with
regards to “reprocessing of nuclear fuel and fast breeder reactors.” As the State
Department put it, the conference proved a “historic forum for interchange of views
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between nuclear supplier nations and Third World countries.”270 The architect of the
Carter Administrations new nuclear policy, however, was less enthusiastic about the
conference. From Joseph Nye’s perspective, the conference that “condemned Carter’s
policies” was essentially an example of the sentiments represented by a momentous
“transnational nuclear elite” who were “bitterly opposed” to the change of heart on
nuclear energy advocated by the Carter White House.271
Perhaps the most proliferation-relevant aspect of the Shah’s strategic hedging in
this period, however, was going on, under the American radar, between Tehran and Tel
Aviv. The secret nuclear cooperation was despite Israel’s initial concerns over France's
nuclear cooperation with Iran. For instance, in early 1976, Israeli Foreign Minister Yig'al
Allen registered Tel Aviv's dissatisfaction over the issue seeking "certain clarifications"
from Paris on the transfer of nuclear technology and reactors to Tehran.272
The scene started changing toward the late 1970s however, as Tehran and Tel
Aviv came to increasingly sympathize with one another’s strategic perceptions.
According to documents allegedly left behind in Tehran by Israelis following the 1979
Iranian revolution, within an oil-for-arms collaborative arrangement, codenamed Flower,
Iran and Israel were jointly cooperating in the development of sophisticated surface-tosurface and submarine-launched missile systems.
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According to the records, 1650-pound missiles with a range of 300 miles were
scheduled for assembly and test firing near Sirjan in the southern Iranian province of
Kerman. The United States was kept so completely out of the loop on the project that,
according to a 1986 New York Times articles, U.S. officials in the State Department, the
Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council were caught
unawares by the revelation of the intimate engagement between Tehran and Tel Aviv on
a nuclear-relevant missile technology project.
The remarks made by Harold Saunders, former Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs on the issue couldn’t be more revealing: ''Israel built a lot of things
for the Iranians that we did not know about. But it surprises me that the Israelis would
have brought the Iranians into the development of a missile that may have been part of
their nuclear program. If that is the case, I am surprised we did not know about it.''
The Shah’s military confidant General Toufanian was Iran’s interlocutor in
negotiating the deal with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Minister of Defense
General Ezer Weizmann. Toufanian, recounting his memories after the Iranian
revolution, made no secret of the Flower project’s special appeal to the Shah because of
its nuclear potential. Reiterating Iran’s disinterest in a nuclear weapons capability at the
time, Toufanian observed, ''that did not mean we would not be interested in another
decade.''273
The inclusion of Tehran in Tel Aviv’s nuclear doctrine was the ultimate
manifestation of the proximity of the Iranians’ and Israelis’ strategic reading of the
Middle East’s security environment and power relativities as two strategically lonely
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countries. One could bring into relief the special relation between Iran and Israel in this
era by contrasting it to Tel Aviv’s vociferous complaints over the decades against
provision by the United States to the Middle East Arab states of any ballistic missiles
capable of striking Israel. What really makes the Flower project oddly unique, however,
is the fact that Israeli officials made a point of letting Iran in on the perfected
technology’s compatibility with nuclear warheads. Israel’s willingness to secretly
incorporate the Shah’s Iran into the military dimension of its nuclear program, while
aware of Washington’s hypersensitivity to the issue, has been one of the most intriguing
and contradictory aspects of Tel Aviv’s attitude toward proliferation in the Middle East.
Conclusion
In a March 1976 interview with Le Monde, the Shah put his vision regarding the
indivisibility of military prowess and economic prosperity in the most categorical terms:
“There is no such thing as economic strength without military strength,” HIM told
Jacqueline Grapin, Le Monde’s financial and economic correspondent.274 This vision set
the broad stage for the initial threat interpretations of HIM’s nuclear program.
These proliferation fears were only being accentuated by the Shah’s carefully
calculated insistence in the following years that he harbored no atomic ambitions, not
particularly out of respect for Tehran’s contractual non-proliferation commitments, but
primarily due to hardheaded pragmatic calculations. HIM’s most lucidly articulated
position on the issue came during an interview with the BBC’s Panorama on December
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13, 1976. Pressed on the question of Iran’s future military ambitions, the Shah expressed
optimism that Tehran would be the world’s most formidable non-atomic power within
five years. His Majesty expressed the rationale for this position in the most realistic
terms: “I am not thinking of this, because I could never be a first-class nuclear power. I
could never be a match. Because the only nuclear power around us with which we could
eventually have a clash is the Soviet Union, and what is the use of a few silly little
[atomic] bombs against those 50-megaton weapons? I mean it is not an intelligent
policy.”275
In another interview with the French Radio in June 1977, the Shah tied Iran’s
quest for non-nuclear supremacy to a well thought-out Iranian quest to extract extended
deterrence from the Western bloc. “My regular army should become so strong that a
country with bad designs against us would be obliged to use nuclear weapons to beat us.
By using nuclear weapons it would begin a world war, which I believe everyone is trying
to avoid."276
The Shah expressed sentiments along the same lines to his chief civilian nuclear
ideologue Akbar Etemad when the AEOI Director pressed him on pursuing a nuclear
weapons option during a private meeting: Considering "the geopolitical position of Iran,”
and its “vital need for the free flow of oil,” the Monarch stated, “the military nuclear
option would create tensions and upset our foreign policy.” The Shah added, however,
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that the “only factor that may bring about a dramatic change and weaken our position is
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one of the countries in the region."277
If the Monarch’s sentiments are to be taken at face value, an all-important
question becomes one of how can one satisfactorily explain Iran’s seemingly
uncompromising attitude toward the Americans on the issue of full fuel cycle? This
requires delving deeper into the political psyche of the AEOI especially its chairman
Akbar Etemad.
One has to bear in mind that there was a fundamental difference between
Etemad’s narrative on the nuclear issue and that of the Shah. While His Imperial Majesty
had been baptized into the nuclear world through a functional paradigm-- that tended to
reduce a nuclear enterprise to its energy, security, and prestige components—in Etemad’s
view, there was an all-important normative dimension associated with an indigenous
nuclear program that required a holistic understanding of such an enterprise; one that was
not reducible to its spin-off benefits such as security and the like.
Whatever dividends derivatively accrued from such a holistic enterprise, in
Etemad’s view, would find their organic context within the country’s international
placement rather than being subsumed or shaped by it. Based on his later comments on
the Islamic Republic era, Etemad thought that such a subsumption had befallen the Iran’s
post-revolution nuclear program—one consumed by its security implications—since it
lacked such strategic forethought and organic contextualization.
From Etemad’s perspective, this aspect made national nuclear programs unique
cross-generational undertakings whose successful implementation required a broad-based
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national consensus, a durable unity of purpose, and a hospitable international
environment. Such an alignment of the stars, in Etemad’s view, was extremely rare
especially among Third World countries. Iran under the Shah, in Etemad’s judgment,
stood at such a historically propitious juncture in the mid-1970s: a moment that might
never repeat itself in the future.278 As explained in a piece he wrote in the mid 1980s,
embarking on the nuclear enterprise was a multilayered undertaking of "psychological,
social, economic, political, and cultural implications" that required a “genuine national
mobilization effort.”279 As the Islamic Republic’s nuclear struggle vividly demonstrated
decades later, AEOI chief’s judgments were presciently on the mark.
Another way of explaining Iran’s diehard and, at times, go-it-alone nuclear
attitude under the Shah would necessitate reading it through the prism of the Monarch’s
close confidants. Based on such a reading, despite the comments by the Monarch to the
contrary, the scope, scale, pace, and energetic thrust of Iran’s nuclear program from 1974
to 1978 was such that even the innermost circle of Iran’s political, scientific, and strategic
elite couldn’t help but read nuclear weapons ambitions to it.
For example, during an interview in 1987, Fereydun Fesharaki, a well-known
economist and energy advisor to the Shah’s government revealed a letter he wrote to the
Shah counseling, “if he wished to pursue the bomb route, expensive nuclear power plants
were not the right way.”280
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The Shah’s Minister of Court and arguably his most intimate confidant Asadollah
Alam also believed that HIM was actively considering the ultimate nuclear option. His
posthumously published diary reads “HIM has a great vision for the future of this
country, which, though he denies it, probably includes the manufacturing of a nuclear
deterrent.”281
In an interview in 1985, Hassan Toufanian, the four-star general in charge of the
Shah’s military procurement cryptically hinted in the same direction claiming Iran had
hatched plans to secure “deterrent weapons” from Israel that he could not disclose, but
for which he ordered the shipment of $260 million worth of petroleum to Israel.282
The shah’s Foreign Minister, Ardashir Zahidi, voiced similar sentiments: “The
Iranian strategy at that time was aimed at creating what is known as surge capacity, that
is to say to have the know-how, the infrastructure, and the personnel needed to develop a
nuclear military capacity within a short-time without actually doing so. But the
assumption within the policymaking elite was that Iran should be in a position to develop
and test a nuclear device within 18 months.”283
These sentiments, especially those expressed by Zahedi, jibe well with the Shah’s
repeated strategy that he would drift with the nuclear tide in the Middle East broadly
conceived. Given the Shah’s obsession with having an unmistakable and formidable
deterrent posture— in no small part since the Monarch believed that the Middle East
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Arab states, especially Iraq, were prone to misperception and miscalculated risk-taking—
one would be extremely hard put not to lace HIM’s nuclear program with at least some
medium-term potential for weaponization. From that perspective, one could safely argue
that Iran’s nuclear program following the Indian PNE had a tacit security subtext to it.
Surveying the documents from this era, despite an unfortunate lack of access to
the CIA side of the INP story, leads one to the conclusion that the Americans were
perceptibly concerned about the sustainability of a purely civilian nuclear program by the
Shah considering his progressively assertive and autonomous foreign policy posture, his
desire to exercise authoritative leadership domestically, his high-expectation national
security psyche, his fascination with procuring the state-of-the-art military hardware, and
the inextricable link he systematically drew between military and economic
modernization.
On a balanced reading of evidence available and at the risk of taking a step into
speculation, a verisimilar judgment on the Shah’s nuclear vision in the mid to late 1970s
would look something along these lines: faced with the major dilemma of not having the
technical know-how to compete with the Indians and Israelis on its periphery while at
pains to avoid the appearance of being on a crash course toward nuclearization (that
would antagonize the Americans), HIM opted for a two-track policy: aim for maintaining
the Middle East a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) at the doctrinal level while, as an
auxiliary insurance policy, build a massive civilian nuclear infrastructure that could
derivatively churn out a weaponizable capability in short order.
In other words, the Shah kept the political decision open to revision by pursuing a
massive civilian nuclear program (commonly referred to as the Japan option). This
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option, also termed the “breakout capability,” entailed possessing all the “knowledge,
infrastructure, and materiel, which usually lie beneath the threshold of suspicion, but
which can be rapidly adapted or reorganized to allow for weaponization processes to be
undertaken.”284
Related to this, one wonders whether it was conceivable, in the Shah’s mind, for
Iran to shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding peace and stability in the Middle East
without having a nuclear capability especially since Israel and India already possessed
that capability. In other words, wouldn’t a non-nuclear gendarme in a nuclear
environment constitute a contradiction in terms?
Pausing a bit further on the same subject, one also has to bear in mind that despite
a progressively rising political temperature over the INP in Washington, only genericlevel concerns comparable to those expressed toward other proliferation-prone US allies
were expressed toward Iran. A close scrutiny of the declassified documents indicates that
while a comprehensive securitization of Iran as a clear and present proliferation threat
was absent from the United States’ strategic thinking, the Iranian nuclear program was
well on its way in the politicization segment of the securitization spectrum toward the end
of the Shah’s regime.
In this period, the de-securitizing pressure to the INP was attributable to a
systemic-level macro-securitization arch where the US-USSR rivalry subsumed and
defined all other security concerns. In other words, the main US-USSR security paradigm
exercised such a tight grip on the security culture of the United States in this period that
other concerns found prominence only though contextualization in the US-USSR arch
284
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rivalry and rarely emerged to the surface independently. The INP’s under-securitized
status in this period was despite the fact that a 1974 Memorandum for Secretary of
Defense on the long-term implications of Iran’s nuclear program drew a staggeringly
sobering picture predicting "the annual plutonium production from the planned 20,000
MW Iranian nuclear power program [would] be equivalent to 600-700 warheads.”285
In this period, it is also noteworthy that despite the U.S. intelligence community’s
pinning hopes on Iran’s NPT membership to produce a long-term non-proliferation
behavior, this assessment is poorly substantiated by the Shah’s private and public
articulations of what would incentivize or dissuade Iran from seeking a nuclear
capability.
As far as the Shah was concerned, that decision would have more proximately
been shaped by how Iran interpreted its security environment with the NPT exercising
only permissive influence on it. This position of the Shah is in stark contrast to the
Islamic Republic’s justification for why Tehran would not go nuclear where its inviolable
treaty commitments under the NPT assume, at least rhetorically, prominence and the
security dividends of nukes are either de-emphasized or downright derided. If this
observation holds true, an all-important counterfactual question is whether the Shah’s
Iran would have withdrawn from the NPT faced with the formidable odds the Islamic
Republic’s

nuclear

enterprise
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CHAPTER 4:
1979-1988: NUCLEAR DORMANCY
With the forward momentum of the AEOI already severely compromised during
the transition from Etemad to Ahmad Sotoodehnia, the Iranian nuclear program lapsed
into a virtual coma when the Islamic Revolution swept across the country in 1979.
Following the toppling of the Shah’s regime, the head of the AEOI, Sotoodehnia, was
imprisoned for almost four years.
As touched upon before, Ayatollah Khomein’s demonizing of the nuclear
program as a white elephant project essentially slammed the brakes on an enterprise
whose institutionalization on a national scale was far from complete under the Shah.
Khomeini’s rather categorical renunciation of all matters nuclear arguably deprived the
Islamic Republic of much flexibility in reviving the Shah’s nuclear energy program. The
massive exodus of nuclear scientists following the revolution could also be, at least
partially, attributed to the ideological and moral tone of Khomeini’s unqualified antinuclear policy that found a rather curious hasty implementation by the Transition
Government of Mehdi Bazargan.
The contrast between Ayatollah Khomeni’s sentiments on the issue with its
straitjacketing impact on Iran’s official nuclear discourse and the finesse-saturated
statements of Prime Minister Nehru in 1957 is quite revealing. “No man can prophesy the
future,” the Prime Minister said before adding, “but I should like to say on behalf of any
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future Government of India that whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we
shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes.”286
In any case, whether one ascribes Khomeini’s position to revolutionary fervor,
ideological overconfidence, or strategic misguidedness, the founder of the Islamic
Republic took away much vital ambiguity from Iran’s domestic and international nuclear
discourse forcing Tehran to either publicly qualify the founding father’s sentiments on
the issue or embark on a clandestine path in the years ahead. In reality, Tehran opted for a
little bit of both, a policy that, retrospectively viewed, proved an ill-conceived
combination as it exposed glaring contradictions between Tehran’s discourse and
behavior and gave rise to a massive and growing trust deficit between Iran and the
international system.
In those heady days following the revolution, under the Interim Government of
Iran established under the premiership of Mehdi Bazargan in 1979, a petroleum geologist
by the name of Fereydoun Sahabi was placed at the helm of an anemic AEOI. Almost
immediately after assuming office, Sahabi launched a scathing criticism of Iran’s nuclear
enterprise under the Shah. Taking to task the activities of the AEOI under the previous
regime as "directed improperly in order to create a consumer market for the industrial
products of other countries in Iran,” he emphasized that in the future, "no foreign
manpower will be utilized in the AEOI.”287 Sahabi went on even further questioning the
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very raison d’être of the AEOI as an organization “imposed upon the Iranian people” “in
the wake of the former regime's modernization policy.”288 These sentiments naturally
translated to a wholesale nuclear de-mobilization in the months ahead.
In such an atmosphere, on July 31, 1979 head of KWU office in Tehran, Norbert
Schmitt announced the company's unilateral withdrawal from the two nuclear power
plants in Bushehr. The KWU letter addressed to the AEOI mentioned that the German
company "no longer felt bound by the contract" it had concluded with Tehran.289
Following the KWU announcement and caught up in the revolutionary fervor of
the time, Abbas Taj, Iranian Minister of Energy cast aspersions on the contract the AEOI
had concluded with KWU: "Because this contract was not in Iran's interests; because
implementation of the contract would have made [Iran] dependent on outside sources
from the standpoint of technology, raw materials, and foreign engineers; and since the
contract embodied colonialist features and had not been formulated in Iran's interests, it
was therefore rejected by the Iranian Government.”290 Tehran estimated the damage
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inflicted by the KWU withdrawal at DM 5 billion claiming financial compensation by the
German company.291
Soon after the termination of the KWU deal, in February 1980, Sadegh
Ghotbzadeh, Iranian Foreign Minister and one of the most vocal anti-nuclear hawks in
the transition government, announced Tehran's desire to withdraw from the Eurodif
consortium in line with Iran's strategy to scrap all its nuclear energy involvements.
Following those remarks, French Minister of Industry Andre Giraud announced that Paris
would not reward Iran’s unilateral pullout and would not "refund" Tehran's share of the
enterprise.292
Although the Islamic Republic’s rather impulsive decision to make a u-turn on the
Shah’s nuclear energy policy de-nuclearize its energy sector enjoyed initially strong
ideological and some pragmatic support on the domestic scene, the experts closely
analyzing Iran’s future energy trends predicted a return to the Shah’s paradigm sooner or
later. Manour Kashfi, for instance, argued as early as 1980 that the structural economic
imperatives on the ground would propel Iran, over the next two decades, towards
resuscitating the previous regime’s nuclear energy program.293
These sentiments proved prophetic as barely two years into the repudiation of all
matters nuclear the initial signs of a change of heart on the issue appeared in Tehran. In
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May 1981, for example, at the initiative of the AEOI, a seminar in Isfahan was held to
investigate the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran. The range of issues covered
in the papers presented—including economic necessity, technological feasibility, safety
issues, full fuel cycle, training and manpower—demonstrated the AEOI’s newfound
interest to put the Shah’s program back on track.294
Shortly following that, in March 1982, the head of the ENTEC in the city of
Isfahan made headlines going public with the Islamic Republic’s plans to make a foray
into the field of nuclear technology.295 Iran’s interest in nuclear technology was decidedly
on an upward moving trajectory now. In May 1982, the AEOI’s Nuclear Research Center
sponsored a conference entitled “Radioisotopes Seminar and Its Application in Science,
Medicine, Agriculture and Industry” where non-energy benefits deriving from the atom
were also brought to the fore.296 It is important to bear in mind here that lacking a ringing
endorsement by Ayatollah Khomeini as a national priority, the Islamic Republic’s initial
attempts at following in the Shah’s nuclear footsteps were few and far from being linear
and systematic until the mid 1980s.

294

Hariri, A., R. Khonsari Moosavi, J. Shoai-Naini, and M. A. Motamedi. 1982. Abstract of articles
presented at the seminar of investigating the construction of nuclear power plant in Iran. Performer: Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran, Tehran. January 1982.35p.Report: AEOI-129, CONF-8105194-ABSTS,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/86233463?accountid=10901 (accessed July 28, 2011).
295

Reuters. 1982. Iran to Restudy A-power. New York Times, March 18, 1982.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/424317436?accountid=10901 (accessed July 28, 2011).
296

Abstract of articles of radioisotopes seminar and its application in science, medicine, agriculture and
industry held at nuclear research center of atomic energy organization of Iran from 29-31, may, 1982. 1982.
Performer: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Tehran. Nuclear Research Centre.1982.81p.Report: INISMF-7519, CONF-8205146-ABST, http://search.proquest.com/docview/86233516?accountid=10901
(accessed July 28, 2011).

161

According to a nuclear energy expert quoted in a 1988 intelligence report, the
decision to discontinue the Shah’s ambitious nuclear program was taken in light of the
fact that it would be "ridiculous to continue a program that depended totally on foreign
expertise." The report, however, went on to warn that the infrastructural and scientific
foundation developed by the Shah would facilitate the Islamic Republic to move towards
developing a nuclear weapons capability.297
This ideological diagnosis for termination of the program is radically different
from the more pragmatic one argued by Fereydoon Sahabi who later claimed the program
was simply not sustainable for a post-Revolution Iran in dire financial straits. Sahabi,
who broke his almost three-decade silence on the Interim Government’s nuclear policy in
2007, dismissed the conventional wisdom that Bazargan and his technocrat protégés had
fundamental anti-nuclear energy predispositions. While explicitly endorsing the common
perception that neither Bazargan’s nor Rajai’s cabinets had any clear understanding as to
the wisdom of initiating a nuclear program in the first place, Sahabi’s remarks reflect a
highly skeptical attitude by both Prime Ministers toward the real value of maintaining a
highly capital-intensive nuclear energy program for an oil-rich country.
The first chairman of the post-revolution AEOI claimed, however, that he left no
stone unturned, under the most unenviable financial and political circumstances, to
salvage what precious little he could of the Shah’s program. Up against insurmountable
financial odds domestically and political challenges internationally, Sahabi put together a
20-page report on the AEOI’s state of affairs to discuss with Bazargan. Upon a critical
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assessment of the situation, the Prime Minister’s directive for Sahabi was to trim the
AEOI down to a manageable and sustainable scale.
Following the instructions by the Prime Minister, the AEOI, after much
discussion with the nuclear and energy expert community decided on forging ahead with
Bushehr power plants and scrapping all other projects. Chief among the withdrawn
commitments, on seemingly budgetary grounds, were two 900 MWe power plants under
construction on the Karun River by Framatome.298 However, as mentioned earlier, at this
point in July 1979, a frustrated KWU had already suspended work on the Iran-I and IranII projects in Halileh citing payment arrears and lack of a credible negotiating partner in
Tehran.
Such sweeping divestment by the Bazargan Interim Government in the energy
sector has long been a contentious issue in the Islamic Republic’s domestic political
debate. Sahabi’s disarmingly simple response to criticisms was that, in the final analysis,
Etemad’s AEOI had simply bitten off more than it could chew and the bottomless pit the
AEOI created under the Shah was not sustainable with dwindling oil revenues. There
were reports after the revolution, for example, that the real cost of building the projected
20 power plants would have well exceeded, by possibly three times, the official forecast
of $30 billion.299
In this period, it is curious to note that even though the U.S. officials
acknowledged Ayatollah Khomeini’s termination of the Shah’s nuclear program as a
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“satanic” enterprise, the remote likelihood that the Islamic Iran might have gained the
equipment and know-how for uranium enrichment with laser beams made the headlines
on August 22, 1979.300 This hyped reaction was the earliest indication of how the change
in the nature of political regime in Tehran had altered the United States’ reading of Iran’s
dabbling with the atom and Washington’s threat perceptions about it.
Washington’s inflationary threat perception of the INP only continued to intensify
in the following years in the face of physical evidence that Tehran had almost completely
abandoned all nuclear enterprises. For instance, the US State Department suggested as
early as October 1980, following the bombing of Iraq’s nuclear complex by Tehran, that
Iran, along with Iraq, Pakistan, and Libya, was “bent on” developing a nuclear weapons
capability.301 This was followed by a 1982 U.S. intelligence survey that included Iran
among 31 countries who would be “able to produce nuclear weapons by the year
2000.”302
With threat judgments on the INP constantly escalating in the absence of a factual
grounding, the difference in the modality of securitization pre- and post-1979 revolution
was crystallizing in the 1980s. The gist of the difference was that if under the Shah’s rule,
Tehran’s nuclear enterprise was designated as a proliferation challenge at the level of
physical capabilities, under Khomeini’s regime the threat-designation bar was set at the
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mere level of scientific know-how. Within the new paradigm in the making, the
combination of the atom and Islam was viewed and internalized as an explosive cocktail
worth moving heaven and earth to deter and defer at almost any cost. For the United
States, Khomeini’s Iran was the manifestation par excellence of such a baleful
eventuality if it got around to gaining nuclear capacity. Almost two decades later in
October 2007, President Gerorge Bush most explicitly articulated this hyper-securitized
paradigm, “If you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be
interested in preventing them [Iranians] from having the knowledge necessary to make a
nuclear weapon.”303
A side-effect of the premature securitization of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear
behavior was the gradual formation and institutionalization of a conceptual framework
within the new regime’s elite that the United States would have either embraced a nuclear
Shah or at least looked the other way if he was hell-bent on going nuclear. This paradigm
either explicitly or tacitly is predicated upon a set of perceptions well ingrained in Iran’s
establishment elite ever since. The first taken-for-granted perception is that Washington
was willing to extend to the Shah the “Israel treatment.” In the Iranian establishment
elite’s judgment, this would translate into an either sympathetic or apathetic posture
toward a proliferating Shah. As evident from the previous chapter, the declassified
evidence on the United States’ nuclear approach toward the Shah hardly substantiates
such a narrative.
Second, they point at Western Europe’s expansive cooperation with the AEOI and
the U.S. nuclear industry’s chomping at the bit to secure lucrative nuclear deals with Iran.
From the pot-revolutionary Tehran’s vantage point, the fact that Washington blessed
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these deals, full well aware of their undeniable proliferation implications, indicates a
certain level of receptivity toward a nuclear Iran under the Shah.
Last, and perhaps most important, the Iranians believe that it was inconceivable
for a megalomaniac Shah to stand idly by while Islamabad, whom HIM considered Iran’s
junior partner, acquired nuclear weapons. Iran’s senior nuclear negotiator under President
Khatami was so convinced of this counterfactual that in 2010 he claimed, “the Shah’s
ultimate goal was gaining nuclear weapons capability and if he was still in power, Iran’s
nuclear arsenal would be comparable to that of India and Pakistan.”304 As evident in
Mouavian’s remarks, in the Islamic Republic’s judgment, premised upon a purportedly
unimpeachable truth that the Shah had proliferation intentions, Ayatollah Khmeini’s
unequivocal renunciation of the atomic program was a counter-nuclear move of the
highest order that effectively pulled Iran back from the proliferation precipice in 1979.
This counter-proliferation move, however, failed to generate any de-securitizing
dividends for Tehran in Washington.
With the current of Tehran-U.S. relations rapidly and irreversibly drifting to the
security zone, the context of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities was further
securitized in November 1979 with the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran,
apparently with Ayatollah Khomeini’s implicit blessing, and the ensuing 444-day hostage
crisis. This event had massive implications for Iran’s subsequent nuclear activities, not
least since it drastically undercut the credibility and inviolability of Iran’s commitments
to its international contractual obligations like the NPT.
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In the eyes of the international community, the embassy takeover was a vivid
manifestation that the Islamic Republic was willing to match its unorthodox rhetoric with
deeds. From that perspective, the embassy takeover demonstrated the kind of
international irresponsibility the new Iranian regime was capable of and "provided some
serious grounds for concern about long-term proliferation problems in this country."305
With this broad context taking root in the international system and reinforced by Iran’s
removal from the Western bloc (that exerted considerable dampening pressure on the
public designation of Tehran as a proliferator under the Shah), the slightest sign that the
Islamic Republic might pick up the nuclear baton where the Shah had left off was almost
inevitably to be treated as a credible international proliferation threat.
One would be well advised, however, not to read Iran’s commitment to its
international contractual obligations exclusively through the prism of the embassy
takeover. More panoramically viewed, for example, one could argue that the domestic
psychological and normative inhibitions against breaching the non-proliferation regime
were probably at their lowest in the years following the Iranian Revolution, particularly
after the embassy takeover and during the Iran-Iraq war. There is no evidence, however,
to suggest that the withdrawal from the NPT was considered as a viable option in the
Iranian national security apparatus in this era.
Another enduring legacy of the embassy takeover with some massive spin-off
impact on the future unfolding of the INP was the introduction and, over time,
normalization of an ever broadening, deepening, and tightening sanctions regime against
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the Islamic Republic by successive US administrations.306 This was a policy decision
that, in the judgment of many Iran observers, drastically transformed the direction and
tenor of the Iranian Revolution and the behavior of the Islamic Republic.
In any case, as the hostage crisis between Tehran and the United States was
raging on, Saddam’s Ba’ath regime unleashed a massive military strike against Iran in
September 1980. Merely a few days after the breakout of the war, the first nuclear related
incident in the life of the Islamic Republic transpired. On September 21, 1980, two
Iranian F-4 Phantoms struck Iraq's 40-megawatt thermal (MWth) reactor on the outskirts
of Baghdad. Although Tehran scored a significant intelligence and a consequential
symbolic hit by inflicting some damage on the laboratories and other supporting
facilities, the reactor building escaped the attack mostly unscathed.307 The modestly
successful attack, the first military strike against a nuclear reactor ever, was completed in
a secretly coordinated Iranian-Israeli surgical operation conducted in June 1981 by a
squadron of IAF F-16As.308
On October 23, 1983 another turning point with strategic implications for the INP
took place in Lebanon. On this day, Hezbollah, a newly created Shia militant group
inspired by the revolutionary Iran, attacked the barracks of the peacekeeping
Multinational Force in Lebanon killing 299 U.S. marines and French servicemen. These
attacks marked the initiation of the triangulation of Iran’s nuclear efforts by terrorism
through Tehran’s overseas proxies.
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Out of this triangulation emerged the applicability to the INP of the concept of
“nuclear terrorism” as an asymmetric strategy that would purportedly grant countries like
Iran a comfort zone to pull off unconventional attacks on the west (using their non-state
clients) with plausible deniability. Arguably, the most consequential and enduring impact
of Tehran’s intimate association with these non-state actors was its deleterious impact on
Iran’s deterrability as a responsible rational state in a nuclear context.
In other words, the argument went, since these non-state actors had no territorial
return address (a most fundamental imperative for deterrence to emerge and take hold)
Tehran could transfer its nuclear capability to these extreme risk takers and challenge the
very foundations of the doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence. “Nuclear blackmail” was
the terminology of choice to capture the essence of the new reality. Over the years, the
Islamic Republic’s failure to either rhetorically or operationally distance itself from these
violent non-state actors (VNSAs) as its nuclear capabilities were advancing did little to
inspire confidence in Tehran’s nuclear trustworthiness and its future deterrence
credentials.
In parallel with Tehran’s involvement through Hezbollah in Lebanon increasing
came a major turn in the tide of Iran-Iraq War in favor of Tehran in 1982 and 1983. The
Reagan Administration, concerned over the prospect of a strategic decisive victory by
Tehran and its unexpected progress in the war effort, unleashed a new round of sanctions
regime known as Operation Staunch. Within this new policy framework Secretary of
State George Schultz urged U.S. embassies to put pressure on the host countries to curtail
the transfer of arms and dual-use equipment to Iran. This shift in policy came on the heels
of a decision by Washington in the previous year to lift dual-use sanctions on Iraq and
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provide Saddam with ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) support.
Operation Staunch, imposed at the height of Iran-Iraq war, exercised an enduring
grip on how Tehran later came to perceive U.S. sanctions regime against itself. From this
perspective, an ever-expanding sanctions regime was internalized as an inalienable part
of Iran-U.S. relations in the post revolution era (that was only incidentally connected to
Iran’s nuclear program) whose ultimate objective was to bring about regime change in
Tehran.
Securitization of the INP Gains Momentum
On April 24, 1984 the authoritative Jane’s Defense Weekly quoted some
unidentified West Germany intelligence sources as saying that Iran had entered the “final
stages” of gaining a nuclear capability that had put it a mere two years away from the
bomb.309 Although the British publication’s claim was immediately countered by the U.S.
State Department as “unlikely,”310 it set in motion a never-ending trend of putative
projections by different intelligence agencies-- ranging from a few months to a decade-on what kind of timeframe stood between Iran and the bomb. ''We believe it would take
at least two to three years to complete construction of the reactors at Bushehr,” the State
Department stressed, adding that Bushehr’s light water reactors were not “particularly
well-suited for a weapons program.” The State Department concluded by emphasizing,
“There was no evidence of Iranian construction of other facilities that would be necessary
to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel.”311 The Jane’s article was apparently based
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on reports that West Germany’s KWU had started “preliminary assessment” of the
feasibility of completing the two Bushehr reactors, a prospect pronounced highly unlikely
by the FRG officials with the Iran-Iraq war still in full swing.
The Jane’s article, however, brought some clarity and a foretaste of what was to
come to Washington’s approach toward Iran’s nuclear status as an NPT member state.
The U.S. State Department cited the Iranian Government’s “previous actions” as a
ground that Tehran’s pledge to abide by its “international commitments” was less than
complete. The DoS specified Iran’s state of war with Iraq as intensifying those concerns.
Out of these set of anxieties emanated a policy articulated as the following: “the United
States will not consent to the transfer of U.S.-origin nuclear equipment, material or
technology to Iran, either directly or through third countries, where such consent is
legally required.'' Within this framework, the United States also discouraged ''other
nuclear suppliers” from engaging in nuclear cooperation with Iran.312
Faced with such inhospitable circumstances, Iran’s initial attempts to rekindle the
Shah’s nuclear attempt were focused on Bushehr. Having realized that keeping the BNPP
mothballed meant the waste of billions of dollars of capital already sunken, Tehran turned
to a host of countries to complete the Busher-I reactor. Chief among these states, initially,
were Argentina and China. Argentina had had a long history of working with the Shah’s
program and had also helped Iran “convert Tehran's Research Reactor from highly
enriched uranium (93 percent) to low-enriched uranium fuel and later supplied 20percent-enriched fuel under international safeguards.” China, according to a nuclear
cooperation agreement concluded in 1987 would help Iran with "scientific exchanges and
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the eventual purchase of miniature neutron source reactors and a heavy-water research
reactor."313 Iran’s first multiple covert and overt attempts to resuscitate the BNPP with
various countries were turned down, however, in no small part, under the U.S. pressure.
Realizing the inhospitable international ground and feeling left to its own devices,
Iran set out to take a leaf out of Pakistan’s book by finagling its way into the nuclear club
through securing individual hardware and software components (or components of
components, for that matter) in whatever way possible. This was a policy that triggered a
long Whack-A-Mole between Tehran and Washington that has continued ever since the
mid-1980s.
According to US intelligence sources, Iran terminated the revolution-induced
hiatus in its nuclear program in 1982 by attempting to “ resurrect at least part of the
Shah's ambitious nuclear power plans" especially the BNPP and “a pilot-scale fuel
fabrication plant and heavy water facility.”314 According to this analysis, the Islamic
Republic reinstituted the program by picking up where the Shah had left off and trying to
build upon the existing infrastructural and scientific foundations. The program was
reinstituted apparently with Ayatollah Khomeini’s blessing under the supervision of Mir
Hossein Mousavi. This report makes it explicit that Mousavi was not pushing for the
development of a nuclear weapons program. During this era, the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI) continued to oversee all elements of Iran’s nuclear program
and reported directly to Prime Minister Mousavi.
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The Islamic Republic faced an uphill battle in pursuit of the Shah’s nuclear
program, however. Two factors were of paramount significance here: one was the
revolutionary elite’s continued disdainful and dismissive attitude towards the Shah’s
program. Under these circumstances, breathing life into the discarded program was a
most formidable task. An enfeebled economy further compounded by Tehran’s
revolutionary excesses and its confrontational foreign policy provided for the most
disagreeable atmosphere for a normal nuclear awakening in the post-revolutionary Iran.
Second, was the fact that Iran’s post-revolution nuclear consciousness was born and
cultivated in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War with the international cards decidedly
stacked against it. This second war factor had undeniable implications for the subsequent
ease with which Iran’s nuclear effort, even the most innocuous aspect of it (the Bushehr
Nuclear Power Plant), was securitized. In other words, the war atmosphere granted
credence and credibility on the claims that Iran, at a minimum, was seeking a nuclear
deterrent capability and no aspect of Iran’s nuclear program could be de-contextualized
and disengaged from this broader fact. This prevailing theme essentially turned every
aspect of Iran’s nuclear program into a proliferating behavior in the eye of the Western
countries.
It was in this atmosphere that in June 1985, Iranian Majlis Speaker Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani’s Beijing visit --the first to a non-Muslim country by a high-ranking
Iranian official since 1979-- triggered speculation about Iran’s secret nuclear dealings
with China. It is important to note here that by the mid-1980s China had replaced France
as Washington’s country of concern in transfer of sensitive proliferation-relevant
technology to Third World countries. These allegations were floated within the context of
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China’s apparently rogue proliferation behavior. The United States was concerned that a
secret deal had been struck with Iran despite Beijing’s conclusion of a nuclear
cooperation agreement with the Reagan Administration. The Americans viewed their
April 1984 deal with China as a persuasive mechanism to bring China’s sensitive nuclear
technology transfer in line with international non-proliferation norms and regimes and
Beijing’s eventual accession to the NPT. This took place in 1992.
These concerns re-intensified in October 1985 when the U.S. intelligence
community alleged that China was providing nuclear technology to Tehran. The
intelligence reports substantiated allegations already going around in Washington that
China was sharing sensitive proliferation-prone knowhow with, in Californian Senator
Alan Cranston's words, "five nuclear outlaw" states- Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Pakistan,
and South Africa.315
As proved to be the case in numerous other proliferation disputes between Beijing
and Washington, the two capitals seemed to be on different pages on the all-important
question of what constituted nuclear proliferation and what a solid non-proliferation
posture required. Put crudely, China believed that conforming to the United States’
highly broad definition of proliferation could hurt its commercial interests at a crucial
juncture when Beijing was making a calculated and deliberate foray into the marketbased international economy.
In the meantime, the U.S. intelligence community’s proliferation concerns were
not even widely shared by the Reagan Administration whose senior officials were at
pains to portray China as part of the solution, not part of the problem, in Washington’s
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international counter-proliferation efforts. A senior US official, for instance, openly
countered Senator Cranston’s sentiments claiming China had effectively reversed its
attitude toward proliferation. “China used to think proliferation was good because it
undermined the hegemony of the two superpowers,” the official observed, concluding;
“now it thinks proliferation is bad."316 A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement promptly
rejected Cranston’s allegations categorically denying any nuclear relationship between
China and Iran.317
In this connection, it is important to note that the U.S. intelligence community, by
its own admission, did not have a good grasp on China’s proliferation behavior before it
formally acceded to the NPT in March 1992. The U.S. viewed this as a sign that the
Chinese were not entirely a bona fide partner in enforcing their arms control vision yet
careful enough not to alienate the Americans.318 Much to the chagrin of the United States,
this “juggling strategy” by China remained a perpetual feature of the Chinese approach
toward cooperation with Iran on the nuclear issue over the years to come.
At the end of this era, Khoemini’s death opened up the possibility for a wholesale
change of heart and a reboot in the INP. Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union, which had
been strained and surly, if not outright antagonistic, also started to thaw. A fair chunk of
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credit for the rapprochement should go to Rafsanjani whose presidency marked the era
when Iran embarked on de-ideaologizing its relations with the Soviet Union. It is
important to note that Rafsanjani’s success on this score was facilitated significantly
“with the fallout from the Rushdie affair holding up the normalization of Tehran's ties
with the West, [and when] the USSR found itself, at least temporarily, with a relatively
clear field ahead for increasing its influence in Iran.”319 The BNNP reactor came to
symbolize this relationship with Iran and Russia formally starting nuclear cooperation in
1992.
It is also important to note that the United States, even before Khomeini's death,
viewed the Ayatollah’s January 1989 letter to Gorbachev320 as indicative of "his approval
of the warming trend already underway" signaling "Moscow that Tehran no longer
regarded ideological differences as a major barrier to expanding political and economic
relations."321 One noticeable element in the U.S. intelligence community’s reading of the
evolving relationship between Iran and the USSR in 1989 was a conspicuous lack of
mention of the nuclear field for potential future cooperation between Tehran and
Moscow.322
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Conclusion
While the Iranians have consistently ruled out the notion that their nuclear re-birth
following the 1979 Revolution had nothing to do whatsoever with the Iran-Iraq war, there
appeared evidence in the years following the end of the war that this was hardly the case.
Within this context, it is customary for the mainstream accounts of Tehran’s decision to
accept the 1988 UNSC ceasefire resolution 598 to point mainly to the widespread war
weariness, lack of breakthrough on the frontlines, recruitment challenges, fear of U.S.
intervention, and Saddam’s use of chemical weapons.
In 2006, however, former President Rafsanjani released a confidential
memorandum by Ayatollah Khomeini addressed to the Iranian officials that set the stage
for an alternative narrative. In the July 1988 memorandum, the Iranian Supreme Leader
conveys the contents of correspondence between him and IRGC commander-in-chief
Mohsen Rezaei a few weeks earlier where Rezaei insinuated an effective offensive could
only be launched against Baghdad if Tehran possessed sophisticated weaponry including
nuclear weapons.323 This was the first time and the earliest documented instance where an
exhortation to militarily utilize a nuclear capability came from the nation’s top military
brass.
As much as Western media lavished attention on the released memorandum as
indicating Iran’s nuclear weapons predilection, however, the apathetic response it drew
from Khomeini at the time demonstrates the marginal role the IRGC played in Tehran’s
nuclear policy under Khomeini. The letter by Khomeini also demonstrates that Saddam
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Hussein’s use of chemical warfare during the Iran-Iraq war seems to have contributed to
Iran’s decision to speed up the campaign to salvage the remnants of the Shah’s nuclear
program. Furthermore, as Tehran was warily eying the resuscitation of Saddam’s nuclear
program following the destruction of the Osirak reactor, a determination was taking deep
roots in Tehran not to concede an erratic Ba’ath regime any nuclear edge.
This document, additionally, demonstrates that the mid-1980s were perhaps the
most crucial and formative years in the overall trajectory of the Islamic Republic’s
nuclear socialization. Additionally, the war-born technological and equipment
procurement activities associated with the INP in this period had an enduring impact on
the international community’s attitude toward the trustworthiness of Iran’s international
contractual commitments.
This enduring impact was in no small part due to the fact that Iran never tried in
the subsequent years to justify and recant the mid-1980s as an aberration era when it had
to take a set of temporary emergency measures as a sovereign state in the face of
overwhelming existential security challenges. As former IAEA Director General
Mohamed Elbaradaei points out in his memoires, Tehran’s adamant reluctance to admit
to some level of under-the-radar activity in its nuclear behavior during the 1980s
significantly detracted from the credibility of its subsequent non-proliferation credentials
and undercut the international community’s willingness to give Tehran the benefit of the
doubt, look sympathetically on the era, and provide Iran with a tabula rasa.324
Towards the late 1980s and as the Iran-Iraq war seemed to be stalemating,
farfetched and fantasy-laced analyses and news articles were especially on the rise with
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regards to Iran’s nuclear program. In what seemed to be no more than hunch- driven
sensational journalism, for example, The Washington Post ran a piece authored by David
Segal in April 1987 titled, “Atomic Ayatollahs: Just What the Mideast Needs-An Iranian
Bomb.” The article, after drawing much attention inside the beltway for three weeks,
turned out to be almost completely based on “misquoted, misrepresented, and fabricated”
information the author claimed to have obtained from an interview with Fereydoun
Fesharaki, a prominent economist who left Iran after the 1979 revolution.
In what Segal called “a chilling glimpse of Iran’s desire to acquire nuclear
weapons,” he related a meeting between Khomeini’s confidant Ayatollah Mohammed
Beheshti and Fesharaki in May 1979 during which the Ayatollah pleaded Fesharaki to
build the atomic bomb for the Islamic Republic since “our civilization is in danger and
we have to do it."325 Fesharaki wrote a chastising letter to the Post a few weeks later
essentially debunking all the claims attributed to him in the piece. “Ayatollah Beheshti
did not tell me it is my duty to build a bomb,” Fesharaki wrote, adding, “As an economist
(not a scientist, as Mr. Segal calls me), I am hardly capable of building a nuclear
bomb.”326 Segal’s piece was only a foretaste of what was to come in the decades ahead as
the credibility and reputational cost of getting Iran wrong kept hitting all-time lows year
after year.
On a balanced reading, one notices that a sense of fatalism about Iran’s
predilection for proliferation crept into the U.S. foreign policy establishment since the
mid 1980s. In other words, in this period, the United States came to internalize
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proliferation as part of, as it were, the DNA of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The
documents declassified so far don’t shed a definitive diagnostic light on the inner
workings of how this paradigm came about. However, the consensus view in Tehran on
this has consistently been one of regime change. In other words, as far as Tehran was
concerned, the United States instrumentally and opportunistically designated an
innocuous civilian nuclear program as a proliferation threat in order to create an
international atmosphere of contingency toward the Islamic Republic ultimately aimed at
toppling the clerical regime. An analytical assessment of the securitization of the INP,
however, reveals an infinitely more complicated trajectory.
On a more analytical reading, a host of political, economic, ideological, and
military ingredients crept into the securitization process of the INP following the Islamic
Revolution. On the economic front, the resuscitation of a previously renounced and
denounced profligate program went right in the face of prevailing energy trends and
raised proliferations concerns. From this perspective, the general sense in the mid 1980s,
in diametrical contrast to the mid 1970s, was that the “peak oil” argument was far from
an article of faith it was made out to be in the previous decade. As a matter of fact, the
contrast in perception from the oil crunch of the mid 1970s to the 1980s oil glut couldn’t
be starker. This development coupled with a sharp drop on the demand side in the global
energy market tremendously decreased the economic attractiveness of capital-intensive
and time-consuming nuclear power plants. The new situation was so dire that in the early
1980’s, in the words of a U.S. intelligence memorandum, "the market in developing
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countries for nuclear power reactors virtually collapsed."327 Under these transformed
circumstances, only magnified by the woeful status of Iran’s coffers, a defiant push for
nuclear energy could hardly make for a solid economic argument.
On the ideology front, the Islamic Republic never quite developed a consistent
and cogent argument for the change of heart from the early days of the revolution when
the Shah’s nuclear program was impugned as a satanic undertaking. This lack of
explanation was consequential in the lukewarm reception of Ayatollah Khamenei’s 2007
Fatwa (religious degree) on the Islamic non-sanctionability of a range of nuclear options
including the development, acquisition, stockpiling, threats to use, or actual use of
nuclear weapons from a Shi’ite perspective.
On the military front, as earlier argued, the Islamic Republic’s war-born nuclear
awakening made a de-securitized narrative by Tehran hardly convincing while giving
credence to proliferation intentions. Comparatively analyzed, if under the Shah the
received rationale for why Iran might be incubating a nuclear weapons agenda was
contextualized within the framework of the Monarch’s insatiable thirst for state-of-the-art
conventional weapons, in the Islamic Republic era, Tehran’s alleged predilection for
proliferation received a reverse mode of reasoning. Under the Shah, it was feared that the
zestful conventional procurement could be naturally extended to the nuclear realm. In the
Islamic Republic era, by contrast, it was either explicitly or implicationally argued that
the ordeal of having been on the receiving end of Saddam’s WMD strikes combined with
Tehran’s strategically disadvantaged position to procure conventional arms were factors
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compelling enough for a lonely Islamic Republic to aspire to acquire at least some
“threshold” nuclear capability for deterrence purposes.328
On the political front, the Islamic Republic’s idealistic approach to the NPT didn’t
help decelerate the securitization of its nuclear behavior either. On this score, one has to
bear in mind an important development that distinguishes the post-revolution Iran from
the Shah’s on the all-important question of the nature of the NPT. Under the Shah
especially since the mid 1970s Tehran tended to view the main function of the NPT in
terms of maintaining a non-nuclear status quo in Iran’s strategic environment. Viewed
from this perspective, the primary bargain of the treaty was one that was not even
explicitly verbalized in the treaty, one that was only derivatively, circumstantially, and
retrospectively visible. This was part of the reason why in the Shah’s era one notices only
minimum public critique of the nature of the bargain between the nuclear haves and havenots and the former’s unfulfilled commitments under article VI to de-proliferate.
By contrast, in the post-1979 era Iran came to internalize and interpret the nature
and purpose of the NPT quite differently. This time around, viewed from Tehran, the
defining feature of the NPT’s core bargain was article VI where the NNWS’ abstention
should have been commensurately reciprocated by a verifiable denuclearization in the
NWS camp represented by the U.S. and the USSR. For instance, on February 19, 1995
Iran’s UN Ambassador Kamal Kharrazi threatened Tehran would oppose an indefinite
extension of the treaty unless a revision was made “in the accord binding signatories to a
deadline for the destruction of nuclear weapons.”329 Of course, over the years, especially
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since the early 2000s and as Iran’s nuclear capabilities were advancing and its future
nuclear horizons were widening, Iran shifted the thrust of its critique of the NPT back to
article IV of the treaty.
To pause a bit longer on this point an argument can be made that the defining
feature of the Shah’s conceptualization of the NPT was that it tied in Iran’s contractual
obligations under the treaty with the country’s broader strategic security environment
thereby making his non-proliferation pronouncements credible and externally verifiable
from a realist International Relations perspective. The Islamic Republic, on the other
hand, through decoupling its interpretation of the core bargain of the NPT from its
security context, made a realist and non-normative reading of its nonproliferation claims
extremely problematic and allowed a mercurial and Janus-faced aura to surround
Tehran’s entire nuclear posture.
Finally, in analyzing Tehran’s nuclear behavior and the United States’ response to
it, parsing out a 1985 National Intelligence Council Memorandum’s diagnosis is
illuminating. This polemic document essentially argued that subjecting the policymaking
environment on the proliferation issues to "the normal pull and tug of domestic politics"
acts as a retarding if not permanently revising force on the "incentive structure" of
proliferation. However, the United States almost never pursued this advice in the case of
the Islamic Republic.
As a matter of fact, a case can be made that by inflating the military threat
emanating from Iran’s nuclear program in the late 1980s, Washington inadvertently
helped privatize Tehran’s nuclear decision-making away from the public and normal
political arena into the more esoteric national security zone. This policy was in direct
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conflict with the report’s most crucial assessment that:
“Over the next five years or so, there is a good chance that today's relatively
favorable nonproliferation regime will not be seriously endangered. The principal factor
leading to this conclusion is that only arguments of national security, particularly if they
involve serious fears about potential national annihilation, are likely to carry enough
weight with decision makers to override the negative reactions they might anticipate from
supplier countries, neighbors, the international community, and from domestic critics of
decisions to develop nuclear weapons. Few, if any, countries with developing nuclear
capabilities seem likely to perceive so ominous a threat to their survival during this
period.”
Furthermore, the memorandum, rather realistically, predicted that the physical
impediments and technological challenges in the way of proliferation would, over the
long term, lose their effectiveness compared to normative counter-proliferation
mechanisms that gain ideational traction and sedimentation over time. On this point, the
document concluded, “if the industrial capabilities for developing an advanced nuclear
infrastructure continue to spread, as seems virtually inevitable, the United States and
other supplier countries may need to focus more on attempting to boost anti-weapon
motivations in Third World countries than on technological denial, seeking to take
advantage of doubts that already exist about the potential regional security and domestic
political costs of making pro-weapon decisions. The challenge here is to find ways to
enhance those concerns without causing a nationalistic backlash against perceived foreign
interference in sensitive domestic matters.”330

330

Secret. National Intelligence Council Memorandum. The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of
Incentives and Constraints. September 1985.

184

Based on such a judgment, the memorandum warned the counter-proliferation
community against making simplistic causal analyses that made a unidirectional link
between technological capability and proliferation. The memorandum cited this faulty
reasoning as a major cause why Washington’s worst proliferation fears in the 1960s
never transpired.
The memorandum faulted those “earlier projections about the probable rate of
proliferation” with having “too narrow a perception of the process by which the spread of
a nuclear explosive capability comes about.” Due to this pathology, the report observed,
“those predictions tended to be driven by straight line projections of such matters as how
soon a country could have the ability to produce sufficient fissile material for an
explosion, given its recent pace of technological acquisition.” The end result of this mode
of analysis, the document argued, was a kind of technological determinism “implying that
if a country acquired more and more of the technical ingredients that go into making a
nuclear device, the decision to consummate that option would … eventually be made.”
Drawing attention to the multifaceted nature of nuclear decision-making and
warning against reducing it to its technical ingredients, the report explained how in
parallel with “accretions” in technological capabilities, the decision-making process
becomes more multidimensional and multisectoral since it has to take into account a
whole slew of international and domestic economic, political, environmental, and societal
considerations.331 As Washington’s inflated threat designation of the INP demonstrated in
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the mid to late 1980s, almost none of these sentiments found their way into the
paradigmatic framework within which Tehran’s nuclear behavior was construed.
Another major development following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was an
implicit transformation in the United States’ security culture of what constituted
proliferation. Although this change was acknowledged in a 1985 memorandum where it
tracked how various NIEs since the 1960s progressively pushed back the definition of
proliferation from "weapon capability" to "primitive nuclear-explosive capability" to
"sensitive nuclear materials and facilities that might contribute to an explosive (or
weapons) capability,"332 its impact on the Islamic Republic was tremendously more
visible.
It was based on such a new threshold that a 1985 intelligence report placed Iran,
along with Iraq, Libya, and Egypt, as a country of "proliferation concern" who "have
shown interest in developing the kinds of capabilities that, if they succeed, might
eventually bring them to the technological level where they could create an explosive
device. But events and other governments have conspired in the last several years to
place such major obstacles in their paths that there is virtually no chance any of them
could reach that level in the next 10 years.”333As president George Bush famously
declared in 2007, applied to Iran, simply “having the knowledge necessary to make a
nuclear weapon” essentially amounted to a proliferation scenario to be averted at all cost.
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CHAPTER FIVE
NUCLEAR EXPEDIENCY (1988-1997)
Introduction
The end of the eight year war with Iraq in late 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini’s death
in 1989 and the ascendency of a technocrat Rafsanjani to presidency removed a host of
ideological, material, and bureaucratic constraints that had reigned in a full and
systematic resuscitation of Iran’s nuclear past. As opposed to what seems to have been a
clandestine effort to contrive a “short-cut” route to militarily relevant nuclear capability
during the mid to the late 1980s—partly in response to Saddam’s run for the bomb-Iran’s nuclear strategy in the 1990s was mainly characterized by a systematic effort to
build a full-spectrum indigenous nuclear infrastructure that would communicate a
deterring nuclear breakout capacity to would-be aggressors by putting Iran on the
threshold.
The approach, commonly known as the “Japan option” in the non-proliferation
circles, was essentially aimed at rekindling the Shah’s strategy whose ideal goal was to
equip Tehran with all the hardware and software ingredients necessary to build a
deliverable nuclear device stopping just short of a political decision at the top. Tehran’s
thinking was that, in absence of a clear and present security threat, such a capability
would enable it to reap the deterrent dividends of nukes “on the cheap” without having to
pay the exorbitant economic, normative, and security costs associated with stockpiling
them in a hostile environment.
Discrete elements of Iran’s post-revolution nuclear thinking-- heavily influenced
by what Tehran perceived was a conspiracy of silence by the international community in
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the face of Iraq’s use of WMD during the 1980-1988 war-- began to cohere into a
systematic conceptual and operational framework under the presidency of Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani. The technocrat cleric, who later showed a thinly disguised partiality
to assume the mantle of the “father” of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, was
arguably the most instrumental figure in shaping Iran’s nuclear strategy and in elevating
it to the top of the country’s national priorities in the post war period.
Iran’s nuclear program in this period was simultaneously the beneficiary and a
victim of the tumultuous early 1990s that saw the implosion of the USSR and the end of
the Cold War. The INP got a boost, especially in terms of enhanced capability to secure
components, following a decision by the Bush administration to lift US sanctions on the
sale of high-tech equipment to Eastern Europe. The easing of control mechanisms on the
high-tech sector was especially important for Tehran by giving it window of opportunity
to secure the so-called dual-use parts and components from the cash-strapped USSR orbit
countries.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, in the same time, brought about a macrosecuritizational transformation in the international system depriving Iran of much vital
maneuverability and structurally de-securitizing pressures that bipolarity had conferred
exercised on the INP. In other words, the punishment and rewards structure of the
international system had now changed in such a fundamental way that Washington could
aggressively hyper-securitize and antagonize the Iranian regime without worrying about
its balance of power implications.334

334

Mohiaddin Messbahi, "Iran and Central Asia: Paradigm and Policy," Central Asian Survey 23, no. 2
(2004): 109-139.

188

Within this new context, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and
Operation Desert Storm, the notion of “ambitious” power, in some ways reminiscent of
the Shah era, began finding applicability to the Islamic Republic in Western policy
circles. A new conventional wisdom was shaping up in Washington in the early 1990s
that claimed, with the Soviet threat to the north eliminated and the mortal Baath enemy to
the west emasculated, the Revolutionary regime was presented with an unprecedentedly
hospitable strategic environment to throw its weight around in its periphery. Acquiring a
nuclear capability, the argument went, would be an indispensible and organic component
in Tehran’s strategic toolbox to fulfill its ambitions.
It is also extremely important to view the elevation of the INP as a top security
priority for the United States within the context of Washington’s experience with
Saddam’s clandestine nuclear program whose proximity to a weaponizable capability
virtually caught the White House off guard. Following the dismantlement of Baghdad’s
nuclear program after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the conventional wisdom in
Washington was that considering Iranian intelligence elements’ penetrating capacity into
Iraq’s nuclear program – demonstrated by its intelligence sharing with the Israelis before
the Osirak strike—Tehran should also have tried to match, if not outstrip, it archenemy’s
nuclear potential.
The Soviet Collapse and the Cottage Industry of Securitizing the INP
The unpredicted collapse of the Soviet Union particularly caught the U.S.
counter-proliferation community off guard. The hard-currency-strapped nuclear remnants
of the former empire, in the judgment of the U.S. intelligence community, generated a
nuclear black-market where countries like Iran could tap to secure their technology,
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fissile material, and manpower needs unfettered by vigilant government oversight. In
1992, the Bush administration was already alarmed at the deluge of sophisticated
conventional armaments like T-72 tanks and Su-24 and MIG-29 aircraft and a host
unconventional know-how and hardware finding their way from the Former Soviet Union
(FSU) to Iran. In one U.S. official’s words, the new development had not only accorded
Iran “parity” with its archenemy Iraq but could lead to an Iranian “dominance” over the
Persian Gulf region where a heavily sanctioned Iraq was simply too anemic to offer much
of a balancing act to a reinvigorating Tehran.335
Within this broad context in mind, Washington came to view with increasing
suspicion Iran’s laser-focused efforts to complete the BNPP. Put simply, in the George H.
W. Bush Administration’s perspective, there was more to the Rafsanjani administration’s
pull-out-all-the-stops campaign to complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor than met the eye.
Nothing but proliferation intentions could justify Tehran’s “single-minded pursuit of
nuclear power plants in a country deficient in the capital required to build such plants and
rich in natural gas that [could] fire power plants cheaply.”336
Internalizing the unfolding situation in threat terms, in 1992 the United States
passed the “Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act” essentially making it the official policy of
the United States to “urgently” enlist the support of “other nations to oppose any transfer
to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology,
wherever that transfer could materially contribute to either country's acquiring chemical,
biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional
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weapons.”337 This decision marked the beginning of the international securitization of the
INP.
In the Bush administration’s view, the opening of what amounted to a nuclear
bazaar in the FSU coupled with the increasingly non-scrutinized availability of nuclear
know-how – in no small part thanks to the exodus of the FSU’s nuclear scientists—had
essentially given rise to an era of “nuclear ubiquity” where curbing a determined and
well-off aspirant’s foray into the bomb was next to impossible. In a January 1992
testimony before Congress, CIA Director Robert M. Gates put Iran exactly in this
category alleging Tehran had “publicly” hinted at its interest to “have nuclear
weapons.”338
Although disputed by the U.S. military analysts, Gates’ January testimony in
Congress on the galloping pace of the INP made such an alarming impression that 17
ranking senators from both sides of the isle sent an “unusual classified letter” to Secretary
of State James Baker inquiring about China’s proliferation-related assistance to Tehran.
In the view of Congress, any concrete move by the administration to lift sanctions on the
transfer of U.S. nuclear technology to China should have been conditioned on securing
Beijing’s unqualified commitment to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
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established in 1987 by the United States and its western allies to forestall the
dissemination of WMD delivery systems. Especially raising the Senate’s ire was the
prospect of the transfer of the newly commissioned M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles to
countries like Iran.339
Under such uncertain and highly dynamic circumstances, in 1992 Washington’s
concerns that Iran would beat it to the draw in the FSU reached such a feverish pitch that
the Bush administration dropped securing ironclad commitments on human rights, the
START treaty, and market-based economy as part of the United States’ preconditions to
establish full-fledged diplomatic ties with the newborn FSU countries in Central Asian
and Caucuses. This was a central component of the Administration’s efforts to keep tabs
on Iran’s activities in Central Asia and the Caucuses, a region “up for grabs” by Tehran
in Washington’s judgment. As part of this effort, in February 1992, Secretary of State
James Baker visited the region to speed up the establishment of U.S. embassies in
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to neutralize Iran’s
expanding political sway.340
As public and private expressions of concern by the U.S. over the INP were
intensifying, an IAEA delegation conducted an inspection of Iran’s nuclear facilities at
Tehran’s invitation in early February 1992. The nuclear watchdog’s findings couldn’t be
more frustrating for Washington’s securitization agenda. In some disarmingly categorical
remarks, Dr. John Jennekens, the delegation’s spokesperson reported, "there does not
seem to be a shred of evidence on the allegations that were made in the media." Praising
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the “ready access” Tehran had granted to six nuclear facilities and staff members, he
added, "Nothing we have seen proves that there is any activity here against the peaceful
principles of nuclear policy."341
The IAEA report on two sites of concern was especially compelling in dispelling
much speculation over Tehran’s nuclear intentions. One was the site of cauldron
equipment in Isfahan that Washington suspected of having enrichment applications.
Confirming Tehran’s claims that it was exclusively used to “produce stable isotopes of
zinc for pharmaceutical purposes,” the IAEA concluded, “There are absolutely no
facilities for handling or coping with radioactive material in the building housing the
cauldron.” The other suspicious site in Moallem Kalayeh in Northern Iran, claimed by the
Iraq based Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) to be a secret nuclear facility, was
declared by the Agency a “motel-sized” recreational retreat for nuclear scientists. The
IAEA team came so close to issuing the INP a clean bill of health that one of its French
experts “deplored” the fact that Iran was “under a de facto embargo on nuclear
equipment."342
Following the IAEA report, the Bush administration backpedaled on its highdensity threat forecasts, conceding there was “no smoking gun in the way of weapons
intent.”343 This reassuring report (and the follow-up report presented by IAEA Director
General Hans Blix in 1993), however, didn’t manage to put the issue to rest as the nuclear
watchdog organization was accused of credulity in its inspections by the United States
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since it couldn’t unearth the more sophisticated clandestine aspects of Iran’s nuclear
enterprise.
The dust on the issue had barely settled down when in May 1992 a European
newspaper, quoting unidentified intelligence sources, made the headlines claiming Iran
had spirited in two nuclear warheads from the Atomic Research Institute of Kazakhstan
in cahoots with president Nursultan Nazarbayev. The United States spurned the
credibility of the intelligence citing lack of verifiability.344
Shortly afterward, the INP hit the securitization zone again in November 1992
when Vice President of Iran for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Ata’ollah Mohajerani
made international news headlines by obliquely suggesting that Islamic countries should
strive to match Israel’s nuclear capability.345 Although the crude statements were later
repudiated and retracted as personal statements of desire by some junior politician, some
policy circles in Washington and Tel Aviv were quick to interpret them as indicative of
the Islamic Republic’s endeavor to develop nuclear weapons.
Clinton and “Dual Containment”
In 1993 and with the election of Bill Clinton as the 42nd President of the United
States, Iran’s nuclear program plunged deeper into the securitization zone. Unhappy with
the Bush Administration’s purportedly laser-focused attention on Iraq and its implications
for tilting the fragile regional balance in Iran’s favor, the Clinton administration set out to
rectify the perceived disequilibrium. Taking a swipe at its predecessor’s Iran policy, a
Clinton administration official said the Bush people "had the notion that goodwill begets
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goodwill," but "when we came into office, all we saw was an outlaw regime…. We
cannot engage in the process of improving relations with an outlaw state unless we see
change across the board." He concluded, "Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Libya and North Korea are
unable to interact with the international system in a constructive, positive way, so they
build links to each other. What they have in common is the effort to acquire weapons of
mass destruction."346
“Dual containment” was the policy response reflecting the new thinking in the
new White House. Incubated in the early 1990s by Martin Indyk at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the policy sought to subject the Iranian regime to
a sweeping arms sanctions regime comparable to those imposed on Baghdad so the status
quo could be restored at least over the short and medium term.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Clinton’s most veteran diplomat on Iran
and a leftover from the Carter Administration, was the public face of the new policy
strategy. As the chief negotiator with the Iranians during the hostage crisis, Christopher’s
vision of Tehran was deeply scarred by those crisis-ridden 444 days. Frequently referring
to Iran as an “international outlaw,” Christopher made the rounds of international capitals
urging his counterparts to treat Iran “as the most worrisome” state bent on acquiring a
nuclear capability.347
As the administration was scrambling to generate traction for dual containment,
another classified letter sent to the Secretary of State by Senators Claiborne Pell and Jesse
Helms on China’s under-the-counter arms dealings with Tehran injected a renewed sense
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of urgency to create consensus across all the branches of government and shift the heat
from the headache in Baghdad to the real challenge in Iran. The dilemma emanating from
Iran’s nuclear defiance was even more worthy of acute attention, in the new conventional
wisdom putting down roots in Washington, given the clerical regime’s intimate ties to the
terrorist organizations in the Middle East.348
Incrementally, the Clinton’s Administration’s efforts to isolate Tehran assumed
such broad dimensions that some policy experts speculated Tehran had, for all practical
purposes, substituted Moscow as the “New Evil Empire” in Washington’s eyes. An
operational component to this new perception was the United States’ strenuous efforts to
restrict Iran’s strategic options even in instances where Washington’s interests were not
concretely at stake. A vivid manifestation of this was the Clinton administration’s policy
to dissuade the FSU countries from piping their oil through the Iranian corridor. This
obstructive attitude, as far as Tehran was concerned, constituted an example par
excellence of a swaggering post Cold War White House whose hostility toward Tehran
had grown gratuitous and incorrigible. Viewed in the same light in Tehran was the
Clinton administration’s approach in stonewalling and squelching financially distressed
Iran’s efforts to restructure its sovereign debt and secure additional international loans for
post-war reconstruction projects.
In this atmosphere of enmity, “the bill of particulars” leveled against Iran
continued to thicken further in the early 1990s with Tehran’s obstructionist approach
toward the two US-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace initiatives: the 1991 Madrid Conference
and the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords. Tehran’s miscalculation on this issue catapulted Israel
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to the forefront of the INP’s securitizing agents. More internationally, with the 1991
Persian Gulf War widely believed to have slammed the brakes on much of Baghdad’s
nuclear capability, the INP became more conspicuous on the West’s counter-proliferation
radar. Reflecting the altered circumstances, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin relayed
to the Knesset in a January 1993 speech Tel Aviv’s estimate that Iran already possessed
“the appropriate manpower and resources to acquire nuclear weapons within the next 10
years…unless there is an appropriate international effort to prevent Iran from achieving
its ends." In justifying Israel’s characteristically hysterical judgments on the INP, Rabin
implied that Iran’s acquisition of Scud-C missiles technology from North Korea left no
doubts about Tehran’s offensive intentions.349 A heightened sense of concern over the
INP gained even more traction as David Kay, the former UN Chief Weapons Inspector
drew a parallel between the INP and the initial stages of Saddam’s program.350
The synergetic impact of these factors resulted in a tone-deaf attitude in
Washington toward the conciliatory gestures of the pragmatic President Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani and a sense of vindication among the old-guard hardliners’ in Tehran who
argued Washington’s animosity toward the Islamic Republic was categorical and not
issue oriented. Based on this latter argument, advocated most prominently by Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Iranian nuclear issue, just like other
allegations, was simply a tool of convenience opportunistically utilized by the United
States to camouflage and facilitate a more fundamental regime-change policy.
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Bestowing even more credibility on the Iranian hardliners’ argument was an
institutionalizing posture in Washington’s conservative policy circles that Iran’s
proliferation behavior had almost nothing to do with the political configuration of power
in Tehran as long as the cardinal framework was one of Islamic Republic. As a matter of
fact, some even went so far as to claim that the real threat emanated from the pragmatists
like Rafsanjani posing as moderates who were “most keen to develop conventional and
nuclear arsenal.”351
The policy of “actively” containing Tehran (masquerading as “dual containment”
policy) was not without its vocal critics in Washington either. Viewing the Iran situation
in light of the broader context of the United States’ counter-proliferation experience with
North Korea and Iraq, the critics were pressing the point that the policy of not directly
dialoguing with the ill-disposed proliferators was as simplistic as it was unproductive.
Gary Sick, the prominent Iran veteran in the National Security Council under the Ford
and Carter administrations was among the most vocal critics of the Clinton’s policy.
From Sick’s vantage point, the policy ran the risk of unnecessarily escalating
matters with an otherwise approachable and impressionable Tehran to a crisis level.
These were not the only pathologies associated with dual containment though. The policy
“is openly disregarded and privately mocked even by many of our friends in the region,
as I learned in a meeting this summer with representatives of Persian Gulf states,”
observed Gary Sick adding, “Contrary to prevailing pop analysis and wishful thinking,
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our jawboning and obstruction of international development credits for Iran will neither
transform nor bring down the Islamic revolutionary regime.”352
Critics were also skeptical of “singling out” Iran based on a litany of grievances
where others in the Middle East could hardly produce a more laudable report card.
Labeling the administration’s obsessive fixation on Iran a “policy trap,” Edward Shirley
tried to contextualize Tehran’s proliferation behavior against a more strategic backdrop.
Echoing hardcore realist sentiments, he wrote: “Iran has probably sought to construct or
purchase weapons of mass destruction. But who would not in the Middle East? Iran was
gassed into surrender in the first Persian Gulf war; Pakistan, Iran's proselytizing Sunni
neighbor to the southeast, probably has the Bomb; Saudi Arabia, its most ardent and
reviled religious rival, has longer-range missiles; Syria is engaging in a major military
buildup, courtesy of Saudi-American largesse during the second Persian Gulf war; Iraq
and its Scuds are still just across the border; and Israel has both missiles and nuclear
weapons. Iran, having been vanquished by a technologically superior Iraq, knows very
well the proliferation nightmare that can ensue when the arms possessed are insufficient
to deter…. If the theory of deterrence works in the Muslim world, the mullahs will be as
subject to its roles as were hardcore Soviet communists. As long as Washington or
Jerusalem maintains a serious counter-threat, the Iranian nuclear menace remains
effectively checked by the West.”353 Shirley’s harangue was a frustrated reaction to the
fact that the theory of nuclear deterrence- an article of faith for the majority of the Cold
War baptized generation of the U.S. foreign policy establishment- had magically lost all
its applicability to Iran. One could argue that the main reason for this otherwise eerier
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lack of appetite for deterrence was that, it in the eye of Washington, it would complicate
the securitizing of the INP by undermining the end-of-the-world paradigm within which
Iran’s nuclear program was marketed and internalized. Put more crudely, viewed from
Washington, securitization trumped deterrence and anything else that interfered with its
proper articulation.
In such an atmosphere where securitization reigned supreme, the international
nuclear watchdog’s vouching for Iran’s compliance with its NPT commitments generated
little ripple effect into the policymaking circles in Washington. In point of fact, the
nonchalant fashion in which the IAEA reports on Iran’s nuclear bona fides was being
received in Washington marked the beginning of “politicization of intelligence” on the
INP. For instance, although in 1994 intelligence evidence concluded that shrinking oil
revenues had slowed down the INP and forced a discretionary debate in Tehran on the
cost-benefit wisdom of pushing the nuclear program forward, its impact on the policy
level was miniscule.354 As if completely oblivious to the IAEA reports, in March 1994
Anthony Lake wrote an influential article in Foreign Affairs where the National Security
Advisor put Iran and Iraq in the category of “reactionary backlash” regimes bent on
proliferation that needed to be confronted and neutralized.355
Running in parallel to the politicization of intelligence- perhaps one of its spin-off
effects- was a logic-defying tendency in Washington to read proliferation into every
aspect of Iran’s nuclear program, no matter how far-fetched its weaponization
implications. In this climate, it was hardly surprising that the conclusion of a preliminary
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agreement in January 1993 with China to build two 330 MWe nuclear power stations and
the signing of a contract with the Russian Federation in January 1995 to build a 915
MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor (PWR) triggered a kneejerk hysterical
reaction in Washington. This melodramatic response acquired more ironic proportions
when some analysts pointed out that these reactors had no direct proliferation
implications and were in fact comparable to the “light-water nuclear plants being offered
cost-free to North Korea in return for its agreement to give up its graphite reactor
technology.”356
INP’s Russia Connection Sends Securitization to New Heights
In 1995 an unprecedented surge, both in scope and depth, in the securitization of
the Iranian nuclear program took place. The trigger came, by and large, from the formal
conclusion of a January 1995 accord with Russia. Worth $800 million, the agreement was
Iran’s first successful shot at completing the first unit of the BNPP within four years.
Almost immediately following the agreement, however, came US Defense Secretary
William J. Perry’s comments over the apocalyptic implications of a nuclear Iran.357
The nuclear deal with Russia changed the dynamics of the Iranian nuclear
program in the sense that whereas prior to 1995 U.S. threat designations of the INP were
informed by speculation, analogy, intention-reading, and intelligence estimates, the
conclusion of the 1995 deal provided a seemingly concrete platform to hammer home
Washington’s securitizing posture and generate international consensus around it.
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Additionally, it set the stage for the internationalization of a comprehensive sanctions
regime heretofore unilaterally imposed by the United States.
Despite the Clinton Administrations’ strenuous efforts to secure maximum
international support for its sanction policy, however, America’s North Atlantic allies
only put up a pro forma and reluctant attitude toward the proposed sanctions regime. This
reluctance, on the part of Europe and Japan, was based on an implied conviction that the
U.S. allegations against Iran still suffered from physical fact deficiency. In other words,
from the European and Japanese perspectives, the body of damning evidence produced
by the U.S. intelligence community on the INP was long on speculation, inference,
intention judging, future scenarios, circumstantial evidence and short on direct evidence
like satellite photos and steel and concrete facts. For example, word got around that
during the 1995 US-Russian summit meeting in Moscow, president Clinton failed to
present Yeltsin with a “satellite photograph of an Iranian nuclear headquarters from
which a nuclear weapons program might be directed. This was because, a New York
Times article explained, no such center existed.”358 This situation, in the words of the
Washington Post’s investigative report, sensationally titled “The Atomic Ayatollahs,”
made Washington’s sanctions touting argument vulnerable to the charge it was
“overreacting because it remained obsessed with Iran's mullahs after 16 years of vitriol,
hostage-taking and spilt blood.”359
As touched upon before, introducing yet another kink to Washington’s argument
was the fact that while the replacement of Yongbyon’s graphite moderated reactor with a
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light-water version was being advocated as a counter-proliferation success in North
Korea, Tehran’s projected acquisition of the same kind of reactor from Russia was
deemed a proliferation event. The internal inconsistency in exactly what constituted
proliferation coupled with a lack of smoking gun substantially detracted from the
credibility of Washington’s slam-dunk judgments on the INP, making some allies
question the authenticity of the United States’ panic button when it came to Tehran. As if
the atmosphere was not already foggy enough, the IAEA added to the confusion by
repeatedly certifying the INP’s compliance with the NPT. This was much to the public
irritation of the Clinton administration whose top officials insisted Iran was in breach of
the spirit of the treaty by shrewdly abusing its loopholes.360
A side effect of this comprehensive securitizing move by Washington was the
virtual foreclosing of nuclear diplomacy with Tehran so the INP could be buried deeper
in the security zone. As a New York Times editorial pointed out in 1995, not only did this
blanket securitizing policy ran the risk of “aggravating Iranian paranoia, and adding
motivation to build the bomb,” it also managed to “impede efforts to halt Iranian bombmaking by limiting diplomacy, and by trying to stop all other countries’ commerce with
Iran instead of focusing on trade in bomb-building technology.”361
Immediately following the threat drumbeat issuing from Washington and Tel
Aviv, Tehran and Russia orchestrated de-securitizing moves of their own. As part of this
effort, along with reissuing comments by Moscow reminding the West of its
unimpeachable proliferation track record following the ratification of the NPT, Iran’s
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ambassador to the IAEA Mohammed Sadegh Ayatollahi announced Iran’s pledge to
return to Russia the irradiated (spent) fuel rods that could contain plutonium isotopes (Pu239) suitable for weaponization. Not impressed with the arrangement, Warren
Christopher minced no words letting the Russians know that the White House “will not
ultimately be satisfied by anything other than the end of the nuclear cooperation
program." The State Department’s rationale for pursuing such a “purist” policy was
concerns that the BNPP could become the gateway for the transfer of militarily
applicable nuclear technology to a rogue state.362
In the meantime, the US Congress, skeptical of Clinton’s “solicitous” attitude
toward President Yeltsin, threatened to “cut off all aid to Russia” unless the Kremlin
rectified what a Senator called its “inexplicably stupid moves.”363 A defiant Moscow shot
back, calling the nuclear deal with Tehran “a high-stakes issue all around” and suggesting
that Washington’s status as a “strategic partner” had eroded. Moscow went even further
accusing Washington of “double standards” by opposing the Iran deal on commercial,
and not proliferation, grounds while offering the same type of reactors to Pyongyang.
Russia’s Atomic Energy Minister Viktor N. Mikhailov’s retort to Congress’s threat
couldn’t be more bristling: “The [Russian] Atomic Energy Ministry has received $215
million in U.S. aid to help Russia dismantle its own nuclear weapons but has lost $450
million in potential sales of uranium to the American market because of U.S. antidumping restrictions.”364
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Almost caught in the Moscow-Congress crossfire and in an effort to meet halfway
a consternated U.S. Congress’s push for crushing pressure on Iran and to demonstrate to
US allies and rivals the priority of putting maximum teeth into the sanctions regime,
president Clinton issued an executive order in March 1995 barring all U.S. entities from
supervising, financing, and managing Iran’s petroleum projects.365 The measure was
expanded and tightened further in June to include almost all trade with Tehran. The
immediate effect was the killing of a pending $1-billion deal between a Dutch subsidiary
of Conoco Oil Company and Iran to develop the offshore Sirri oil field. Panoramically
viewed, the cancellation of the Conoco deal was a watershed event that marked the total
departure of Iran-US relations from the economic zone after the 1979 revolution. In other
words, this development dispossessed Iran-US relations from its most powerful desecuritizing potentiality, i.e., U.S. commercial interests in Iran.
In this atmosphere and as the triangular Moscow-Tehran-Washington thicket was
spiraling out of control, a New York Times editorial warned the White House and
Congress against pushing the envelope lest Washington ended up with the worst of all
worlds. “The most likely outcome of all this is that Iran will get the reactors, the United
States and Russia will be estranged, the destruction of Moscow's nuclear arsenal will
slow and efforts to curb the spread of nuclear arms will be set back,” darkly warned the
editorial.366
Washington, however, kept clamorously pressing the line that Tehran was on a
“crash program” to nuclearize. This time, the United States also pointed fingers at a “side
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agreement” Tehran had presumably signed with Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry to
obtain gas centrifuges to indigenously enrich uranium. Whereas in Washington’s
judgment such a capability could only shortcut Tehran’s route to obtaining weaponsgrade fissile material, Moscow expressed confidence that, with proper monitoring,
Tehran would exclusively use the equipment to obtain the LEU necessary for the BNPP
and other civilian power plants.
At this time, Tehran, having sensed the vulnerability of the United States’ nonproliferation position in international forums, found the upcoming NPT review
conference of 1995 (up for extension or expiration) a golden opportunity to diffuse its
nuclear file. In an effort to bring into sharp relief the discriminatory fault line separating
nuclear haves from have-nots, Tehran tapped into the numerical majority of the NAM
countries. Already feeling the heat and the international trend U.S. sponsored sanctions
were taking, the Iranian officials were making the rounds of NAM capitals soliciting a
“vote against the NPT's extension unless the use of export controls against a country in
compliance with the treaty is made illegal.” Depicting itself as the “Article IV victim” of
a loophole-riddled NPT and losing no opportunity to throw light on Washington’s
deafening and embarrassing silence on Israel’s nuclear anomaly as the weakest link in the
United States’ counter-proliferation argument, Tehran, in the words of Jessica Mathews
of the Council on Foreign Relations, “skillfully persuaded most of the non-aligned
countries to turn its special case into a generic issue.”367
Further raising the stakes on the 1995 NPT review conference, on February 19,
1995 Iran’s UN Ambassador Kamal Kharrazi threatened Tehran would oppose an
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indefinite extension of the treaty unless a revision was made “in the accord binding
signatories to a deadline for the destruction of nuclear weapons.”368 Notwithstanding its
out-of-the-ballpark rhetoric before the review conference though, Iran’s actual behavior
at the venue was rather subdued. The most scathing comments at the venue came from
Cyrus Nasseri, Iran’s Permanent Representative to the UN Office at Geneva who accused
the United States of having “violated the terms of the NPT” by depriving Iran of its
“rights” to have access to nuclear technology on the basis of some unauthenticated
speculation and circumstantial evidence.369
In the meantime, as the United States’ sanctions regime on Iran had generated
crisscrossing rifts between Washington and almost the rest of the world, in May 1995,
Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization chief Reza Amrollahi announced Tehran’s plans to
build 10 nuclear power plants over the next two decades to generate some 20% of the
country’s electricity needs. Amrollahi also disclosed that Tehran had already paid the
“down payment” to the Chinese for construction of two 300-MWe pressurized-water
reactors (PWR). This announcement, considering Beijing’s perceived technological
limitation to independently conduct turnkey nuclear projects, came as a surprise to the
Americans and its European allies.370
While Washington was turning up pressure on Tehran at an accelerated rate,
puzzled policy analysts were trying to come to analytical grips with the “exceptional”
treatment Iran was receiving in Washington. The gamut of explanations ranged from the
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influence of the Israel factor371 to the preparatory stages of taking kinetic action against
Tehran. The New York Times’ David Sanger tried explaining “the Iran exception” by
tapping into the configuration of lobby groups shaping and shoving policy inside the
beltway. “Perhaps the real reason that the Administration was able to act so strongly
today is simple politics,” he maintained, adding, “What Iran lacks in the United States,
for understandable reasons, is any constituency in Congress. The Administration was
under tremendous pressure from the business community last year to separate human
rights from the issue of trade preferences for China. There is an active Vietnam business
lobby, led by companies that realize that the country may be the last source of welleducated, well-disciplined and very inexpensive labor in Southeast Asia. But by and
large, American companies are not clamoring for a chance to work in a country that still
routinely calls the United States the ‘great Satan.’”372
In the meantime, Clinton’s sanctions executive order came to hurt Iran’s
economic interests next door in the FSU sooner than Tehran anticipated; In April 1995,
“bowing to U.S. pressure,” the Republic of Azerbaijan divested Iran of its 5% share in a
consortium to develop the country’s offshore oil deposits in the Caspian Sea.373 Also
under mounting US pressure and agitation, Moscow bowed out of the tentative agreement
to sell a gas centrifuge plant to Tehran.374 A mix of U.S. pressure and dwindling oil
revenues also convinced Beijing to drop out of a contract to sell Iran a uranium
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hexafluoride conversion plant it was planning to set up at the Esfahan Nuclear
Technology Center (ENTEC). The purchase of the uranium conversion facility (UCF)
would enable Tehran to convert the yellow cake into pure uranium gas (UF6) required for
gaseous diffusion enrichment. In Washington, this was deemed a key initial step in
Tehran’s efforts to indigenously master the full fuel cycle. Whereas Iran claimed it
needed the facility to manufacture fuel rods for its civilian nuclear reactors, the United
States viewed it as part of a sophisticated scheme in Tehran to sneak its way into
weapons-grade uranium.375
Dual Containment and Its Critics
As Indyk’s prescription for countering Iran was coming under mounting pressure
from multiple fronts in 1995, an increasingly hawkish Secretary of State was elevating
the Iranian menace well beyond the dual containment policy. "Iran today is in a category
all its own," Christopher said, adding, "No other regime employs terror more
systematically as an instrument of national policy.”376 Shortly following the remarks, the
Administration, accused of being slow on the trigger by both the Israelis and the
Congress in turning up the heat on Iran, expressed support for a $ 20 million covert plan,
led by House Speaker Newt Gingrich, to counter Tehran’s reckless behavior and
destabilize the clerical regime by supporting to its diehard opponents.
This development marked the entering of the INP to the covert military zone in
the beginning of 1996. A few months after this revelation, came news that the president
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had signed into law the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) on August 5, 1996. The key
provision of the act, first introduced by Senator Alfonse D’Amato of New York, required
“the President to impose at least two out of a menu of six sanctions on foreign entities
and persons that [made] an investment of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s
energy sector.”377
As President Clinton was going hot and heavy against the INP, the critics of “dual
containment run amuck” were growing increasingly vocal as well. Highly critical of the
Administration’s policy in burning all the bridges to Tehran, Richard Murphy, former
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs took the rationality
of these excessive measures to task. “The policy of ‘dual containment,’ that seductive
phrase which quickly became part of the vocabulary of American Persian Gulf policy in
1993, has helped paralyze our thinking about Iran”, he wrote, imploring the White House
to step back and revisit its perspective on Tehran. Contrasting the United States’ Iran
policy with the Cold War era, Murphy maintained, “Containment has lost the meaning
we once gave it when we talked for nearly half a century of containing the Soviets. Today
we routinely dismiss the Iranian Islamic regime as a pariah state. But history and
geography work against that mindset. Iran is a major state in the region and sooner or
later will again make its weight felt.”378
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Also prominent among the critics of Clinton’s Iran policy was Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor, whose change of heart on the clerical
regime was most visible. The onetime advocate of a military coup as an antidote to the
Iranian Revolution was now all about engaging Tehran. “I do not see any reason why we
should be pursuing a policy of isolating Iran,” he argued, reasoning, “because Iran, if we
pursue hostility towards it, makes it more difficult to isolate Iraq.'' Pressing for the need
to forge “a good strategic relationship with Iran in the longer run,” Brzezinski argued
such a development would ensure stability in the Middle East and Washington’s access to
the energy corridors of Central Asia. Similar sentiments were being echoed by Brent
Scowcroft, the two-time National Security Adviser under Presidents Gerald Ford and
George H. W. Bush.
These disparate voices for change finally coalesced in 1997 putting forward the
most scathing critique of the administration’s policy by a bipartisan group of three
foreign policy gurus. In a Foreign Affairs article entitled “Differentiated Containment,”
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy tore dual containment apart
as more of an unsustainable “slogan than strategy” that was “far too blunt an instrument
to serve American interests in the Middle East.” Critical of Clinton’s unilateral sanctions
policy as “extraterritorial bullying,” they called into question the “justification for the
treatment” Washington was visiting on Tehran over its nuclear program. “Instead of
simply punishing the country,” they called for a policy of “pushing the controls and
inspection provisions of the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime to their limits and
continuing to make counter-proliferation efforts a top priority.”379
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Such a sea change in policy, however, would involve a drastic trimming down of
the Iranian threat package Washington had grown accustomed to, one that included more
nebulous elements like opposition to the Middle East peace process and human rights
abuses. As the administration’s INP policy was suffering from a threat deficit in absence
of a smoking gun, such a radical re-articulation would enervate the securitization energy
of Clinton’s Iran policy and naturally fell on deaf ears.
In resonance with these domestic foreign policy heavyweights, key European
allies France and Germany (with massive economic ties to Iran) wasted no time
questioning the extraterritoriality of the seemingly disproportionate measures. The
Clinton administration’s decision to forge ahead with the sanctions track was, in the
judgment of the Europeans, a suboptimal policy choice considering its sloppy track
record and the disheartening prospects for its future success in changing Tehran’s
behavior, much less, its regime. Some observers even went so far as to suggest that a
policy of hyper-securitization and its concomitant sanctions regime could further calcify
Iran’s recalcitrance by depriving Iran of much-needed “maneuverability” to rediscover
and, with any luck, redefine itself.380 Partly bowing to these pressures and concerned that
the ILSA’s full implementation would widen the transatlantic difference of opinion on
Iran, in 1997 the Clinton administration shied away, on national interest grounds, from
penalizing Total SA of France, Gazprom of Russia, and Petronas of Malaysia which were
developing the South Pars natural gas filed in Iran.381
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In the meantime, some policy experts were insisting that Washington go even
further and overhaul its Iran policy by wooing the regime’s potentially pro-west elements
to its side. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) argued, for example, that Washington stood a chance to make strategic gains by
nurturing technocratic moderate elements in Tehran who didn’t view the United States as
a sworn enemy.382 This line of thinking was in accord with the “critical dialogue”
formula that the Europeans were vociferously advocating while airing their displeasure at
what they perceived was an ill-conceived containment formula that assumed parity
between Iran and Iraq.
In view of the Europeans, since Washington’s short history of engagement with
Tehran had been mainly through oil, anti-communism and terrorism, its policy response
to Iran’s WMD challenge was blunt and lacked the kind of sophistication that would only
come by paying attention to the country’s vibrant civil society and political discourse.383
As one European diplomat put it, “Except for Turkey, Iran is the only real country in the
region, with 3,000 years of history. It's a complicated country, with a real intellectual life.
It's not Iraq.” In light of these conceptual and operational pathologies, as far as the
Europeans were concerned, the policy of dual containment had turned so dysfunctional
that it was isolating the United States more than it was isolating Iran.384 These so-called
cooler heads, however, had a snowball’s chance in hell to prevail as whatever traction
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they managed to muster was neutralized with Defense Secretary William Perry pointing
at an Iran link in the Khobar Towers bombing of June 1996.385
Furthermore, just as the White House efforts to bring its North Atlantic allies
onboard with its securitization platform were looking futile, an opportunity to mobilize
support and narrow down the differences presented itself. On April 10, 1997 a German
court implicated high-ranking Iranian officials in the gangland-style assassination of the
Iranian-Kurdish opposition leaders at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin. An intense
diplomatic crisis ensued when the Berlin court’s verdict implicated high-ranking Iranian
government officials in the incident. Shortly afterward, the EU countries summoned their
ambassadors from Tehran signaling the end of “critical engagement” as Europe’s longterm recipe to deal with Iran. The so-called Mykonos crisis, however, proved no more
than a “passing storm”-in president Rafsanjani’s words- as Germany recoiled into a crisis
control mode and the election of moderate president Mohammad Khatami pushed IranEU economic relations to yet newer highs.386
Washington, on the other hand, showed no interest in re-formulating its singlemindedly securitizing paradigm that tended to treat an otherwise composite Iranian
regime as a monolithic entity. For instance, as Iran’s 1997 presidential campaign, with
the reformist underdog Khatami on the ticket, were heating up, new Secretary of State
Albright wasted no time during her first overseas tour to signal a continuation of active
containment of Iran irrespective of who replaced president Rafsanjani. With her
characteristically point-blank style, Albright castigated the Europeans, the Italians in
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particular, for their “critical dialogue” approach to Tehran and reminded her Chinese
counterparts they couldn’t have the best of both worlds: seek closer ties to Washington
while trading in high-tech with Iran.387
On May 23, 1997, Mohammad Khatami pulled off an upset victory in a
presidential election that saw a record 80% voter turnout. Washington’s reluctance to try
out a more imaginative approach to Iran was, in no small part, driven by the domestic
political environment in the United States as well. Up against an intractable anti-Iran
Congress led by house speaker Newt Gingrich and a consistently lackluster public
opinion toward the clerical regime, the Administration kept shying away from a more
interactive approach toward Tehran.388
Faced with these domestic constraints and wary of jeopardizing the precious little
receptivity the Europeans had recently shown to the containment policy following the
Mykonos crisis, the election of a reformist president was actually met by an intensified
international campaign by the U.S. to curb Tehran’s proliferation activities run amok in
the judgment of the Clinton administration. Besides lodging the usual complaints with
Moscow over its ballistic missile and nuclear cooperation with Tehran, now even a more
substantial part of Washington’s proliferation-curbing efforts were focused on Beijing
which had ongoing nuclear projects in Iran, among them a small research reactor and a
zirconium production facility for nuclear fuel rods. Those efforts finally bore fruit in
October 1997 when the administration managed to extract a written pledge from China to
terminate all nuclear cooperation with Tehran, except for the two mentioned projects that
were deemed proliferation-neutral, in exchange for certification by Washington of a 1985
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nuclear cooperation agreement that would pave the way for exporting advanced U.S.
nuclear technology and reactors to China. Despite Beijing’s formal acquiescence,
however, Washington, especially Capitol Hill, continued to view China as a “reluctant”
partner at best and remained extremely skeptical of China’s long-term commitment to
forswearing all nuclear dealings with Iran.389 As a matter of fact, as The Washington
Post’s Smith Jeffrey indicated, the INP was so high on the agenda during the October
1997 Clinton-Zemin summit meeting that Washington essentially put on the backburner
all other high-stakes issues in Sino-US relations just to secure a strategic concession on
the INP.390
A Shift from the BNPP to MRBMs
In 1997 one could also notice a shift of focus in the ingredients and stylistics of
Washington’s securitization approach toward the INP. The change of focus came about,
seemingly, due to the Clinton Administration’s failure to ferret out conclusive evidence
on Iran’s purportedly “crash program” to go nuclear. In this year, through much closer
intelligence sharing with Tel Aviv, the cutting edge of Washington’s threat
pronouncements moved away from a dispersed, low-key, and deliberately paced nuclear
program that defied slam-dunk verifiability toward Tehran’s ballistic missile program.
At this point, especially alarming to the Israelis was intelligence that Iran had
acquired the technological knowhow to indigenize North Korea’s No Dong missiles into
Shahb-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that would put Israel within its
operational range. Interpreting this capability in purely offensive terms, the Defense
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Intelligence Agency (DIA) endorsed Israeli intelligence prediction that the new missiles
could come in the pipeline in a matter of 18 months. On a different front, openly irked at
Russia’s blasé attitude toward what he viewed a “vigorous” missile buildup, in
September 1997 Vice President Al Gore asked his Russian counterpart Viktor
Chernomyrdin to hold up his end of the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin bargain.391 This was a
secret agreement concluded in June 1995 that called for Russia to terminate all “advanced
conventional weapons” sales to Iran by 1999 in exchange for a pledge by Washington not
to impose penalties on Moscow under the 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act.
As a sense of alarmism over Iran’s delivery capabilities was setting in, the
Israelis, backed by AIPAC and an increasingly hawkish Congress, were relentlessly
pushing the line that the Russians were in breach of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement
and were, in the words of Prime Minister Netanyahu's director of policy planning David
Bar-Illan, “very actively” in cahoots with Tehran on “both the transfer of knowledge and
material." In Tel Aviv’s judgment, by training Iranian students in missile technology,
Moscow was basically putting Tehran in a position to have the capability to strike any
target in Israel within a mere 18 months.392
The Tel Aviv-AIPAC-Congress axis had grown so momentous in 1997 that
members of Congress were now openly accusing the Clinton Administration of a
“consistent lack of candor and enforcement of arms control agreements with Russia."
Republican House member Curt Weldon went so far as to introduce a bill that would
require the U.S. government to contribute $110 million to assist Israel’s Arrow anti-
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ballistic missile interceptor system “for the purpose of protecting a United States ally in
imminent peril." Concerned that the Congress’s obsessive focus and possible legislative
action on the Iran-Russia missile nexus was threatening US-Russia relations at the
strategic level, the Clinton Administration mobilized Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, Martin Indyk, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation, Robert Einhorn to appease the AIPAC and Congress. 393
Washington’s efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapons delivery capability were not
limited to Tehran’s missile acquisition efforts, however. In a rather unusual move to beat
Tehran to the punch, on November 5, 1997 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen
announced that the United States had bought 21 Soviet-era MIG-29 fighter aircraft from
Moldova over concerns Tehran was eyeing them.394 Fourteen of these jet fighters were of
the high-performance nuclear capable MIG-29C model that disconcerted Washington the
most and prompted the deal’s inclusion in the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) program conceived in 1992 within the Department of Defense to decommission
the FSU’s WMD stockpiles.
This heightened securitization of Iran’s missile capabilities widened the
transatlantic rift even further. Within this context, the European prescription, especially
after the enthusiastic election of President Khatami in a referendum-like victory for the
reformist movement in Iran, was to seize on the opportunity and start a genuine forwardlooking dialogue with the moderate pro-change forces through persuasion rather than
coercion. Rallying support for such a long-term strategic objective was next to impossible
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in Washington though as a relentless barrage of intelligence reports was being leaked to
the media on Tehran’s ballistic missile shenanigans and its apocalyptic implications for
Israel once married to a nuclear capability. As a matter of fact, the framing of Iran’s
missile capability as constituting an existential threat to the state of Israel had assumed
such formidable momentum at this point that even the efforts of Prime Minister
Netanyahu to resurrect “the doctrine of the periphery” failed to make much desecuritizing dent in the ingrained paradigm in Washington and Tel Aviv.395
Conclusion
In this expediency period, although the elimination of Saddam’s imminent threat
(in 1991) decidedly moved Tehran’s behavioral and rhetorical attitude towards one of
pragmatic sophistication, a lack of a commensurate reward mechanism by Washington
continued to produce suboptimal results for Clinton’s Tehran policy. Tehran found this
attitude particularly malevolent. For example Tehran’s February 1995 formal
announcement that it would sign the NPT “despite the flaws in the treaty”396 generated
almost no resonance in the broader scheme of threat judgments meted out to it. The
Clinton administration’s failure to reciprocate Tehran’s goodwill gestures, arguably in the
most formative years of Iran’s post-War nuclear socialization in the mid 1990s, had an
indelible impact in sedimenting the notion in Tehran’s conservative power corridors that
the nuclear dossier was only incidental to the more profound regime-type bone of
contention the U.S. had with the Islamic Republic.
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Presented with the all-important dilemmatic question of whether the United States
was against a nuclear Iran or a nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran397, the proponents of this
paradigm- that culminated in the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005- strongly
favored the latter. The intertwinement of the securitization of the INP with regime change
in the mid 1990s essentially removed deterrence as a de-securitizing and stabilizing
element in Iran’s relations with the United States.
Another factor deepening the securitization of the INP in this period came through
a change in the composition of the nuclear decision-making circle in Tehran. Although
the Rafsanjani Administration (1989-1997) tried in earnest to place Iran’s nuclear
decision-making at the policy level under civilian leadership and to present a united and
unequivocal front on Tehran’s lack of interest in pursuing the nuclear weapons option,
the IRGC’s occasional excursions into the domain betrayed that there was more to the
INP than met the eye. As a matter of fact, one can track the initial signs of the IRGC’s
involvement in the nuclear decision-making to the early years of Ayatollah Khamenei’s
Supreme Leadership in the early 1990s. Mohsen Rezai was perhaps the first prominent
military figure that weighed in on the issue in the public domain. The IRGC Chief
Commander’s sentiments on the issue, however, were in keeping with the official line
coming out of Tehran. For example, in an interview with the Iranian daily Tehran Times
in 1994 he cited “political logic, moral concerns and world realities” as determinants
“stopping” Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability.398
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The IRGC’s closer involvement in the INP resulted in the bifurcation of Tehran’s
nuclear efforts into two parallel programs: A core civilian nuclear program
predominantly oriented toward resurrecting the Bushehr power plants under the authority
of the AEOI and a peripheral sanctions-busting enterprise run by the IRGC geared toward
securing technology, material, and components to keep a surge capacity a feasible option.
As expected, there was ever-increasing overlap between the two domains over the next
two decades as along with the deepening securitization of the INP the IRGC assumed a
more strategically consequential role, along the way marginalizing and almost consuming
the AEOI in the late 2000s.
The coming to power of the Clinton Administration further accelerated the
securitization drift of the INP as the language of “existential threat” crept into Israeli and
US discourse on Iran’s nuclear enterprise. The Clinton Administration’s strategy of
choice to signal this heightened sense of alarm over the INP was one of putting more
biting teeth into the sanctions regime already in place. The resultant Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 essentially torpedoed a pending $1billion deal between a Dutch
subsidiary of Conoco Oil Company and Iran to develop the Sirri oil field and marked the
total departure of Iran-US relations from the economic zone.
In an interview with Mike Wallace in March 1997 an otherwise levelheaded
president Rafsanjani could hardly hide his frustration at the fact that the leader of the
capitalist world had written off its commercial interests over what Rafsanjani perceived
was an ideological dispute.399 Equally shocking to the Iranians was the fact that their first
major move toward normalization and joining the so-called Washington Consensus -
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opening up their energy sector to international oil companies following the 1979
revolution- was being spurned and aborted by Washington upon arrival.
Another important factor that made Washington’s securitizing moves partially
successful in the era was a conspicuous lack of a democratic and diffuse domestic debate
on the pros and cons of the nuclear option in all its manifestations. In the eyes of the
majority of the Western states, the history of proliferation was rife with a tendency to go
for the bomb in countries where a tightly knit nuclear decision-making apparatus
operated in the shadows. Iraq under Saddam, Pakistan under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Israel
under David Ben-Gurion, and South Africa under the apartheid rule were a few examples
substantiating this notion. Although Tehran, well aware of the securitizing implications
of hush-hush nuclear politics, embarked on a controlled opening up of the public space to
the INP toward the late 1990s, this endeavor was largely unsuccessful in generating a
vibrant public dialogue on the issue. This failure had to do as much with the democratic
deficits of a theocratic system that tapped into the public space ex post facto for symbolic
reasons as with the fact that it never went beyond a public opinion manipulation tool to
genuinely make the public part of the country’s nuclear conversation.
Further complicating the task of placing the INP on a popular mandate by the
Iranian government was an inherent clash-whether perceived or real- between the
foundational myth of Tehran’s clerical regime (as an Islamic Republic) and a rekindling
of nationalistic fervor imperative for rallying the public around the nuclear flag. Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s personal apprehension, lest Iran reverted into a
runaway nationalistic mood, was highly visible in this regard. In any case, one could
hardly overestimate the degree to which excluding the general public from the nuclear

222

debate facilitated the targeting of the INP for securitization by the United States and the
West.
Despite being up against insurmountable odds, Tehran was hard at work in the
late 1990s trying to forestall Washington’s securitizing posture vis-à-vis the INP from
becoming mainstream international wisdom. President Khatami’s recipe to ease the
stifling pressure was a policy of détente toward the international system in general and
the Persian Gulf Arab States in particular. The culmination of this policy at the regional
level was Tehran’s much-publicized hosting of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) summit in December 1997, the largest international event held in Iran
after 1979 with over 50 member states in attendance. The détente policy had some
limited success in diffusing the security energy of the INP at the international level as
well when the Europeans saw an opportunity to seize on the moment and start a
persuasive and forward-looking dialogue with Tehran’s moderate pro-reform forces.
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CHAPTER 6
1997-2011: NUCLEAR APPEASEMENT & FLAMBOYANCY

Introduction
Arguably the most consequential impact of the election of President Khatami in
1997 was demonstrating to the international community Iran’s capacity to normalize and
redeem itself from within. Khatami’s recipe to showcase this capacity and ease the
stifling pressure on Tehran was a policy of détente toward the international system in
general and the Persian Gulf Arab States in particular. As mentioned in the last chapter,
the culmination of this policy was Tehran’s much-publicized hosting of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference in December 1997, the largest international event held in Iran
with over 50 member states in attendance.
As détente was yielding moderate results in de-securitizing the INP, however, the
apocalyptic 9/11 attacks threw Iran’s nuclear program back into the military extreme of
the securitization spectrum. The Bush Doctrine that emerged out of those attacks
diagnosed the intersection of technology and ideology as the most intractable national
security challenge facing the United States in the 21st century. In order to avert a nuclear
9/11, preventive war was the prescribed policy as promulgated in the 2002 National
Security Strategy of the United States. The strategy’s implications couldn’t have been
graver for Iran’s nuclear program as President Bush placed Tehran front and center in the
doomsday WMD-terrorism-tyranny triangle in his January 2002 “axis of evil” speech.
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As Iran was coming to grips with the dizzying pace of events surrounding its
nuclear program, in August 2002 an Iranian opposition group sent shockwaves through
the INP by exposing two secret nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak. These revelations
marked the beginning of the comprehensive securitization of the INP at the international
level. Before long and as Tehran was trying to finesse its way out of the NPT noncompliance accusations, the doctrine of preventive war found its first kinetic applicability
in Iraq as the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to neutralize
Saddam’s purported WMD capabilities. The Iraq War of March 2003 pushed, if only by
association, the Iranian nuclear program even deeper into the military extreme of the
securitization spectrum.
Khatami’s Era
Khatami’s détente policy, did not mean that Iran had stopped its shop-till-youdrop nuclear policy of scouring the market to get its hand on as much nuclear heardware
and software as possible before the post-Soviet collapse black-market closed. On a more
formal level, Iran’s relations with Russia were on a progressively upward trajectory in the
late-1990s as Moscow was increasingly viewing the “Oriental states” as a counterweight
to Washington’s eastward expansion through NATO’s incorporation of the Eastern
European members.
For example, during a high-profile visit by Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, Iran’s
parliament speaker to Moscow in April 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin cordially
referred to Tehran-Moscow ties as a “positive cooperation” that “showed a tendency to
grow.” The same sentiments were voiced even more vociferously by Gennadi Seleznyov,
the Communist speaker of the Russian Parliament during a press conference with Nateq

225

Nouri when Seleznyov put Iran’s embattled relations with Western Europe following the
Mykonos crisis as part of ''the West's intrigue against the East.''400 Tehran, for its part,
was incrementally viewing its ties to Moscow in a strategic light especially in terms of
Russia’s capacity to keep in check the securitization thrust of its nuclear endeavor.
As the military and nuclear cooperation between Tehran and Moscow was
accelerating, the contours of a polarizing and heated debate in Washington on the longterm implications of a nuclear Iran were crystallizing. On the one extreme, were Iran
hawks in both Israel and the United States whose Iran analyses were frequently
punctuated by the word “apocalypse,” as in their view nuclear weapons could only
further embolden a reckless Tehran to defy the norms of responsible international
behavior by granting it a critical zone of immunity.
On the other extreme, however, were the more hardheaded Iran realists who
believed nuclear weapons would actually have a sobering impact on Tehran’s foreign
policy rhetoric and behavior. This latter view was not lost on some authoritative voices
inside the state of Israel whose panic button on a nuclear Iran was deemed the quickest to
go off. For instance, Martin van Creveld, a renowned Israeli military historian, went so
far as to make an analogy between Iran and China on the issue: "When Mao and Stalin
acquired nuclear weapons, they calmed down," he observed, adding "If Islamic states get
the bomb, the effect will be the same. Once you have the 'absolute weapon,' war ceases to
be fun. It becomes suicide."401
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Foreign policy realists’ sentiments on the feasibility of deterring Iran, however,
were quick to be drowned out as a deluge of doomsday prognostications about the INP
soon overwhelmed the international public square. This came about in late 1997 as
Israel’s Mossad went public with its intelligence on Russia’s secret nuclear and ballistic
missile technology transfers to Tehran previously only shared with the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). In a series of articles in The Washington Times, Bill Gertz
catalogued Russia’s non-compliance with the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin deal on arms
proliferation to Tehran. The visibly miffed Clinton Administration, under pressure from
the Congress and the AIPAC, dispatched Al Gore to Moscow who publicly criticized
Russia and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin over Iran's ''vigorous'' ballistic missiles and
nuclear technology procurements.
Washington, in this period, was especially concerned by the intelligence reports
that the FSU’s cash-strapped scientific community was being lured and recruited into
Iran’s military-nuclear industrial complex enabling Tehran to indigenously master the full
range of nuclear and ballistic missile options. Moscow, careful not to let the controversy
derail its strategic ties with Washington, relieved head of the Russian arms export agency
(Rosvooruzhenie) Aleksandr Kotelkin of his post among accusation of corruption and
promised to clean up the agency of the bad apples.402
If Washington’s negotiations with Russia over transfer of WMD-relevant
technology to Iran were yielding little concrete results, in October 1997 the Clinton
Administration scored a major victory with China. Following months of an intense
diplomatic effort spearheaded by National Security Council Director for Nonproliferation
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Gary Samore and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn, Beijing pledged to
drastically and verifiably curtail its nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran and, more
broadly, bring its nuclear exports in line with the international nonproliferation regimes,
especially Article III of the NPT, by formally joining the Zangger Committee (A.K.A. the
Nuclear Exporters Committee). This concrete written commitment by Beijing would pave
the way for President Clinton to authorize the transfer of advanced civilian nuclear
technology and rectors to China.403
The devil-in-detail problem however again reared its head despite the conclusion
of the deal in the Jiang Zemin-Clinton summit meeting of October 30, 1997 when Iran
hawks in the U.S. Congress criticized the agreement for failing to incorporate the two
nuclear projects China had already undertaken in Iran. These two projects included “a
small research reactor and a factory to manufacture a special metal sheath -- known as
zirconium cladding -- for nuclear fuel rods.” Ever skeptical Congressional hawks were
demanding the Administration seek the termination of these projects and include the
banning of cruise missile sales to Iran as part of a comprehensive package.404
In the meantime, as a sense of resignation was creeping into Washington’s
strategic assessment of the prospects for consequentially sanctioning and isolating Iran, a
new wave of clamor in the United States was pushing for diplomacy and dialogue with
Iran now that a moderate president Khatami was trying to “remove tensions” from
Tehran’s foreign policy. In a Foreign Policy piece, Robin Wright and Shaul Bakhash
echoed the sentiments expressed by numerous “former senior U.S. officials-both
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Republican and Democrat-from the National Security Council, the State Department, and
the Central Intelligence Agency” who “publicly urged Washington to test the waters of
constructive engagement through either European allies or direct dialogue.”405
Reflecting the same sentiments and taking issue with hawkish opponents of
diplomacy with Iran who saw Tehran’s penchant for proliferation as part of the DNA of
the clerical regime, Graham Fuller, former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence
Council at the CIA observed, “If a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement can come about--and this
is not unattainable--it will go a long way toward lessening the intensity of Iran's need to
develop these weapons or to use them against the U.S. or its allies. A rapprochement
indeed takes two, but Washington must appreciate that Iran's weapons quest is as much
the result of the present U.S.-Iranian hostility as it is the cause.”406
Comments by President Khatami in a December 1997 interview with CNN on the
need for Iran and the U.S. to create a “crack in the wall of mistrust” between the two
states by engaging in a “thoughtful dialogue” helped further de-escalate the mounting
tensions. Shortly afterward, Clinton dropped a de-securitizing line of his own by
reciprocating Khatami’s olive branch: "I would like nothing better than to have a
dialogue with Iran,” Clinton vowed.407 As an aura of rapprochement between Tehran and
Washington was gaining momentum at least at the executive level, calls in Washington
for directly engaging Khatami’s Iran, as the US did with China, were growing more
vocal. In this transforming atmosphere, some Clinton White House officials went so far
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as to praise Iran’s “key role in shaping" the December 1997 OIC Summit Conference's
final communiqué that explicitly “condemned terrorism, called for dialogue between
Islam and the West and -- significantly -- didn't call for lifting U.S.-supported sanctions
against Iraq.”408 These calls for engagement managed to gain even some operational
traction in the Clinton Administration when the President decided not to impose sanctions
on French energy group Total for investing some $2 billion in Iran’s natural gas fields.
Now, there was talk in Washington of charting a new path with Iran analogous to SinoAmerican rapprochement in the Nixon Administration.409 On the nuclear front too,
President Khatami categorically denied Iran’s desire to become a nuclear weapons state
and pledged his Tehran’s commitment to cooperate with the IAEA.
These conciliatory gestures and the accompanying new ground broken by Tehran
and Washington, however, fell well short of bringing about a Gorbachev-Reagan-like sea
change in Iran-US relations as foreign policy hawks in both capitals regained command
of the discourse. In Tehran, the hardliners closely affiliated with Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei threw into doubt the revolutionary credentials of President Khatami,
likened him to Gorbachev as a westoxicated and intimidated figure (Mar’oob), and
accused him of derailing the Iranian Revolution from its anti-imperialist right path. In
Washington, foreign policy hawks were scoffing at the naïveté of Clinton’s putative
policy of dialoguing with Iran and claiming, “dialogue is an instrument of policy, not a
policy.” Peter Rodman of the Washington Post wrote,” The conflict between Iran and the
United States has been a clash of fundamental purposes -- Iran's assault on Western
positions in the Middle East, its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, its sponsorship
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of terrorism and hostility to Arab-Israeli peace, and our resistance to the same. It is naive
and absurd to think that these issues are a product of misunderstanding or a failure of
communication.”410
The ongoing tug of war in Washington on whether to isolate or engage Iran
continued up until President George Bush’s “axis of evil” speech of January 2002. The
nest result of this lack of unity of purpose on Iran was the relaying of conflicting
punishment and reward signals by Washington to Tehran, a misaligned and rudderless
policy where carrots and sticks neutralized, rather than reinforced, each other. For
instance, in June 1998, Secretary of State Albright, seemingly intrigued by Khatami’s
extended hand for dialogue, observed, Iran "is participating in diplomatic efforts to bring
peace and stability to Afghanistan and is making a welcome effort to improve relations
with Saudi Arabia and other neighbors in the [Persian] Gulf," adding “we are ready to
explore further ways to build mutual confidence and avoid misunderstandings.”411 These
comments were expressed about the same time when Bruce Riedel, “the top Iran policy
official on the National Security Council” emphasized the need to “maintain a policy of
seeking to constrain the dangerous behavior of Iran,” citing Tehran’s opposition to the
Middle East peace process, while trying to see if the changes in Tehran offer an
opportunity for a better long-term relationship." In the meantime, he was emphasizing
Iran's continued status as “the principal state sponsor of terrorist groups throughout the
region."412
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Faced with the double-dilemma of conflicting signals issued by Washington and
the power struggle in Tehran between the reformists (who saw a normalization of ties
with the United States as a natural extension of Khatami’s policy of détente) and the
conservative old guard (who saw anti-Americanism as one of the defining and
indispensible features of the Iranian Revolution), Khatami’s foreign policy team
demanded the White House operationalize its conciliatory rhetoric by easing sanctions on
Tehran and dropping its opposition to the passage of the Caspian Basin oil pipelines
through Iranian territory.
For instance, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister and later UN Ambassador
Mohammad Javad Zarif observed, “We see a move at least in rhetoric on the part of the
United States to better understand the realities of the Islamic Republic as well as of our
region,'' before adding, ''Where it matters, where it will be taken seriously by Iran -regarding the policies of the United States, the behavior of the United States -- we see the
remnants of a Cold War mentality.” Especially disturbing to the Iranians, in this regard,
were ubiquitous allusions by the U.S. officials to Iran’s attempts at acquiring Weapons of
Mass Destruction.413 These speculative WMD allegations, in Tehran’s judgment, were
symptomatic of the fact that the United States’ Iran policy had become hostage to the
Israel factor and betrayed Washington’s psychological unpreparedness to disengage itself
from the weight of history and embark on a de-securitized path with Iran.
As the Clinton Administration was showing all manner of confusion on how to
deal with Iran, the tentative atmosphere for rapprochement took a double hit in 1998.
First came news in July 1998 that Iran had test fired a strategic medium-range ballistic
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missile (MRBM) with a range of 800 miles. This would put Israel within the operational
range of the liquid-propellant missile. Second, was an unprecedented move by federal
prosecutors in New York who, for the fist time, publicly accused Iran of giving
operational training to members of Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization that had
“sent emissaries around the world in an effort to procure nuclear weapons.”414
The combined result of these twin events was the paving of the way in Israel and
the United States for the designation of Iran’s nuclear program as an “existential threat.”
It was within such an atmosphere that Efraim Sneh, a Labor Party hawk in the Israeli
Knesset speculated that a “pre-emptive strike” on Iran might become imperative since
“international efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring missile technology and developing a
nuclear capability had failed.” Following Sneh’s remarks, Israeli Defense Minister
Yitzhak Mordechai quickly rejected the military option out of hand.415
In the meantime, Washington’s relations with Moscow were precipitously souring
as different elements in the Clinton Administration, the US intelligence community, and
the Congress were accusing Kremlin of either complicity or criminal negligence over the
steady outflow of nuclear technology, scientists, and hardware to the rogue states.
Matters reached a fever pitch in January 1999 when White House national security
adviser Sandy Berger announced unilateral U.S. sanctions on three Russian institutes,
Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology, the Mendeleyev
University of Chemical Technology, and the Moscow Aviation Institute.
Moscow’s reaction to these measures was uncharacteristically trenchant. A
Foreign Ministry statement termed “any attempts to speak with [Russia] in the language
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of sanctions and pressure” “absolutely unacceptable” and vowed retaliation. The
Communist Party leader was far less diplomatic in lashing out at the U.S. punitive
measures: "The United States of America has imagined that they are a gendarme,
prepared to dictate conditions not only to countries, bombing foreign states, but to ban,
and even to dictate conditions to, separate universities and scientific laboratories,"
Gennady Zyuganov vented.416
One could call 2000 a watershed year in Iran’s relations with the Russian
Federation. After Vladimir Putin assumed presidency in May 2000, Moscow wasted little
time notifying Washington of its intent to rescind a 1995 deal with the United States to
mothball new battlefield weapons contracts with Iran. Almost immediately following that
came another blow for the lame duck Clinton’s dual containment policy. In December
2000, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev made a three-day official trip to Iran, the
first official visit by a Russian defense chief to Tehran since the 1979 Revolution. During
the high-profile visit, which included meetings with President Khatami and Iran’s
Defense Minister Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, a publicly defiant Sergeyev expressed
great satisfaction at the termination of the 1995 pact that had caused a “great pause” in
Tehran-Moscow military cooperation and reassured his Iranian counterpart that “there
will be no pauses from now on.”417
The termination of the secret Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement and the strategic
trajectory of Tehran-Moscow ties became even more manifest during a high-profile state
visit by President Khatami to the Kremlin in March 2001. This marked the highest-
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ranking meeting between the two countries in almost four decades. During the visit
President Putin officially announced Russia’s agreement to resume the sale of
conventional weapons to Iran and reiterated his country’s commitment to complete the
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. In some candid remarks bound to rankle Washington and
Tel Aviv, Putin commented, “politically, Iran should be a self-sufficient, independent
state that is ready to protect its national interests.”418
The resumption of ballistic missile cooperation between Tehran and Moscow in
this period finds even a more strategic context once analyzed against the backdrop of the
newly sworn-in President Bush’s plans to pull out of the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile
(ABM) treaty (long deemed an indispensible nuclear arms control keystone) and erect a
National Missile Defense (NMD) system aimed at shielding the United States from
nuclear blackmail by rogue states like Iran and North Korea. The Bush Administration’s
decision to withdraw from the treaty and forge ahead with the NMD as an “urgent”
military objective, spearheaded by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, was a clear
indication that Washington was giving up hope, at a strategic level, on the Russian
Federation’s non-proliferation bona fides.419
Within this strategic context, the Bush Administration’s first specific encounter
with Iran came in mid-2001 when the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was due to expire
in August after five years in effect. Faced with the dilemma of renewing or easing the
ILSA, Bush’s response was one of muddling through. This was a clear sign that the
Administration’s Iran policy was yet to coagulate. "As far as Iran goes, it's too early at
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this time in our relationships to really -- I mean, it's one thing to consider, it's another to
act, to act on sanctions, and I don't intend to do that anytime soon," the President
equivocated.420
A few months after these remarks came the 9/11 attacks in New York City and
the Washington D.C area that marked a major reorientation in the U.S. foreign policy
toward the rogue states. Iran’s initial response to the attacks was a guarded expression of
sympathy coupled with promises of intelligence sharing and operational cooperation with
Washington in sweeping the Taliban and Al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan. The commonality
of interests was further reinforced in the UN-brokered and US-sponsored Bonn
Conference in December 2001 aimed at creating an interim Afghan government when
Iran threw its weight behind the U.S. candidate for Afghan presidency Hamid Karzai and
extended a cooperative gesture toward Washington’s nation-building strategy in
Afghanistan.
The Bush Administration, however, failed to reciprocate these goodwill gestures,
as the new paradigm of the “Global War on Terrorism” (GWoT) reigned supreme in
Washington. It was within this context that Iran was promoted from a rogue state to a
member of the ''axis of evil'' in George Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address.421 The
president, in the speech, placed Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, at the intersection
of a hostile ideology and a penchant for acquiring WMD. This, in Bush’s judgment,
rendered Tehran “a grave and growing danger” against which a pro-active preventive
policy was imperative. "I will not wait on events while dangers gather,” the President
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said, before warning, “The United States of America will not permit the world's most
dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."422 This
speech, institutionalized in the Bush Administration’s national security documents of
2002 and 2006, marked the militarization drift of the Iranian nuclear program and set the
stage for the language of “surgical strike” to enter the United States’ Iran terminology.
Triumphant and euphoric, following the impressive success of Operation
Enduring Freedom in sweeping the Taliban from power and shortly after the President’s
“Axis of Evil” speech, Washington initiated a concerted effort to accelerate the
militarization of the threat package issuing from Tehran. In February 2002 Secretary of
Defense Donald accused the Iranian government of obstructing Washington’s antiterrorism campaign. "We have any number of reports that Iran has been permissive and
allowed transit through their country of Al Qaeda," Rumsfeld said.423 Reflecting the same
sentiments, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice placed Iran front and center in
Washington’s most urgent security concerns following the 9/11 attacks: nuclear
terrorism. "Iran's direct support of regional and global terrorism, and its aggressive efforts
to acquire weapons of mass destruction, belie any good intentions it displayed in the days
after the world's worst terrorist attacks in history," Rice said.
Tehran interpreted the Bush Administration’s combative language as indicative of
the fact that Washington was aggressively incubating a “regime change” policy vis-à-vis
Tehran. In a letter to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Iranian Foreign Minister
Kamal Kharrazi registered Tehran’s “strong indignation” at the Bush’s State of the Union
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address and the Administration’s escalatory follow-up remarks. The letter took to task the
fundamentals of the GWOT paradigm and Iran’s placement within it as a nuclear
proliferator. It labeled the GWOT as a "self- centered, unilateral and naive" policy
smacking of imperial hubris that utilized "threat or use of force against what the United
States has arrogated to itself to call terrorism.”
In Iran’s judgment such an arbitrary policy “undermined the global resolve to
embark on a real and comprehensive war on terrorism” and made it look like the United
States was “confronting the entire Islamic world."424 The cumulative impact of this new
atmosphere was enervating the overall energy of Iran’s foreign policy under Mohammad
Khatami otherwise geared towards bringing Iran back into the international fold.
In the meantime, Tel Aviv found in the GWOT and the United States’ growing
animosity toward Tehran a most hospitable ground to push for internationalizing the
securitization of the INP. In New York, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres accused
Iran of developing nuclear weapons and supplying Hezollah with medium-range missiles.
The Foreign Ministry also launched an international campaign by “preparing a letter for
Israeli ambassadors to present to foreign governments urging them to cut ties with Iran if
it doesn't stop developing missiles and nonconventional weapons.”425
These provocative developments and escalating expressions of mutual hostility
were progressively feeding into the militarization energy of the INP. Now, Iran was
publicly concerned that Israel was hatching operational plans to unleash a military strike
on its nuclear facilities analogous to Operation Opera against Osirak in 1981. Iranian
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Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani’s response to these speculations was unmistakably
defiant: "If Israel carries out any military action against Iran, it will face a response that
will be unimaginable to any Israeli politician,” the Rear Admiral threatened.426
In such an atmosphere, the Europeans were equally confused and shocked as the
Iranians on what was driving the Bush Administration’s newfound militant policy against
Tehran. In remarks indicative of the growing transatlantic rift on the GWOT and the
extent of its applicability to Tehran, a senior EU diplomat observed, “Bush can say what
he likes and we listen to him. But we've seen in the past how Washington's policy of
containment with regard to Iran and Iraq has led nowhere. We have our own foreign
policy interests as much as the US has its own." Another EU diplomat put Europe’s sense
of loss and dismay at where Washington was going with its new saber-rattling Iran policy
in most disarmingly simple terms: "We don't get [it] with Washington. One day, the US
praises Iran for its part in the post September 11 war against terrorism. The next day, as
Condoleezza Rice said herself, Iran's aggressive efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, belie any good intentions it displayed after September 11. Is that a foreign
policy?"427
As the securitization thrust of the INP was precipitously moving upward, another
shock in mid-August 2002 pushed Iran’s nuclear program deeper into the military zone.
On August 15, 2002 came revelations by the Iranian opposition group the National
Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) with links to the terrorist organization Mojahedine-Khalq Organization (MEK) accusing Iran of secretly building a nuclear enrichment
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facility at Natanz and a heavy water plant in Arak.428 Following the whistle blowing, the
IAEA insisted on inspecting the sites, especially the Natanz facility.
The IAEA director reported to the Board of Governors the startling progress Iran
had made in terms of the scale of its undeclared nuclear activities. In the words of the
IAEA Director General, two aspects of the Natanz facility were especially disconcerting:
“The first was the scale of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which required a sharp reassessment
on our [IAEA] part. Up to this point the hallmark of Iran’s nuclear program had been one
power reactor under construction at Bushehr, for which Russia had contracted to supply
the enriched uranium fuel. But Natanz, when fully operational, would have the capacity
to supply the fuel for two to three one-thousand megawatt reactors. What other facilities
was the AEOI planning or constructing? The second aspect was still more disconcerting.
Aghazadeh [the AEOI Chairman] told us [IAEA inspection team] that Iran’s centrifuge
development program was entirely indigenous.”429
The timing of these revelations couldn’t have been worse for Iran as they
coincided with mounting U.S. push to launch the first counter-proliferation war on Iraq
on March 20, 2003 and North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal from the NPT on
January 10, 2003. The military implications of the clandestine aspects of Iran’s nuclear
program were not lost on the Iranians either, as soon following the uncovering of the two
nuclear facilities and Tehran’s lackluster and lethargic cooperation with the IAEA, the
United States unleashed Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 20, 2003 removing Saddam
Hussein from power over allegations of a WMD program.
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Tehran, concerned it would be the next target in the Bush Administration’s
regime change master list, wheeled into action by trying to undertake whatever initiatives
it could to de-securitize its nuclear profile. Iran’s de-securitizing strategy was two
pronged: First was an international confidence-building and credibility-restoration
campaign to scatter the clouds of apprehension surrounding its nuclear program and
threatening to poison its relations even with Russia. Second, was an under-the-counter
effort to strike a comprehensive threat reduction package deal directly with the United
States.
On the first front, Tehran agreed, within the Tehran Declaration of October 21,
2003 and the follow-up Paris Agreement of November 14, 2004 to furnish the IAEA with
full information on its nuclear profile, temporarily and voluntarily suspend all enrichment
and reprocessing activities, broadly conceived, and abide by the provisions of the 1997
IAEA Additional Protocol that enabled the Agency to conduct more intrusive inspections
of Iran’s declared and undeclared facilities and activities, including its laser enrichment,
reprocessing, and heavy water projects.
Coming on the heels of these trust-building measures by Iran, ElBaradaei’s
November 10, 2003 report to the IAEA Board of Governors on the INP was nothing if
not equivocal. The Director General, on thin ice with Washington over his position on
Iraq’s WMD program and accused of having a pro-Iran bias by John Bolton, the U.S.
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, concluded his report
by confirming Iran’s non-diversion of nuclear material for weaponization purposes. This
key judgment by the IAEA, much to Washington’s chagrin, put Iran in the ballpark as far
as its compliance with the NPT was concerned. El Baradaei wrote, “to date, there is no
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evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities ... were related to
a nuclear weapons program,” before adding the caveat, “However, given Iran’s past
pattern of concealment, it will take some time before the Agency is able to conclude that
Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.”430 The IAEA report had
significant impact in decelerating the militarization drift of the INP in the mid-2000s.
The second component of Iran’s de-securitization campaign was even more
unprecedented and unorthodox for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In early May 2003, the
Iranian Government sent, through the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, a secret proposal to
Washington, with the apparent blessing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The
comprehensive proposal’s objective was to try and “test the waters for a ‘grand bargain’
with Washington, a rapprochement along the lines of Nixon’s China strategy.” The stepby-step proposal’s long-term goal was to deescalate Iran-U.S. relations from one of
ideologically driven, wholesale animosity to a realistic negotiation compartmentalized
into manageable wish and woe lists. The Iranians believed that such a problem-solving
approach would pave the way for a breakthrough in the vicious circle of mutual
exclusivity in defining national interests between Iran and the US and contribute to an
atmospheric change where cooler heads on both sides could prevail. The Bush
Administration, however, spurned the Iranian offer, apparently due to the premature
triumphalism unleashed by the "Mission Accomplished" moment in Iraq. Even if it was
no more than obliquely expressed, buried in Tehran's unofficial offer was an
unprecedented readiness to disengage Iran's national security interests from its nuclear
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program and forge a nuclear-free modus vivendi with the United States in the Middle
East.431
On a balanced reading, the Khatami administration’s de-securitization campaign
fell well short of making an enduring dent in what seemed to be turning into the INP’s
institutionalized securitization in the international system. One can hardly overstate the
domestic political cost of the grand bargain’s failure for President Khatami and his proWest reformist camp. As far as Iran’s anti-West conservatives were concerned, the
unreciprocated unclenching of fist by Khatami on Iran’s nuclear program essentially
vindicated Ayatollah Khamenei’s long-held conviction that the INP was simply a tool of
convenience opportunistically wielded by the United States to engineer regime change in
Tehran.
In the meantime, Khatami’s transparency policy with the IAEA was producing
sub-optimal results under the mounting pressure applied by the United States. The June
17, 2004 report by the IAEA was especially strongly worded and lamented the fact that
"Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely, and proactive as it should have been.”432
As the international institutional pressure on Iran was escalating, Tel Aviv and
Washington were employing the language of kinetic force as an antidote to Tehran’s
seemingly recalcitrant nuclear behavior with more frequency and visibility. The IAEA
was also coming under increasing pressure by Washington to refer Iran’s nuclear dossier
to the UN Security Council for the imposition of targeted sanctions under Chapter VII of
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the UN Charter, a scenario Iran was endeavoring to avoid at all cost without appearing
intimidated.
In the meantime, the EU’s role on the INP in this period was reduced to delaying
the physical militarization of the nuclear faceoff between Tehran and Washington-Tel
Aviv axis. IAEA Director General Mohamed Elbaradei later recalled a conversation
between him, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, and German Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer when the Europeans told him, “the EU-3 [the UK, Germany and France] was
trying to act as a kind of ‘human shield,’ through their dialogue with Iran, to protect
against the risk of military action by the United States or Israel.”433
Ahmadinejad’s Nuclear Obsession
In mid 2005, as the Bush Administration’s WMD rationale for the Iraq war was
proving nothing more than a deliberate subterfuge for regime change, the “Coalition of
the Willing” was showing all symptoms of breaking apart, the post-invasion Iraq was
turning into a full-blown military and diplomatic quagmire for the United States, and
Iran’s encirclement fears were dissipating, President Khatami’s seemingly lenient posture
toward the West on the INP came under scathing criticism in Iran’s conservative power
corridors. The cumulative result of these determinants was a presidential campaign run
by the conservatives on the nuclear self-determination platform.
As part of this strategy, a perennial theme in presidential-hopeful Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad’s numerous stump speeches during his 2005-election campaign was to
castigate the reformists’ unreciprocated pandering to the West on the INP. After a
firebrand Ahmadinejad assumed Iran’s presidency in 2005, Tehran’s nuclear attitude

433

Mohamed Elbaradaei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times (New York,
NY: Metropolitan Books, 2011).

244

entered an era of nuclear flamboyancy and saber rattling, a drastic departure from
President Khatami’s period when Tehran was meticulously endeavoring to avoid being
relegated into an international outcast. Having made the reformists’ allegedly fainthearted nuclear policy into something of a campaign manifesto, the new President found
himself with no choice but to allow nuclear brandishing brand and govern his foreign
policy as well.
Veteran political observers inside and outside Iran were offering different
narratives on who the new President’s nuclear exhibitionism was and what to make of the
reckless and provocative rhetoric coming out of Tehran nearly three decades into what
was generally perceived to be a maturing Revolution. Whatever the private reasoning
behind this strategy, one can hardly overstate the securitizing implications of such
nuclear flamboyancy for the Islamic Republic in the Ahmadinejad era.
President Ahmadinejad’s facilitating role in accelerating the drift of the INP
toward the militarization extreme was not limited to his nuclear revisionism though. A
few months into his new post, the President touched off an international outcry against
Iran by advocating the elimination of the state of Israel “off the map” and calling into
question the existence of the Holocaust in October and November 2005, respectively.
Following these perplexingly unorthodox remarks, even for Iran’s rather unwonted
domestic political scene, the notion of “nuclear holocaust” figured with credibility in the
international discourse on the INP. The net result was an unprecedented mobilization at
the international level behind the designation of Iran’s nuclear program as an imminent
international threat.
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Within this context, the President’s inflammatory rhetoric simply conferred
credibility on the Israeli argument that an Iranian nuclear capability was not simply an
existential threat to the Jewish state, rather it constituted an international challenge that
called for the full energy of the international community. Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric also
tremendously granted Tel Aviv and Washington the luxury of sustaining and
mainstreaming the language of kinetic action against Iran in absence of any “smoking
gun” evidence on the existence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran.
Iran’s IAEA and UNSC Dilemma
While Ahmadinejad’s harsh and anachronistic rhetoric was helping galvanize
global public opinion against Iran’s nuclear effort, international institutional
securitization of the INP was facing decreasing obstacles. At this point, the EU, for all
practical purposes, had lost almost all credibility with the Iranians to hold in check, let
alone reverse, the energized momentum of the INP toward militarization. Europe’s
debilitated status became even more evident in August 2005 when its highly publicized
incentives package (aimed at perpetuating Iran’s suspension of indigenous enrichment
activities) was deemed by Tehran smacking of the Old Continent’s colonial legacy. As a
matter of fact, Tehran found the EU proposal so “insulting in its language and paltry in its
benefits”434 that it actually incentivized Iran to terminate its suspension of uranium
conversion activities at the ENTEC in Isfahan.
The IAEA Board of Governors’ reaction to Iran’s decision was to up the ante in
its September 24, 2005 report by claiming “Iran’s many failures and breaches of its
obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement constitute non compliance in
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the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute.”435 The trigger word “noncompliance” in the report paved the way for Iran’s referral to the United Nations Security
Council and officially marked the end of an era of appeasement in Iran’s nuclear policy.
From then on, Iran and the United States-Israel axis were engaged in a delicate game of
chicken while Europe was standing idly by.
Iran shot back to the Board decision by announcing, on January 3, 2006 its
intention to resume its uranium enrichment Research and Development activities at the
Natanz pilot facility. The result of this upwardly spiraling chain of events was a nonunanimous decision by IAEA Board on February 4, 2006 to refer Iran’s nuclear file to the
UNSC. Tehran, determined not to appear buckling under pressure, retaliated by scaling
back its policy of détente with the IAEA even further. On February 14, 2006 Tehran
announced its suspension of implementing the Additional Protocol. Tehran’s referral to
the UNSC gave even more credibility to speculations, already in wide international
circulation, that the United States was pursuing a carefully cultivated policy of “courting
failure” on the INP to set the stage for taking kinetic action against the Iranian regime
and, with any luck, decapitate it.
Washington’s obstinate position that Iran suspend all enrichment activities as a
precondition for negotiating with Tehran to start and the Bush Administration’s
unreasonable insistence on Iran scuttling the entirety of its pilot-scale uranium
enrichment R&D activities were vivid manifestation of this bellicose posture. In the
words of the IAEA Director General, “‘not one centrifuge’ had taken on vast importance
for those Beltway ideologues who saw the United States as a global disciplinarian and
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who listened only to one another, perpetuating beliefs that were utterly removed from
reality.”436
With no easing of Washington’s humiliating prerequisites to talk to Tehran in
sight, the E-3 took another shot at wooing Tehran back onto a diplomatic track. This time
around, the E-3 initiative, enjoying the support of the five UNSC permanent members (P5), consisted of a fairly intriguing incentives package that would address a good chunk of
Tehran’s nuclear demands short of indigenous enrichment and reprocessing. Just as
expected, however, the proposal had an infinitesimal chance to succeed in the face of
formidable securitizing forces pounding on the INP and symbolized by the phrase “all
options are on the table,” as President Bush was fond of repeating. Under such stifling
circumstances, Tehran was not even given enough time (Tehran wanted until August 22,
2006 to mull over the details) to formally submit its final response.
On July 31, 2006 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1696 under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter demanding Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities and work out its
outstanding issues with the IAEA. Reference to Article 41 of Chapter VII in the
resolution sent an unmistakable message to Tehran: the INP had been catapulted to an
international security threat, the international institutional process on addressing the INP
was more political than legal-technical, and the IAEA’s de-securitizing capacity was
drastically curtailed.
The head of the IAEA later put the irreversible impact of UNSC Resolution 1696
in most illuminating terms: “In my view, Security Council Resolution 1696 was not only
counterproductive from a policy perspective, but also a misuse of the council’s authority
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under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was staggering to compare the difference in
treatment of North Korea and Iran. North Korea had walked out of the NPT and made
explicit threats about developing nuclear weapons, yet the Americans were ready to join
them in a direct dialogue…. By contrast, Iran… was penalized for possibly having future
intentions to develop nuclear weapons…”437
Under such hyper-securitized conditions, rendered more complex with the Israelis
beating the drum for an imminent military strike unless the UN sanctions regime on Iran
kept tightening and expanding and Iran’s Arab periphery secretly imploring Washington
to “cut off the head of the snake” by striking Iran438, the IAEA and EU-3’s diplomatic
dexterity hit insurmountable roadblocks and yielded no breakthroughs. Shortly thereafter,
on December 3, 2006 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1737 under Article 41, Chapter VII
of the UN Charter introducing a fresh set of sanctions against private and legal entities
involved in Iran’s "proliferation sensitive” activities. These punitive measures were
intensified and expanded on March 24, 2007 with UNSC Resolution 1747.
In the meantime, the INP had picked up enough securitization energy to move
forward on its own momentum. Now, talk of military attack on Iran was well on its way
to become a mainstream issue in the U.S. foreign policy discourse on Iran. The increasing
frequency with which President Bush, Secretary Rice, and Vice President Cheney, among
others, utilized the code word for a conventional or, for that matter, nuclear war against
Iran, “all options are on the table,” was testimony to this atmosphere.
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As all the de-securitizing actors of the INP seemed utterly exhausted and on the
defensive, the U.S. intelligence community put a pause on the galloping pace of the INP
toward a military conflict. On December 3, 2007 President Bush authorized, with delay
and reluctance, the release of a declassified version of the NIE drafted in November 2007
and entitled: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The NIE, “the Intelligence
Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national security issues
designed to help US civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national
security interests,” was unmistakably emphatic in its key “high confidence” judgment
that “in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.”439
The release of this document threw into sharp relief the reality gap in the
mainstream American and international discourse on the INP where Tehran’s
determination to weaponize its nuclear capability had turned into something of an article
of faith. NIE 2007 was a seminal document on several fronts. First, its counterintuitive
key judgment indicated the intelligence community’s success in de-politicizing its
intelligence judgments following the Iraq fiasco and restoring its credibility and
objectivity. Second, it’s judgment that Iran had halted its weaponization activities in 2003
vindicated the hardheaded foreign policy realists who had long insisted Iran’s alleged
nuclear weapons program was directed against the Baath regime in Iraq and not Israel.
Third, the timing of Iran’s cessation of nuclear weapons activities, following the toppling
of Saddam’s regime in 2003, demonstrated that Iran’s nuclear behavior was rational and
prone to cost-benefit calculations. Naturally, this meant that Iran was a deterrable actor
even in a nuclear context.
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Just as expected, realizing the long-term implications of NIE 2007 in demilitarizing the political discourse about Iran in Washington, the securitizing agents and
actors of the INP quickly sprang into action questioning the credibility of the coordinated
judgment of the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies. Peter Hoekstra, a Republican congressman
and the former chairman of the House Intelligence Committee called the 2007 NIE “a
piece of trash.” A livid President Bush later termed the document as “eye-popping,”
lamenting its deleterious impact on the securitizing “momentum” of the INP.440 The
neoconservatives in the Bush Administration were mainly concerned that the report
would undo the accumulation of pressure on Iran, would inject second thoughts into the
international community’s judgments on the credibility of the U.S. President’s
proliferation judgments and threat perceptions, and would make the consensus building
process to tighten the noose on the Iranian regimes more arduous.
The public venting of anger over the results of the NIE 2007, was arguably the
most vivid manifestation of the widening gap between clinical intelligence on the INP
and the expectations of the politicians in charge. In the meantime, as far as the Islamic
Republic was concerned, the NIE’s confirmation of Iran’s suspension of its nuclear
weapons program, its delayed and reluctant publication by the Bush administration, and a
lack of visible change in Washington’s rhetoric vis-à-vis Tehran following its release
were all signs that the nuclear was simply a pretextual issue and the securitization of the
INP had nonfactual underpinnings.
A most visible sign the securitization of the INP had grown fact-resistant was the
adoption, on March 3, 2008 of yet another UNSC Resolution (1803) under Article 41 of
the UN Charter extending and escalating the previous rounds of punitive measures. This
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was followed, on September 27, 2008 by UNSC Resolution 1835 that further expanded
the scope of entities subjected to UN sanctions and tasked Iran with proving “the
exclusively peaceful nature of “ its nuclear program to the international community if it
wanted to “be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon.” The
speedy adoption of these resolutions helped solidify the notion in Tehran that the UNSC
was completely devoid of any de-securitizing agency when it came to dealing with the
INP as it was hopelessly politicized.
Iran, having given up all hope on institutional international mechanisms to
prevent the militarization of its nuclear enterprise à la Iraq, was testing the waters to turn
to the United States directly. However, as this approach was being worked out, there
appeared a fundamental and growing gap on the nuclear issue, at both diagnosis and
remedy levels, between the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. This
discrepancy essentially boiled down to the fact that whereas president Ahmadinejad
viewed the nuclear dispute as inextricably intertwined with the broader context and
legacy of Iran-US relations, the Supreme Leader favored viewing those as two separable,
if not already discrete, issues. From Khamenei’s perspective, the nuclear crisis was a
marginal issue that was only incidental to Iran’s hardcore grievances with the West. One
can analyze President Ahmadinejad’s persistent attempts to forge a rapprochement with
Washington, despite never enjoying the Supreme Leader’s public blessing, during both
Bush and Obama administrations within this context. Under the prevailing conditions,
President Ahmadinejad’s multiple efforts at incorporating the nuclear issue into part of a
package security deal with the United States did not succeed as they never received the

252

Supreme Leader’s definitive green light and as the Bush Administration was approaching
the end of its lame-duck year in office.
INP’s Covert Militarization and Domestic De-Nationalization
The election of President Barak Obama injected a guarded sense of optimism into
Iran’s leadership on the prospects for a de-militarized Iranian relationship with the United
States and to resolve the INP standoff. Viewed from Tehran, President Obama’s Iran
policy seemed one of impressing on the Iranians that the Unites States was willing to
drop the language of regime change, cultivate a strategic sub-nuclear modus vivendi with
them, and find, through aggressive direct diplomacy, a non-coercive solution for the INP.
More importantly, the Iranians publicly appreciated the fact that the new President was
deliberately distancing the U.S. from the maximalist “suspension before negotiation”
position of the Bush Administration. That position had struck the Iranians as a sinister
plot to lend more international credence to and cloak the underlying strategy of “regime
change” by Washington.
President Obama’s INP policy got off to a lethargic start, however, as the task of
cleaning up after his predecessor’s twin wars in Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with the
financial meltdown on the home front and severe global economic recession consumed
much of the President’s attention. Another factor in this regard was the unchanged status
of the NIE 2007’s key judgments and intelligence reports that Iran’s commercial-scale
enrichment operations at Natanz had hit technical snags. As a result, Gregory Schulte, the
U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency under Bush, stayed in his
position well into Obama’s first year as president until June 2009.

253

As the new Administration was getting ready to put into action its more pragmatic
Iran policy by directly engaging the top Iranian leadership (Obama sent a letter directly to
the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei), Iran’s domestic political scene went through a
tumultuous transformation. In June 2009, a botched up presidential election significantly
eroded the united front Tehran had been strenuously trying to put up vis-à-vis the
international scene. Following the post-election upheavals, Mir Hossein Mousavi, the
one-time Prime Minister and presidential hopeful emerged, for the first time in Iran’s
nuclear history, as a domestic opposition figure who had the capacity to challenge and
undo the state’s nuclear judgments and decisions with long-term consequentiality. The
fact that the Green Movement leader’s nuclear attitude was more hawkish than that of the
incumbent firebrand Ahmadinejad, in some experts’ view, warranted caution in lending
unqualified support to Mousavi, whose name received mention in the U.S. intelligence
community’s memoranda as one of the founding fathers of the post Revolution INP.
Following the election crisis, the Ahmadinejad Administration, with its domestic
legitimacy compromised and his image deeply scarred, was scrambling to score a
substantial foreign policy victory to reassert its credentials. This led to Iran’s surprisingly
lenient posture on the nuclear issue in 2009 when Tehran agreed in October to ship a
whopping 75 percent of the 4000 lbs LEU in its possession to Russia and France to be
converted into 20% enriched fuel plates Iran needed for the Tehran Nuclear Research
Reactor.441 Faced with Mousavi’s blistering criticism of the deal as “squandering away”
Iran’s nuclear gains, a humbled Ahmadinejad backed out of the agreement and publicly
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accused Mousavi of throwing a monkey wrench into the government’s foreign policy
decisions.
In this period, one could see the embryonic signs of the de-nationalization of the
INP following the election crisis where the nationally electrifying effect of nuclear
program seemed teetering on the brink of dissipation. The opposition “Green Movement”
that grew out of Mousavi’s ill-fated presidential bid even came close to presenting a
domestic securitization challenge to Iran’s nuclear program with some self-appointed
prominent Green figures referring to the INP as an anti-democratic enterprise being
imposed on the Iranian people by an authoritarian regime. This securitizing move,
however, fizzled out rather quickly in no small part thanks to Mousavi’s hawkish stance
on the nuclear swap deal.
Following the election fallout, Ahmadinejad’s nuclear obsession also came under
mounting pressure by the right-wing traditional principlists (osoolgarayan-e sonnat-i)
who took the president to task for reducing the Iranian Revolution and the political
system that came out of it to the nuclear standoff with the West. Their argument was that
Iran’s recognition (as a regional power) should be premised upon the more fundamental
and durable virtues the Iranian Revolution stood for, (like justice, freedom, and selfdetermination) rather than being consumed, contaminated, and exhausted by some
nuclear saber rattling with the West.
In the meantime, further complicating nuclear deal-making with Iran following
the 2009 elections was the highly dynamic state of affairs in Tehran and the President’s
substantially emasculated credentials, dubious legitimacy, and uncertain hold on power.
Now the question was whether Ahmadinejad could still be treated as an authoritative
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interlocutor on Iran’s nuclear program. The fallout from the 2009 elections and the
overwhelming pressure applied to the Obama White House by the U.S. Congress and
domestic public opinion to put America on the right side of history and side with the
opposition Green Movement essentially meant that Obama’s pragmatism was dead on
arrival. This situation left the President with no choice but to follow in the footsteps of
his predecessor. At about the same time, a deluge of reports started leaking to the
mainstream media that the U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies had furnished the IAEA
with incriminating evidence alleging Iran had conducted recent weaponization studies on
its nuclear program. These reports further torpedoed any hope for charting an alternative
path to deal the INP. The result was the continuation of the United States’ broad strategy
to put the INP on a securitized path at the international institutional and state levels.
A significant even further consolidated the Obama Administration’s change of
mind, if not heart, about the INP toward late 2009. In September 2009, Tehran revealed
to the IAEA its almost completion of a secret enrichment facility, known as the Fordow
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), buried some 265 underground near the city of Qom. Once
fully operational, the facility’s depth would, according to some estimates, put it beyond
Israel’s conventional bunker-busting capabilities to take it out. Fordow’s proximity to the
holy city of Qom would also make a nuclear operation against it look like a countervalue
(city-busting) strike. The combination of these factors would essentially grant Iran the
capability to deter by denial an Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities. From this point on,
the language of “zone of immunity” entered the Israeli conversation on Iran’s nuclear
program, a moment when Iran’s nuclear facilities would be physically shielded against a
successful attack.
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Iran-Turkey-Brazil Axis
In May 2010, Iran launched its last offensive aimed at garnering much-needed
foreign policy credibility for a legitimacy-deficient President Ahmadinejad and diffusing
the mounting talk of an eventual strike by Israel with or without Washington’s consent.
Brzail, an emerging “diplomatic giant” with permanent membership aspirations at the UN
and Turkey with a neo-Ottomanist paradigm shift toward the East under the stewardship
of Prime Minister Erdogan became active interlocutors in Iran’s nuclear dossier in 2010.
The two countries, with discrete regional and international agendas, found the INP a
once-in-a-blue-moon opportunity that comes medium-sized powers’ way to punch above
their actual weight.
Turkey, anxious to utilize its “strategic depth” as prescribed in the doctrine
promulgated by political scientist turned Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, became
especially active on Iran’s nuclear conversation in 2010. As a matter of fact, Ankara’s
relations with Tehran became so cordial under Davutoglu that, for the first time since
1979, Turkey removed Iran from the list of strategic threat countries in the 2010 edition
of Turkey’s main national security document, the so-called Red Book. This development
coupled with the addition of Israel to the “threat list” gave Ankara unique credentials - as
a regional Muslim state- to sway Tehran’s nuclear calculus toward a more conciliatory
path.
Brazil complemented Turkey in diffusing the gathering storm on the INP. As a
one-time nuclear defiant Brasilia had been on the receiving end of what it perceived was
a discriminatory non-proliferation regime in the 1970s and 1980s before it finally came
clean with its secret nuclear weapons program in the 1990s and acceded to the NPT in
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1998. As two-time Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim later recalled, this legacy
enabled Brasilia to reflect on the INP and argue with Tehran from a position of sympathy.
Particularly appealing to the Iranians was President Lula and FM Amorim’s stance on the
imperativeness of recognizing “Iran’s right to develop her own peaceful nuclear program,
including her capacity to enrich uranium” as “the missing link” in the West’s approach to
the INP.
From Amorim’s perspective, such recognition would give Iran the much-needed
assurance that it would not be indefinitely discriminated against because of its clandestine
nuclear activities in the past if it adopted a full-disclosure policy going forward. Likening
Iran’s position to someone whose credit card had been suspended due to payment default,
Amorim believed Iran’s non-proliferation creditworthiness should not be “stripped
forever” once it rectified its suspect past. In some pointed and charged remarks, bound to
be music to Tehran’s ears, he went on saying, “just as one should not be deprived of
access to credit because of religion or race—or even because one lives in a ‘bad
neighborhood’ (the analogy holds)—a country cannot be deprived of access to a
technology because it is Muslim or is situated in a dangerous region, especially if one of
its neighbors is known to possess not only the same technology, but the actual
weapons.”442
Within this atmosphere of camaraderie, in the Tehran Declaration jointly issued
by Turkey, Brazil, and Iran on May 17, 2010, the parties reaffirmed “the right” of the
Tehran to all nuclear fuel cycle activities including uranium enrichment. Tehran, on the
other hand, demonstrated unexpected flexibility to swap 1200 kilograms of its LEU in
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exchange for 120 kilograms of 20% enriched plates required to fuel the Tehran Research
Reactor.443 Arguably, the most significant aspect of the Declaration was Iran’s consent to
deposit more than fifty percent of its LEU in Turkey in one tranche, a significant
departure from its earlier rejection to transfer its LEU stockpile to foreign territory. This
agreement, however, failed to make much de-securitizing dent in the INP as the Obama
Administration refused to endorse its provisions and chose, instead, to forge ahead with a
new and escalating set of punitive measures against Iran. As ElBaradi later wrote in his
memoires, Washington’s nonchalant dismissal of the Tehran Declaration was yet another
sign, “The West refused to take yes for an answer.”444
INP Enters Kinetic Militarization Zone
With the INP deeply ensconced in the military extreme of the securitization
spectrum, Iran’s nuclear program came under a host of unconventional attacks. The
general perception in Washington and Tel Aviv was that if the program couldn’t be
knocked off its feet, it could at least be knocked off its stride while more comprehensive
solution were being conceptualized. The subversive measures that included, among other
things, cyber warfare (e.g. the Stuxnet virus attack), sabotage, and targeted assassination
of Iranian nuclear scientists picked pace and became increasingly aggressive after mid2010. According to analysts, in absence of an attractive military option in the near term
the United States and Israel had settled for the intensification of these “measure short of
war” in 2010 to retard Iran’s crossing of the proverbial “point of no return.”
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An alternative view, however, was that the cumulative impact of these
unconventional measures-- along with an ever-stiffening sanctions regime and the
singling out of Iran in the Obama Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as the
only non-nuclear weapons state subjected to a nuclear strike by the US—actually
constituted a curtain-raiser to a full-blown military attack on Iran by modulating its shock
value. This view was partially based on the Iraqi experience with the UN where
successive resolutions demonstrated how quantity (11 UNSC resolutions) could turn into
quality (the 2003 invasion). Whatever the private reason behind these covert measures,
their accumulative impact demonstrated that the INP had already entered the kinetic
extreme of militarization in 2010, only one step removed from an all-out military
confrontation.
The INP also came under some domestic securitizing pressure in 2011 following
the March 11 tsunami in Japan and the partial core meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant. As the incident deeply stigmatized nuclear energy and cast a
shadow over its future sustainability, the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) set up a blue ribbon
committee whose official mandate was to investigate the delay in commissioning the
BNPP, but which had a broader agenda: soul-searching on the issue of nuclear energy in
Iran. In April 2011, Hassan Ghafouri Fard, a nuclear expert and chair of the investigative
committee, in some unprecedented public remarks, called for mothballing the BNPP
indefinitely as its high capital cost had rendered it uncompetitive compared to building a
new plant from scratch.
In the meantime, the INP hyper-securitizers saw in the global nuclear abolitionist
movement that grew out of the “Fukushima factor” yet another opportunity to question
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the expediency of the BNPP in a seismically active region in southwestern Iran. Lacking
incontrovertible technical credibility, this securitizing move had a fleeting lifespan,
though, as the BNPP went critical on May 8, 2011.
Furthermore, in 2011 the INP became the passive beneficiary of the Arab Spring
as the democratic whirlwinds in the Middle East and North Africa pushed the Iranian
nuclear program onto the backburner of the United States’ strategic foreign policy
priorities. The Arab Spring’s de-securitizing energy, however, proved no match for the
INP as Tehran’s nuclear effort assumed newfound significance in late 2011. On
November 8, 2011, in a report to the IAEA Board, Yukiya Amano, Director General of
the International Atomic Energy Agency used the unverified intelligence provided by the
United States and Israel, previously deemed of dubious authenticity by the IAEA under
ElBaradaei, as incriminating evidence Iran was on a structured path to nuclear
weaponization. The report claimed a range of activities carried out by Iran that were
deemed “relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.” These included
“efforts… to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military
related individuals and entities; efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production
of nuclear material; the acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and
documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network; and work on the development
of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components.”445
The report, both in its letter and spirit, demonstrated how quickly the ElBaradaei
legacy had grown undone and the extent to which the IAEA’s judgments on Iran under
the new Director General had fallen in line with the securitizing actors of the INP. The
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result was a candid outcry of accusations of duplicity, lack of credibility, and doublestandard from the INP’s now sizable epistemic community. Arguably the most trenchant
critique came from Robert Kelley, a nuclear engineer and the IAEA's chief weapons
inspector in Iraq, who called the report “highly misleading” and accused the IAEA of
having fallen victim to a “misinformation campaign” that was leading the international
community “by the nose.” For Kelly, “the way the data [had] been presented” in the
November 2011 report produced “a sickly sense of déjà vu,” reminiscent of the prelude to
the 2003 Iraq War.446 The Amano report was also in direct contradiction with the latest
U.S. National Intelligence Estimate 2010 on the INP that essentially repeated the key
judgments of NIE 2007.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Over the span of some five decades since its inception, Iran’s nuclear program is
still far from full-fledged fruition. This has turned the INP into the most expensive and
longest civilian nuclear program in the making in the world, the most politicized
enterprise in Iran’s history, and a development that has internationalized Iran’s domestic
scene like never before.
Panoramically viewed, the story of the Iranian nuclear program has been one of
progressively moving on the securitization spectrum toward kinetic militarization. The
opening salvo of the securitization trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program could be traced
back to May 1974 when India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion triggered a fundamental
change of heart in Washington on the Atoms for Peace Program’s long-term
sustainability, imbued indigenous nuclear enterprises with proliferation concerns, and
cast doubt on the effectiveness and sufficiency of the international non-proliferation
regime’s safeguards to detect, much less deter, clandestine diversion of nuclear material
from civilian nuclear facilities.
The coincidence of such a massive overhaul in proliferation thinking in
Washington with the Shah’s full-fledged nuclear bid marked the beginning of the
designation of the INP as a proliferation concern. These U.S. concerns were only
accentuated in the mid-1970s once set against the backdrop of the Monarch’s rapid
morphosis into a “national security leader”, his high security expectations, and windfall
petrodollars that made HIM’s military and nuclear extravaganza financially feasible.
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As these generic factors were defining the broader contours of the securitization
package of Iran’s nuclear enterprise in the mid-1970s, Tehran’s premature insistence on
indigenously possessing the full nuclear fuel cycle further heightened Washington’s
proliferation concerns. The Shah’s cavalier attitude toward Tehran’s NPT commitments
and his thinly disguised irritation at the existing international nuclear order (exemplified
by Iran’s outright indignation at its exclusion from The Nuclear Suppliers Group), only
helped intensify Washington’s apprehensions. Further fueling the securitization drift of
the INP in the mid 1970s was a perceived lack of proportionality between Tehran’s
declared long-term civilian nuclear ambitions and the Iranian economy’s absorptive
capacity to actually utilize them.
On a balanced reading, an argument can be made that although the macro
architecture of the international system, defined by the arch rivalry between the US and
the USSR, exercised a dampening impact on the full-blown designation of the INP as a
proliferation threat, the securitization drift of the INP started in the mid-1970s. After the
Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran’s adoption of the policy of neither east nor west (na
sharqi na qarbi) substantially removed this de-securitizing impediment at the systemic
level and Iran’s war born nuclear awakening during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) came
under mounting securitization especially by the United States.
Over the years after the 1979, a revisionist Tehran’s declared policy of exporting
its revolution to the Middle East and, concomitant with it, Iran’s ties to violent non-state
actors in the Middle East set the stage for the contextualization of the INP within
international terrorism. In the 1990s Iran’s efforts to acquire ballistic missile technology
and it’s clandestine nuclear procurement activities on the black market further intensified
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the proliferation concerns of the United States and pushed Tehran deeper into the
militarization extreme of the securitization spectrum. By the late 1990s, one could argue,
the securitization of the INP was, by and large, institutionalized and a host of state, nonstate, and organizational actors were couching Tehran’s nuclear efforts in proliferation
terms. By the early 2000s, the securitization framework of the INP had grown so
hegemonic that a technocrat President Rafsanjani and a reformist President Khatami’s
efforts to bring Iran back into the international fold proved no match for dismantling this
template. In the early 1990s Iran’s policy of throwing its weight behind derailing the
Middle East peace process catapulted Israel onto the forefront of an internationalizing
securitizing campaign vis-à-vis the INP.
Although Tehran’s efforts at adopting a full-disclosure nuclear policy and its
more generic détente policy toward the Middle East after the defeat of its archenemy
Saddam Hussain in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War bore some moderate desecuritization fruits, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the September 11
attacks of 2001, neutralized those gains and threw Iran back into the foreground of
international proliferation concerns. Tehran’s inclusion by the George Bush
Administration in the so-called axis-of-evil was the most vivid manifestation of the INP’s
elevated placement in US national security anxieties. The presidency of Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad in 2005 further consolidated this prioritization as the new president
reversed Tehran’s conciliatory posture toward the international non-proliferation regime,
exemplified by Tehran’s suspension of its enrichment activities as a confidence building
measure. Ahmadinejad’s unorthodox inflammatory rhetoric on Israel only helped
intensify the securitization of the INP and its unprecedented galloping toward
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militarization in the late 2000s. Now the INP’s securitization template had grown so
powerful that even the U.S. intelligence community’s consensus verdict (NIE 2007) that
Iran had halted the weaponization component of its nuclear program did little to make a
dent it.
With the first decade of the 2000s coming to a close, the securitization of the INP
was progressively moving toward kinetic militarization. The most significant
manifestation of this kinetic phase was the unfolding of a full-fledged covert warfare
characterized by kidnapping and targeted assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists and a
cyber warfare against Iran’s nuclear facilities. The highly politicized IAEA’s November
2011 report on Iran (long on speculative extrapolations and short on factual/physical
judgments) and the subsequent ratcheting up of Israel’s international pressure campaign
that the INP was approaching the so-called “zone of immunity”, where a conventional
military strike would prove incapable of taking out Iran’s nuclear facilities especially in
the deep underground Fordow uranium enrichment site, is a most vivid indication of how
perilously close the INP has come to being subjected to a massive military strike.
This ever expanding and deepening trend of the INP’s securitization leads one to
speculate that unless a comprehensive international de-securitization of the INP takes
place (through regime change or a drastic change of heart in Tehran, both unlikely
scenarios in the foreseeable future) the securitization juggernaut of Iran’s nuclear
program would erupt into a de-proliferating military operation on Tehran.
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